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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE UNIVERSITY SEMINAR MOVEMENT AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

I. The Origin of the University Seminar Movement [1]

THE formal beginning of the University Seminar movement at Columbia University can be dated from March 8, 1944, when nineteen members of the Faculties of Philosophy and Political Science sent a joint letter to Dr. Frank Fackenthal, then Acting President, suggesting the establishment of a series of *permanent* seminars. This proposal was in some measure the result of many years of heart-searching discussions, first by the Woodbridge Committee, appointed by President Butler some years before the Second World War, and later by a special committee under the leadership of Professor Philip C. Jessup.

Professor Edgar G. Miller describes the activities of this second committee in the following words:

> In the winter of 1940-41, the world was in as much a mess as now, and the University was terribly worried. President Butler asked Jessup to ask the University to get conscious. The point of view on which that original thinking started was that the university scholars as individual scholars were contributing heavily to the world. Here on Morningside Heights our concentration of special knowledge, and adding New York City, was pretty hot. Was there any way of bringing this specialized

[1] There is a widespread feeling that the present name is misleading. These new institutions are not properly seminars. It has been suggested that we call them Fellowships, Academies, Institutes, or what seems the most generally favored name, *Collegia*. If adopted, then they could be described as the Collegia at Columbia University, and each separate association would then be the Collegium on the State, Religion, Professions, and so on.

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knowledge, apart from individual efforts, into focus on problems presented to the University and to the world? The technique was the problem. Butler appointed a committee with no name. It became the program committee on the University project. It met for over a year, trying to find out a method of focusing details transcending any one department or discipline, or any one conceivably wise man. We flunked the project completely. There was a dream that we could add a new function. Creation, preservation, and transmission of knowledge was the University's job. If we could only create something to focus these things and transcend the lines. It was a dismal failure, but with indirect values all around. About six years ago the Faculty of Political Science dreamed up this seminar thing—the best answer available. The problem that originally sparked the whole thing —the ability to focus on a problem—is really the reason for the seminars.[2]

It is interesting to note that an outline of the University Seminar idea was made before this committee by the member of the faculty who in 1944 drafted the letter to Acting President Fackenthal. Mr. Fackenthal deserves the greatest credit for this development at Columbia.

The letter follows:

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK

Department of History March 8, 1944

Memorandum to: Mr. Frank Fackenthal
From the Undersigned:

Professor William L. Westermann	Professor Wesley C. Mitchell
Professor Harry J. Carman	Professor Ralph Linton
Professor James T. Shotwell	Professor Arthur W. Macmahon
Professor Horatio Smith	Professor John H. Randall
Professor Robert L. Schuyler	Professor James Gutmann
Professor Horace L. Friess	Professor Philip C. Jessup
Professor Herbert W. Schneider	Professor Leo Wolman
Professor John A. Krout	Professor Joseph P. Chamberlain
Professor Schuyler C. Wallace	Professor Frederick C. Mills
Professor Frank Tannenbaum	

[2] From the mimeographed Report on University Seminars for 1950, p. 5.

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The undersigned, in response to your letter of February 15, 1944, wish respectfully to submit the following proposal for a series of permanent seminars within the Faculty of Political Science. These seminars are conceived of as being, in effect, permanent, independent organisms within the Faculty cutting across all departments and calling for cooperative participation from scholars in various fields. It is proposed that in addition to the existing facilities for study and research provided by the Faculty of Political Science and by the other faculties through courses and seminars given by individual professors, the University announce the establishment of perhaps no more than half a dozen seminars devoted to the study of some of the basic institutions continuous in human society, such, for instance, as the state, war, the organization of labor including the history of slavery, crime, or such ever-present issues as conflict between church and state, friction between urban and rural areas, or the human family. Each seminar would, therefore, be devoted to the continuous study of one of the basic human institutions. These institutions are more comprehensive than any course or any department and reach beyond the present organization of any faculty.

The professors grouped in this type of seminar could be considered as the continuous, intellectual servitors of a permanent institution. It would be their privilege and their task to explore the history and unravel the complex and manifold influences of such an institution. An example perhaps would illustrate the point. Crime, for instance, is as eternal as human society. It has been part and parcel of human development and its ramifications touch every phase of the social structure. A properly staffed seminar on crime would include as a minimum the following personnel: the historian, sociologist, psychiatrist, educator, political scientist interested in municipal problems, lawyer specializing in criminal law, anthropologist interested in crime amongst primitive peoples, and specialists concerned with judicial administration and police and penal administration. Even so the list is probably not complete. It is obvious from the above that the institution of crime is bigger than the Department of Sociology.

Another instance would be a seminar on slavery with which some of the signers of this memorandum have had experience. Slavery as a system of the organization of labor has been a practically continuous institution in the history of man. A proper

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seminar in this field would include an historian, economist, political scientist, sociologist, lawyer interested in the civil law, anthropologist, and perhaps others. It is again obvious that the institution of slavery is greater than the Department of History or the Department of Economics. Another illustration would be the history of the state, which ordinarily falls within the province of political science or philosophy. But a seminar on the history of the state that would attempt to study the ramifications of the state as an institution would include a philosopher interested in political theory, an economist interested in taxation, a political scientist especially interested in the civil service and bureaucracy, a geographer, an historian, a lawyer interested in public law and probably one interested in international law. Again the list is obviously incomplete. Again it is clear that the institution of the state is greater than any department or than any professor in any department.

We have probably said enough to indicate the type of organisms we wish to see established in the Faculty of Political Science. Our reasons for wishing to see them established are too obvious to require much elaboration. But we should like to point out that it would achieve one of the things long sought for—cooperation between the departments of the Faculty of Political Science, as well as with other departments in the University. It would, for the purpose of those seminars, obliterate the departmental lines and throw the emphasis from a "subject" to a "going concern." The seminars themselves, which, as we indicated in the beginning, ought to be limited to perhaps half a dozen, should be very carefully defined both in terms of the pertinent and permanent issues around which they are organized and in view of the available personnel in the University. It is not proposed to abolish, reorganize, or in any way interfere with the traditional and habitual procedure either in the Faculty of Political Science or in the different departments. The only thing that is proposed is that interested members within the departments group themselves together in the service of one or more of these continuing study groups.

1. The seminar so constituted would be not only interdepartmental, but also interfaculty and might even include people completely outside the University.

2. These seminars would be permanent and have an organic existence of their own regardless of personnel changes in the faculty.

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3. The seminar would draw its students either by direct registration or by the professors bringing some of their own students into it for special purposes.

4. The seminar would be administered not by a department or by a faculty as such, but by those faculty members who make up the seminar.

5. The seminar would have from year to year the same name and in time develop its own traditional status within the faculty and the University.

6. The seminar would in time, and the sooner the better, develop its own publication either from seminar papers or from articles contributed by the staff, and we could project into the future a series of publications under the auspices of a slavery seminar at Columbia University or the seminar on crime at Columbia University or the seminar on war at Columbia University.

7. This in time would give the seminars personality and character not only within the University, but in the outside world and serve to attract students from different parts of the United States or from different countries who, being especially interested in one of the major institutions to which one of the seminars is devoted, would come to Columbia to do their serious work in that seminar, regardless of the faculty or the department in which they are registered.

8. It is foreseeable that a student coming to Columbia to take his doctoral degree in the Law School would really write his thesis on some aspect of the law of slavery and have it published as one of the series under the auspices of the seminar on slavery at Columbia University.

9. Instead of writing his thesis by himself in some corner in consultation only with his professor, he would really be writing it in the face of criticism of the entire group of those in the seminar who are interested in that institution.

10. In time to come it might even be possible that this seminar serve as the examining board for the doctoral dissertations written in that field.

To recapitulate the argument: the proposal assumes that it is the function of the University to so organize its energies formally as to devote part of them to a continuous research, study, analysis, and interpretation of a number of the more important and eternal institutions. These seminars, though permanent within the faculty, involve no reorganization of the faculty it-

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self or of the departments. It is only projected that certain members in the departments will devote part of their energies to the seminars because they are already interested in those institutions. It is assumed that these seminars would be self-governing and call for no elaborate overhead administration. It is assumed that in the long run the personnel within the departments might be strengthened with a view to strengthening one or another seminar. It is assumed that a seminar would have a historical perspective without losing a current concern for current issues in human life. It is assumed that graduate students would be able to do their work within these seminars for their degrees. It is assumed that the seminars would develop their own traditions and character and their individual reputations in the world and have their own regular publications. It is assumed also that such a harnessing of the energies of some members of the staff within the University would stimulate intellectual cooperation within the faculty, influence the teaching, vitalize the student's interest in his graduate work, attract students from outside of the University and from other parts of the world, who would become votaries of one or other of these institutions, and would lead both by writing and through the training of personnel to a more direct participation of the University in resolving the many issues that afflict our contemporary world.

This letter was circulated among the members of the University family by George B. Pegram, Dean of the Graduate Faculties. The proposal was widely discussed and, in the end, formally approved at a meeting presided over by Professor Austin P. Evans. In 1945, the movement was set in motion with the establishment of five University Seminars.

II. The Conceptual Basis of the Movement

Unconsciously, perhaps, the University Seminar movement has a theory of the integration of human experience, as well as its own notion of the structure of knowledge that is different from that which underlies the organization of the University. Our Faculties of Political Science, Philosophy, and Pure Science, and our professional schools as well, are compounded of departments which rest upon the assumed existence of " disciplines ". The discipline is conceived of as some unique body of knowledge —practical and theoretical—which is sufficiently self-contained,

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pure, isolated and independent, so that it can be studied meaningfully by itself. The University, in building a separate department for each unique discipline, and then grouping them in faculties or schools, becomes the depository of all knowledge without violating the essential separateness of each discipline.

In contrast, the University Seminar movement sees society organized in many continuing institutions, enriched by experiences peculiar to themselves, and possessed of knowledge and wisdom derived from their own associated existence. The church, the trade union, the corporation, the state, organized crime, the military establishment, the educational system, are separate professional orders, with a logic uniquely different, and shared only by the initiated in each separate order. These permanent groups, going concerns, and institutions are the constituent bodies of our society. Each perennial group, going concern, and institution is a structure of knowledge, experience and practice. The University Seminars aim to encompass all of these elements by building an academic fellowship in which they are represented. The University Seminar, therefore, reaches for membership into all disciplines and activities pertinent to the objective—the understanding of the behavior of a going concern.

III. The Growth of the University Seminars

As can be seen from the following table, the five University Seminars organized in 1945 have now grown to thirteen.

Seminar On	*Founded*
The State	1945
Peace	1945
Religion	1945
The Renaissance	1945
Rural Life	1945
Content and Methods of the Social Sciences	1947
Labor	1948
Population [3]	1949
The Professions	1950
Education	1950
Organization and Management	1951
Communication	1951
Human Variation [4]	1952

[3] In abeyance, 1951-1952.

[4] Not formally grouped within the University Seminar family, but part of the general movement at the University.

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The University Seminars have within the last two years expanded beyond the Faculties of Political Science and Philosophy in which they were first developed. It seemed for some time that they might not lend themselves to other fields. But we now have a vigorous University Seminar on The Theory and Practice of Organization Management initiated in the School of Industrial Engineering by Professor Robert T. Livingston. Professor L. C. Dunn, of the Department of Zoology, has organized in the biological sciences a seminar on human variation. Though not at present formally included within the University Seminar family, it is still part of the same development.

IV. Number of People Involved in the University Seminars

This year there are 280 people attached to our Seminars. Of these, 193 are members of the University faculty, 42 are drawn from 21 other institutions of higher learning, and 45 come from 31 different nonacademic activities.

V. The Administrative Structure of the University Seminars

The University Seminars are independent bodies, authorized but not administered by the University. Functionally, they are attached to the University through a subcommittee and chairman chosen by the Joint Committee on Graduate Instruction.

The University also provides for the expenses of these new institutions, and gives academic credit to students admitted into the University Seminars. The Trustees have created the honorary title of University Seminar Associate for members drawn from beyond the Columbia family.

VI. The University Seminars Are Voluntary Associations

Beyond these limited administrative connections, the University Seminars are voluntary and independent associations. No pressure to join is brought to bear upon any member of the faculty. Membership is based upon invitation. The time and energy devoted to this activity are an addition to the academic responsibilities that faculty members carry. Nor is there any remuneration for the time given to these fellowships, and members of the faculty have devoted many hundreds of hours to these new academic bodies. The University has not actively fomented the growth of these associations. They have devel-

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oped spontaneously in response to the interest and needs of members of the faculty. Some one or more members of the faculty become concerned over an issue which they feel can best be dealt with in coöperation with others. A small committee may be formed for the purpose of surveying the field to which the proposed University Seminar is to be devoted, and to discuss the available personnel from which the original membership might be drawn. If the conditions seem propitious, the question of formal establishment of the group as a University Seminar is then raised with the chairman of the subcommittee in charge of the University Seminars. The question of acceptability is dependent upon the following conditions.

(1) Are the issues to be examined perennial in character, and of such significance as to justify the establishment of a *permanent* group within the University?

(2) Are the questions raised best to be dealt with by drawing together specialists from many different academic disciplines and, where feasible, from nonacademic activities as well?

(3) Is the membership of the proposed group likely to guarantee the highest standards of academic competence and scientific objectivity?

If these broad conditions are met, the University Seminar receives formal approval, and is listed in the University announcements; it can draw on the small amount of financial support provided by the University, and have its outside members given Trustee appointments as University Seminar Associates.

From that point, the newly associated scholars are completely on their own. They elect their own chairman, who is theoretically reëlected annually. They determine their own future membership, and their own program. They decide how often they will meet, how they will work, and whether or not they will accept students, and what the qualifications of such students shall be. They pick their own secretary, usually a junior member of the University faculty, who may receive a very small stipend out of the funds provided by the University.

VII. Where the Members Come From

Concerned as they are with the many-sided incidence of perennial institutions, groups, activities, or issues, the University

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Seminars choose their members so as to satisfy their special requirements, and they may have as many different disciplines represented as they have members. If the group so desires, it invites professors from other universities. Most of our University Seminars have active participants from neighboring institutions of higher learning.

In addition to participants from other academic institutions, the Seminars draw members from many nonacademic activities.

The theory on which the Seminars rest recognizes no sharp divisions between the academic and nonacademic world. It assumes that all the many facets of any going concern are equally important, and, if possible, all should be represented. The " practical people "—the judge, the district attorney, the policeman, the prison warden—are as important to a continuing study of the many-sided activity known as crime as is the sociologist, psychologist, jurist, or professor of criminal law. Only by bringing face to face all who are professionally involved in these matters can the issues be seen in their totality.

The academic and nonacademic members are invited to permanent membership, for only by continued association over many years can these varied bodies of knowledge and experience be merged into a common language system without which understanding is not really feasible. It requires long informal association between men variously trained and attuned to different preoccupations before they can communicate to each other the essence of their own insight.

VIII. The University Seminar as a Going Concern

The University Seminar is an independent universe. Its boundaries are limited only by its horizons. It is confined only by its own intellectual commitments, and these change with time and changing personnel. It has only one reason for being: the desire to understand the workings and to unravel the hidden mysteries of a continuing activity which we call an institution. The group is held together by the experience of supporting one another's curiosities, and deepening one another's insights. Each member already knows a great many facts about the institution, and many of them spend their lives in research,

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or in finding their way in the maze of conflicting pressures and contradictory choices which we call practical life.

The University Seminar is neither a research institution nor a board of directors. It is an intellectual fellowship which deals with ideas rather than facts—if such a distinction has any meaning. It wants to know why the research workers want these particular facts rather than others, and why certain conclusions are to be drawn from the facts when they might yield many others besides. It is concerned with meaning, direction, drift, purpose, value. The facts are plentiful; their many-sided significance is often hidden. That is why the membership drawn from every context is needed, and that is where it is useful. Nor is the University Seminar a board of directors drawing up plans and making decisions. It is concerned about why the plans were drawn, and the decisions made, and their many results and implications. It plays the rôle of evaluating the practice and policy of the institution in the light of the given ends and purposes.

The University Seminar is not an educational project. It is, however, an educational process, an associated way of learning among mature scholars who teach each other. Many specific riddles that need to be unraveled may arise in this process. Each riddle in turn may then become a project, just as buying a dinner or renting a room is a kind of project in daily living. But the dinner and the room are incidents in a life, and so the projects that may arise are incidents in the life of this kind of intellectual fellowship.

Neither can it be said that the University Seminar has a particular method. Each facet of each institution, as it is studied in turn, calls for its own method, and each member adds to the skill, competence and variety of methods available. The Seminar has as many methods at its disposal as it has members, and each possible combination of members and their special gifts, training and experience.

This was noticeable, for instance, in one Seminar when the question under discussion required a broad knowledge of languages. It was soon apparent that the group had among its own members the ancient and modern European languages, and

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a goodly number of Middle and Far Eastern languages as well. The Seminar could bring to bear a breadth of bibliographic knowledge upon the point in question that no single worker or group of workers in one discipline could hope to master, short of much hard labor and months of time—if then.

The method and the project are both incidents, both by-products of a process of continued associated inquiry.

Though the University Seminar is not primarily a research institution, it may stimulate a great deal of research either by its own members or by other groups, and if it is not primarily a board of directors making decisions, its very existence has long-run policy implications. It draws into a common language system and a related body of ideas (if and when these things come to pass) all the available knowledge and experience of the institution which it is studying. Such an outcome cannot be a project, a purpose, or an aim. It can only be a hope, an ideal, a something possible—but possible. Even the approximation to that kind of communication among active people, all of whom are devoting their lives to dealing with the incidence of a given institution, must have wide practical influence.

IX. The University Seminar and the Visiting Scholar

We have had sufficient experience to recognize that the University Seminar has a special rôle in relation to the visiting foreign scholar. Ordinarily, the foreign scholar, if he is not invited to teach a class, has few, and usually formal, contacts with members of the faculty. He may be invited to an occasional meal, or may be asked to give a lecture or two, but unless he has some close personal friends he finds himself isolated and with little opportunity for intimate communication with his temporary associates. His position is improved if he has a class of his own because it gives him students to work with, and greater occasion to deal with the members of a department. But even then it is a rare person who finds himself adopted into an intellectual family.

The situation is different if the foreign scholar finds himself a member of one of our University Seminars. One instance will illustrate the point. A Swiss scholar, brought over by the

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Rockefeller Foundation to a university located some two hours distant from Columbia, was invited to attend a meeting of one of the University Seminars. He was sufficiently interested to ask if he could come again. He returned to the Seminar regularly for the entire academic year, paying his own expenses, and never missing a single meeting. He fell into the mood of the group, took an active part in its proceedings, was asked to act at least one evening as the leader of the discussion, and proved himself a useful member. He had, in fact, found intellectual companionship and accommodation, and soon partook of the friendly informality which characterizes these groups. When the time came for him to return to his own country he remarked privately that this contact was the most important, as well as the most useful, thing that had happened to him in the United States. He had become a participating member of an active intellectual fellowship. His presence was useful to the Seminar, and very meaningful to him. On his return to Europe he wrote about the Seminar and about the issues the Seminar dealt with. In some ways, he had so partaken of our activities that he had become one of us, with much benefit all around. Most of our University Seminars could absorb two, probably three, foreign scholars each academic year.

A very similar experience can be cited for a visiting scholar from another part of the United States. In this instance, he had come to Columbia on a one-year appointment. He was brought into one of our University Seminars, in which he became an active participant. At the end of the year he moved to another institution in a neighboring state as head of a research institute, but he has maintained his membership in the University Seminar and rarely misses a meeting. On leaving the University he wrote a letter to the effect that this regular, friendly association in an intellectual activity was the most important event in his year at the University.

In some way this drawing in for a period of time of scholars from beyond the immediate reach of the University, or from foreign countries, could if broadened become something of great value to the intellectual life of Columbia, and to scholars in foreign lands and distant American universities.

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X. The Seminar as a Teaching Institution

When first established, it was assumed that these associations would prove highly stimulating and effective teaching institutions for specially chosen graduate students. On the whole, this hope has not been fulfilled. The reasons for this are many, and would deserve careful analysis. The older classroom is but a continuation of the chapel, with the preacher in the pulpit, and the congregation down below. The ordinary seminar is an adaptation of the same structure to more advanced students, with the professor at the head of the table. But in our University Seminars there is no teacher. There are instead between fifteen and twenty-five mature scholars, equal among themselves, and there is little place for the student. He finds it a little embarrassing, and the professors feel restrained.

This was particularly true in the early days of the University Seminar. In one instance, when it was suggested that students be admitted, a distinguished member of the faculty, with a national reputation as a teacher, threw up his hands and said, "Mercy, no. We don't want them to see us flounder." For exploratory, tentative, intellectual floundering is characteristic of the process of integration between men drawn from different disciplines and varied spheres of life. It may take much time before they learn to talk to each other rather than at each other. This is facilitated if the gatherings acquire a relaxed, friendly mood, when members begin to call each other by their first names, when they can laugh with and at each other. Eating together is a great time-saver. It helps the process of integration and identification within the group, and eases the strain of difference.

All of this, however, does not make it easier for students. One or two students, if carefully selected, can be absorbed, but as many students as there are faculty members would in most instances prove a hindrance to the main purpose of the group. It is, however, not desirable that graduate students, who stand to gain so much by contact with their elders under the stimulating conditions of a University Seminar, should be excluded. Teaching is one of the purposes of the University, and a major function of the scholar. The University Seminar has its in-

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direct influence upon teaching by its impact upon the teacher. But the University Seminar itself should be able to do this directly, at least upon a limited scale. In the few instances where students have been admitted, the experience has been a profitable one.

Any considerable number of students would require some arrangement for supervision. We already have the power to give academic credit, and we have the experience in the University Seminar on Religion with students who have successfully worked on doctoral dissertations. It has been our hope that the doctoral dissertation would come to be written in response to a need of the University Seminar, and, so to speak, in its presence. In view of the experience with the Seminar on Religion this seems feasible, and useful to both the group and the student.

In this and in other instances, it is possible to foresee that the Seminar groups could be appointed as the examining committee on the doctoral dissertation. In view of the fact that at Columbia University the doctoral degree in Religion is given under the auspices of an *ad hoc* committee, it would not be impossible, if it seemed desirable, to transfer this power to the University Seminar. In fact, the entire field of the relation between the students and the University Seminars is wide open and can develop in many different directions. Much will depend upon the degree of permanent financial support the University Seminars will find. An effective graduate student program will call for a permanent and paid skeleton staff which is not now available. But these are matters for future growth, which cannot be diagramed at the moment. One thing is clear, however; it would be a real loss to the usefulness of this new institution if it were to remain without students.

XI. The University Seminar and Publication

When first organized it was contemplated that each University Seminar would develop or acquire its own publication medium. The Seminar on Religion and Health and the Seminar on the Renaissance have been able to use existing quarterlies. *The Journal of Religion* and *The Journal of the History of Ideas* have been vehicles for some of their work. In the first instance, the papers from the Seminar on Religion were pub-

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lished annually on two different occasions by taking an entire issue of *The Journal of Religion*. This was financed from the small fund at our disposal. *The Journal of the History of Ideas* has published many of the papers read before the University Seminar on the Renaissance. The other University Seminars have not been so fortunate. The need for publication is real, and the Seminars would be more productive if the means for publication were at hand.

The University Seminar on Organization and Management has two unpublished manuscripts ready for the printer. The University Seminar on Rural Life has at least one such volume. The University Seminar on Labor has raised a small fund to prepare a volume in honor of its retiring chairman, Mr. Arthur E. Meyer, to be based upon its very excellent minutes. There is at least another volume that should be developed out of these minutes, but someone would have to be given free time and secretarial assistance to collate and work over the material.

The same thing is true in the case of the University Seminar on Peace. Here, lying unused and unknown, are seven years of excellent minutes, containing the record of the best thought of a group of teachers of international law, history, politics, economics, and so on, on the question of how to organize the peace. It would require a year, possibly two, of someone's free time to do justice to this rich body of material.

In fact, the record of most of our original Seminars ought to be examined. How fruitful such a project can be is illustrated by the history of the first five years of the University Seminar on Religion and Health prepared by Professor Horace L. Friess. This was made possible by a small grant for assistance from the Rockefeller Foundation. Certainly such a review of the history of the University Seminar on the Content and Methods of the Social Sciences would be of real value.

This does not begin to exhaust the question of publication. We have no full record of the papers and books published by members of our University Seminars that have grown out of the work of the Seminars. Even less have we a record of the way these groups have influenced the writing activities or the thought of its members. An accidental remark by a former

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member of the Seminar on the State will illustrate the point: "I have published four papers on the history of Roman bureaucracy which would not have been written but for my membership in that seminar. In fact, it led me to change my basic research interest in the History of Roman Law." Another member acknowledges that two of his recent books would probably not have been written but for membership in these fellowships.

XII. The University Seminar as a Developing Institution

Our University Seminars are, as we have noted, free from administrative tutelages, and can adapt themselves to new situations as they arise. Thus, the Seminar on Religion was for two years organized into two separate groups, on Religion and Health, and on Religion and Democracy, with some members belonging to both. This same Seminar has discussed the desirability of designating a committee from its own members to make a study of some special problems that have arisen, but which are too technical for the group as a whole to deal with. The committee would report back to the larger group. It has also been approached from outside the University with a request that it undertake a special job of research and evaluation for some groups interested in religious phenomena. It declined the invitation after considerable discussion, but there was nothing to have prevented it from doing so except its own sense of appropriateness in the light of its membership and program.

A similar offer in a very different field was made to the Seminar on Organization and Management. The Seminar on the Content and Method of the Social Sciences has, through a special committee, signed a contract with the Office of Naval Research. The Seminar on the Renaissance has been asked to take over some of the activities of the American Association of Learned Societies after that body disbanded its Renaissance Committee.

In the light of its structure and organization, the University Seminar can, if its membership so desires, assume a multiple of different shapes, and take on varied responsibilities within the wide range of academic tolerance.

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XIII. The University Seminar and the University

The traditionally wide administrative tolerance that characterizes Columbia University has permitted these groups to develop with a minimum of official meddling. In return, the University Seminars have brought to the Columbia campus many distinguished scholars from other institutions, and men of affairs from varied walks of life. These associates have discovered grounds of identity with Columbia. In doing so they have enriched our own intellectual life, and our fellowship with the larger community beyond the Columbia campus.

It is here, perhaps, that the University Seminars have their greatest promise of future usefulness. We are really building an edifice that embraces not merely Columbia University, but all of the other institutions of higher learning in the Metropolitan area, and the community at large. We are bridging the gap that has so long divided not merely the different disciplines, but the academic and nonacademic worlds as well.

There is an additional service that our fellowships are rendering to the University which deserves special mention, and this is the communion made possible between the younger and the older members of the academic staff. Our Seminars, though perhaps not often enough, include not merely the older and more distinguished scholars in the University, but a sprinkling of instructors and assistant professors. It has been difficult in a large University to bring the younger men into intimate and continuous contact with their elders, where the conditions of friendly equality prevail. This we do, and the results in mutual respect, friendship and understanding that grow out of these associations are of great value to the individual members and to the University.

XIV. The University Seminar Is a Permanent Institution

There are certain self-evident conclusions that can be drawn from our eight years' experience that bear upon the question of intellectual coöperation among men trained in different disciplines and engaged in varied nonacademic activities.

(1) The most important of these is the essential condition

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of *permanent association.* It takes a long time for intellectuals to get acquainted with each other. It takes a longer time for them to understand each other. The primary requirement is for a complete breakdown of formality, and of the artificial barriers inside which intellectuals tend to live. Intellectuals can think aloud in each other's presence only when completely relaxed, when the atmosphere is friendly, and when differences of attitude, belief and perception can be revealed without any sense of diffidence and hesitancy. It is essential that associates may be free to hesitate, fumble, retract and make many new starts. Otherwise there can really be no gradual intellectual overlapping, so essential to the development of a common language, and a mutual insight. Time is the essence of the matter, and, given time enough, the group will grow into a true intellectual fellowship. And only in an atmosphere of fellowship can we hope for the stimulus essential to the flowering of the human spirit.

(2) The second lesson to be drawn is that this fellowship of the mind comes easiest and most fruitfully when many men are working together on the same issue but from different angles. All facets of the question must be presented and considered, not once, but over and over again.

(3) The issues to which the group is devoting its time must be of major significance to the members, and of sufficient complexity to challenge their best thought and their deepest concern. The questions studied must, as all real questions do, change under their hand, and in a measure always remain baffling, contradictory, and just beyond complete understanding.

(4) The group must feel completely free to follow its own bent, it must be responsible only to its own academic conscience, and it must be untrammeled in organization, method, and membership.

(5) It must be based upon voluntary association, where membership is a privilege, and where the only compensation is the sense of intellectual growth, and the esteem of one's equals in a common intellectual endeavor.

(6) Finally, it must be sensed as a lifelong companionship, as something that will always be there, exacting the best one

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has to offer, and returning the best in fellowship and intellectual stimulus. If it is recognized merely as a temporary group it will neither evoke the best from its members nor return full compensation for the effort.

XV. The Future of the University Seminars

It is difficult to foresee the future developments in a movement as many-sided and flexible as this one which has grown up at Columbia University. But one can perhaps hazard a guess at the broad drift implicit in these voluntary groupings. It is within the range of the probable to say that the University Seminars will in time grow into independent collegia inside of the University—independent in administration, program, membership and finances. They will also be different because they will not merely bridge the formal disciplines and schools, but gather under the same roof scholars from other institutions, and many men from the active world, who will bring their practical experience to enrich the collegium of their choice. But the collegia, because of that, will have some bit of wisdom and use to add to practical people who spend their lives in mending the structure of any living institution.

Frank Tannenbaum

Columbia University

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THE SECURITY OF FOREIGN PETROLEUM RESOURCES

IN recent years it has come to be generally believed that international security is basically a matter of achieving political and economic interdependence among the states of the world. This principle has a special application to underdeveloped countries wherein lie great reserves of petroleum. On these the United States and the free world are presently dependent, and will be increasingly dependent in the future. These petroleum-rich countries are equally dependent upon the free world, not only for markets for petroleum but also for leadership in world affairs which fairly represents their interests, and for assistance in improving the life of their people. In the over-all programs for promoting free-world security, the countries holding these strategic resources have been all but overlooked. This neglect appears to have stemmed from the following conditions:

1) The major foreign oil-bearing countries geographically fall within areas which historically were colonies or zones of influence of world Powers which continue to insist on their traditional prerogatives in these areas.

2) The United States has obtained the coöperation of these Powers in mutual programs affecting other areas of the world and has not been prepared to jeopardize that coöperation by embarking upon effective programs which would tend to undermine their influence in these underdeveloped countries.

3) The popular support needed by the United States government to embark on necessary programs, notwithstanding the adverse views of other nations, has been lacking because the public, while impressed with the great oil revenues of these underdeveloped countries, has been uninformed regarding the prevalence of poverty and disease within them.

The assistance needed by these countries is of a character peculiarly within the ability of Americans to provide. Even if

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it were possible for our allies to undertake adequate programs in these areas, such programs would generally be doomed to failure by the distrust and fear of the local people. Americans, however, are not identified with colonialism in the Eastern Hemisphere; and in South America and in the Caribbean the sins of "Yankee imperialism" have been largely atoned for. The United States has substantially established good will by its good-neighbor policy and by its generous post-war foreign aid program.

This article will discuss the dependence of the United States and the free world on the petroleum resources of foreign countries and the problems which must be solved if continuous access to these resources is to be assured under conditions of mutual coöperation.

United States Dependence on Foreign Petroleum

In past years, the United States was the principal supplier of the world's petroleum; today, the situation is reversed. An unprecedented increase in consumption has turned this country into a deficit nation, despite present production almost five times greater than that of thirty years ago.[1] Proved reserves of crude oil have not kept pace with the multiplying consumption rate: the ratio has dwindled sharply in the last three decades.[2] Concomitant with the increasing needs of the United States, the world's heaviest consuming nation, a greatly expanding demand for petroleum has developed throughout the world. Oil power has been replacing coal and animal energy in increasingly mechanized agriculture, expanding industry, and growing commerce. In military operations, petroleum consumption has geometrically increased under a technology which emphasizes power, speed, and the long-range capacity of land, sea and air equipment.

In 1952, the free world's oil consumption totaled about 4¼ billion barrels, two thirds of which was by the United States and one third by other countries outside the Iron Curtain. By 1975, according to the President's Materials Policy Commission,

[1] President's Materials Policy Commission, *Resources for Freedom*, vol. III, p. 305 (June 1952).

[2] *Ibid.*

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the free world's consumption is expected to rise to 9¾ billion barrels annually, more than two times present consumption.[3] The projected share of the United States will amount to about one half of this, yet the United States can hardly expect to sustain production at much more than its present maximum rate of 2½ billion barrels annually. To satisfy the 2¼ billion barrel deficit in domestic consumption and to supply other requirements of the free world, foreign crude oil production by 1975 will be called upon to yield almost 7¼ billion barrels annually, almost a fivefold increase over present levels.

Some alteration in this forecasted pattern may come in the course of the next twenty years from the discovery of new pools of oil in the United States or from the large-scale development of synthetic oil. But there appears to be slight prospect of discovering new oil fields of such magnitude, and the high costs of synthetic production will likely retard development as long as more economical foreign crude oil is accessible. Some increased imports from Canada can be depended upon to satisfy a part of United States requirements of crude oil; but, in the main, Venezuela, the Middle East and Indonesia will be called upon to produce most of the 7¼ billion barrels needed annually to supplement domestic production. It is for this reason that an enlightened policy of the United States toward these peoples is imperative.

* * * * *

The present problem of assuring the security of the foreign petroleum resources of the United States and the free world has been accentuated by the events surrounding World War II and its aftermath. But the roots of the problem can be found in the history of oil exploitation in underdeveloped countries. Consequently, an understanding of American policies first requires a brief examination of these historical factors. The scope of this article limits discussion to the threat of nationalization to private investment in foreign oil, government sponsorship of private operations abroad, the political heritage of foreign pol-

[3] Present consumption of about 4¼ billion barrels is now about twice the level before World War II.

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icies, and some of the problems created by the unprecedented oil revenues flowing to these heretofore undeveloped areas.

The Threat of Nationalization to Private Investment

Investment in international oil operations has been largely confined to American, British and Dutch interests. Since undertaking foreign oil operations more than fifty years ago, companies of these nations have lost a substantial part of their property through nationalization by foreign governments.[4] The years following World War I saw the Soviets confiscate the Baku and other foreign-owned oil properties of Russia; in World War II the Nazis, and later the Communists, took over private oil properties in Austria, Rumania and Hungary. Today, European oil production, mostly located east of the Alps, is nearly all Communist-owned.

The other principal areas of foreign production, prior to World War II, were Venezuela, Mexico, Iran and Indonesia. Mexico expropriated private oil properties in 1937; Iran followed suit in 1951; while Indonesia, since its liberation as a Dutch colony in 1949, has hardly had time to adopt an affirmative oil policy one way or another. Of these non-European countries, only Venezuela has followed a conscious dual policy of preventing its domination by oil companies while at the same time avoiding the nationalization of oil properties.

In the Middle East, a British company developed oil production in Iran prior to World War I, and Iran has since been a major source. But only since the end of World War II have the Middle Eastern countries of Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq emerged as principal suppliers. Today, in capacity, the Middle East has supplanted Venezuela as the largest producing area outside the United States.[5] Within the short period since the war, these

[4] For the purposes of this article, "nationalization" and "expropriation" will be used interchangeably to denote the taking of property by the state with provision for compensation, whether or not the compensation provided for is considered "adequate" by all parties. "Confiscation" will be used to denote the taking of private property by the state with no provision for compensating the previous owner.

[5] It is now estimated that more than half the oil reserves of the world are in the Middle East. In 1951, total crude production of the world (outside the Iron Cur-

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Middle Eastern countries have been favored with an on-flood of tremendous production, at royalty rates several times those of pre-war levels.[6] Herein lies one of the principal problems in assuring the security of American foreign petroleum resources: the fruitful spending of these vast receipts for the betterment of the people and economies of these countries. It is premature to judge whether the political adjustment to foreign oil operations in these countries and in the new nation of Indonesia will follow the course taken by Mexico and Iran or the policies pursued by Venezuela.

One immediate consequence of the cold war has been the fanning of nationalistic aspirations. Because nationalism, especially in its nascent period, tends to be critical of all things foreign, it always presents a potential threat to any foreign interest. The Soviet Union incites nationalism within other countries as a means to weaken and drive out Western interests and influence. In opposition, the Western Powers, and particularly the United States, encourage the development of national integrity in smaller countries in the interest of promoting the will and the ability to preserve political independence. Petroleum-producing countries, largely underdeveloped economically and vulnerable politically, are the logical objects of prey for Soviet imperialism, motivated in part by the dependence of the free world on foreign oil. Although at the moment the bulk of the world's petroleum resources is under Western control, the Soviets possess a geographical advantage, since more than half

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tain) was 4,000 million barrels, of which the Middle East produced 721 million, Venezuela 622 million, and the United States 2,245 million. The present production capacity of the Middle East more closely approximates 1,250 million barrels annually because of the locked-in production in Iran following nationalization, and the regulated flow in other Middle Eastern countries. Middle Eastern crude production prior to the war was 7 per cent as compared with the present production of 18 per cent of the total. *World Petroleum Statistics,* No. 39, U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines.

[6] Pre-war royalty rates were fixed generally at about 20 cents a barrel. In 1942, Venezuela secured an agreement based on the equal sharing of profits which today amounts to about 80 cents a barrel. Similar profit-sharing terms were accorded Saudi Arabia in 1950, and more recently Kuwait, Iraq and Bahrein. Comparable terms were not offered by the British oil company to Iran until after nationalization, and hence were rejected.

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the world's oil deposits are located in the Eastern Hemisphere on the perimeter of Russia and its satellites. Even the areas of foreign oil deposits in the Western Hemisphere are not immune from Soviet propaganda and influence. The stakes involved extend beyond consideration of the great private investments and the potential private gains. More important are the continuity of oil production, the security of these vast foreign oil reserves for the long-term use of the free world, and the economic progress and political stability of the underdeveloped countries themselves.

Nationalization of oil does not necessarily preclude its availability to the free world, but it portends serious consequences. Nationalism usually stems not merely from grievances against the companies but to a greater extent from the accumulated ill will against the countries of their origin and ownership. Nationalization cannot be considered narrowly as a commercial dispute; it is an international conflict encouraging the growth of suspicion and xenophobia of far-reaching impact. And, ever-present in these areas of conflict, is the insidious threat of international communism—a threat of enemy control of foreign oil resources needed by the free world as a basic source of energy.

Government Sponsorship of Private Operations

The development and present composition of the international oil industry could have been achieved only with the direct participation and encouragement of the American, British and Dutch governments. Today, by their exclusive long-term concessions, seven corporate systems own practically all production rights, outside North America, to the most profitable oil-bearing formations of the free world.[7] These systems comprise

[7] In Indonesia, Royal Dutch Shell had absolute control until the early thirties. Today the country's annual production of 57 million barrels is shared by Shell with Standard-Vacuum (jointly owned by Standard Oil and Socony-Vacuum) and Caltex (jointly owned by Standard Oil Company of California and Texas). In the Middle East, control of the oil industry was primarily in the hands of the British until the end of World War I, when American and minor French interests managed to gain a foothold. Today, Anglo-Iranian, Shell, Gulf, Standard Oil, Socony-Vacuum, Texas and Standard Oil Company of California own practically all the concessions to the present production of 721 million barrels annually (except nationalized Iranian oil).

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the five American companies of Standard Oil Company, Socony-Vacuum, Gulf, Standard of California, and the Texas Company and the two British companies, Royal Dutch Shell [8] and Anglo-Iranian. Through a process of rational development, each of the seven corporate systems by vertical integration has brought under central management all petroleum operations: crude production, refining, transportation and marketing. Nonintegrated independent refining companies rely upon these seven systems for crude supplies, as do independent marketing companies requiring bulk refined products. The seven organizations operate generally throughout the world and usually are affected by the same conditions. Therefore, one should reasonably expect to find a related policy with respect to the planning of crude oil production and refining, a similar world-wide pricing practice, and a comparable royalty or profit-sharing system for each of the producing countries.[9] With this community of interest, the industry will naturally tend to support the individual oil company in its negotiations with a particular producing country; and the multiple sources of crude oil under their control place these companies in a powerful bargaining position.

The international industry is the product of creative free enterprise coupled with paternalistic foreign policies; that is, the colonialism of Great Britain and the Netherlands, side by

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In addition to major oil companies, several independents hold concessions in the Middle East, such as Sinclair Petroleum Company (Ethiopia), American Independent Oil Company (Saudi-Arabian-Kuwait Neutral Zone), Pacific Western Oil Corporation (Saudi-Arabian-Kuwait Neutral Zone), International Marine Oil Company, Ltd. (off-shore around Qatar Peninsula). But as yet, the independent companies have not dispelled, by the discovery of profitable oil deposits, the general belief that the major companies have all the first-class oil-bearing strata under their concessions. In Venezuela, Standard Oil, Shell and Gulf control 90 per cent of the total annual production of 622 million barrels.

[8] Stock ownership is divided between Dutch and British nationals. Although the Dutch own the majority of stock, the company has been under British control by virtue of an agreement. In return for relinquishing control to the British, the Dutch interests were accorded the advantages of trading in the sterling area which were otherwise denied them by British law.

[9] While details of terms vary by country, the basic principle is an arrangement between company and oil-producing country whereby profits are shared equally. See note 6.

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side with vigorous American free enterprise supported by the American policy of the Open Door.

In the early years following World War I, increasing foreign demand compelled American companies to supplement domestic supplies with foreign oil. American oil production abroad was restricted at first to Central and South America, under the benign protection of the Monroe Doctrine. At the same time, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and Shell were making substantial progress in their respectively protected areas of the Middle East and the Far East.

In the Dutch East Indies, oil production was restricted by law to Dutch companies and was monopolized by the Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij, a subsidiary of the Royal Dutch Shell corporate system. In the early thirties the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) managed finally to puncture this colonial monopoly through the intervention of the State Department under the traditional American Open-Door policy. A Royal Dutch Shell subsidiary had applied to the United States government for oil concessions on public lands. As an implied consideration for approving the application, the government required equality of treatment for American companies in the Dutch East Indies.[10] More recently, the Standard Oil Company of California and the Texas Company, jointly operating as Caltex, acquired a concession in Indonesia.

By the end of World War I, an impressive start had been made in oil production in Iran (then Persia) by a British company under a concession granted by that country in 1901. Also in existence at the time was a concession covering Iraq, held by the Turkish Petroleum Company, consisting of British, Dutch, German and C. S. Gulbenkian's private interests. The German interest, later put on the block as one of the spoils of war, was acquired by France under the terms of the San Remo Treaty in 1920. In return France recognized Great Britain as sole mandatory power over the country.

These political maneuvers neglected American interests in the potential oil fields of Iraq. A group of seven major American

[10] Full account is available in Sen. Doc. No. 43, *Diplomatic Protection of American Oil Interests in Mesopotamia, Netherlands East Indies, and Mexico* (Washington, 1945).

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companies, later reduced to five, organized the Near East Development Company for the purpose of acquiring an oil interest in Iraq. Led by the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), they secured the intervention of the State Department, which pressed for the recognition of the Open-Door policy. Access to the rich American market by British companies was made a major consideration in inducing the British to agree to the entry of American companies into the Middle East. After several years of negotiation, an agreement was reached in 1927 whereby the British interest in Iraq's oil, represented by the 50 per cent share of the Anglo-Persian Company, was divided with the Near East Development Company, in consideration for a 10 per cent overriding royalty on all oil produced. In the same year, the Turkish Petroleum Company was reorganized as the Iraq Petroleum Company.[11]

About the time of the I.P.C. agreement, the Gulf Oil Company acquired options on concessions in Kuwait and Bahrein Island. In Kuwait, Gulf waged a battle against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which claimed preëmptive commercial rights, based on Britain's protectorate over the Kuwait sheikhdom. The State Department was again called upon to invoke the Open-Door policy. The outcome of the controversy was a compromise, establishing the Kuwait Oil Company with its shares owned equally by Anglo-Iranian and Gulf. Because Bahrein Island fell within the Red Line Agreement,[12] Gulf, a

[11] Ownership in the Iraq Petroleum Company is now held by the following interests: Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 23¾ per cent; Royal Dutch Shell, 23¾ per cent; Cie. Française des Petroles, 23¾ per cent; M. Gulbenkian, 5 per cent; United States companies, 23¾ per cent. The United States share was divided among Standard, Socony, Gulf, Atlantic Refining Company and Pan-American Oil Company. Standard and Socony, by 1935, had purchased the shares of the other three companies, becoming joint owners of the 23¾ per cent American interest.

[12] American companies admitted to the Middle East oil pool reluctantly participated with their foreign partners in the so-called Red Line Agreement of 1928. This applied to the entire Middle East east of Turkey, but excluded Kuwait and Iran which were recognized as the private reserves of the British. By the terms of this agreement, each company gave up the right to operate individually in the production of Middle East oil and agreed with the others that any Middle East oil operation within the Red Line had to be undertaken as a collective operation and shared in accordance with the respective ownership interest in the Iraq Petroleum Company.

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signatory, sold its option to Standard Oil of California (Stancal) which was not a party to that agreement. The latter could secure the concession only with the approval of the British government which held a protectorate over the Island. British approval was finally given in 1930, again through the assistance of the State Department.

With the discovery of oil in Bahrein in 1932, great interest was stimulated in the adjacent geological formations of Saudi Arabia. An intense contest ensued between the Iraq Petroleum Company and Stancal which ended in 1933 when King Ibn Saud favored Stancal with a long-term concession. In the following years, Stancal's exploration proved the existence of great pools of oil, in both Arabia and Bahrein. In 1936 Stancal sold a one-half interest in its Middle East holdings to the Texas Company in return for substantial cash and a one-half interest in its foreign marketing facilities. By 1947 the Caltex combination appeared strong enough to wage a competitive war if necessary to win a greater share of the world markets, then largely controlled by Standard of New Jersey, Shell and Anglo-Iranian. This threat was averted by an agreement in 1947 by which Stancal and Texas sold Standard of New Jersey a 30 per cent interest and Socony a 10 per cent interest in the Arabian concession.[13]

Mexican fields were the site of the major foreign production in the Western Hemisphere, commencing at the turn of the century and reaching their peak output by 1921. American companies participated in greater numbers in Mexico than in any other foreign field, in much the same free-for-all competitive fashion as that existing in the United States. Following the end of World War I, the numerous independent companies gradually were brought under the ownership and control of the major American, British and Dutch corporate systems, and, by the time of the expropriation in 1937, only four American companies and the Royal Dutch Shell were affected to any degree. Since expropriation, Mexican production has been largely restricted to the state-owned company, Pemex.

[13] Following this agreement, Arabian production was increased from 380,000 to 750,000 barrels daily in 1951.

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At present, the most important foreign oil fields in the Western Hemisphere are in Venezuela. Exploration and discovery commenced after World War I and volume production was achieved by 1926. Unlike that in Mexico in the early period, Venezuelan production from the start was controlled by the major American, British and Dutch companies through concessions obtained directly from the government or acquired by purchase from the original concessionaires. In contrast with the struggle of American companies to secure oil rights in the Eastern Hemisphere, and then only with State Department intervention, British-Dutch companies freely acquired concessions in the Western Hemisphere on equal terms with Americans. Today, the subsidiaries of Standard of New Jersey, Gulf and Shell produce 90 per cent of Venezuelan oil, while nine other companies account for the remaining 10 per cent.

Political Heritage of Foreign Policies

To a greater extent, perhaps, than is true of any other industry, foreign oil development has been influenced and supported by the foreign policies of the Big Powers. Historically, British and Dutch policies had, as their objective, strategic control over the present major oil countries; and the problem of adjustment in political thought is as serious in London and The Hague as it is in Bagdad and Jakarta. It would be erroneous to hold the major companies responsible for the political problems which are associated with the production of oil in underdeveloped countries. A more correct view is that these problems are deeply rooted in historical relationships to which the oil companies have fallen heir. Histories may differ in detail, but the over-all pattern of control and influence has been the same.

After the acquisition of India, British interest in the Middle East became paramount. The years following the Crimean War saw British diplomacy supporting Turkey to prevent the advance of Russia into Asia Minor and India. In the case of strategically located Persia, Britain followed a " desert policy " of neutralizing that country to prevent its being employed as a bridge between Russia and India.[14] A parallel policy was di-

[14] For a scholarly review of this policy, see N. S. Fatemi, *Diplomatic History of Persia* (New York, 1952).

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rected at minimizing the influence of other Great Powers in the Middle East.[15] The object was not only to protect the British life line to India and the Far East; it also was aimed at perpetuating political weakness within the Middle Eastern countries in order that British economic interests could be pursued with a minimum of local resistance. Pursued over many generations, British interests have become identified with imperialism in the minds of the Islamic peoples.

Dutch interest in Indonesia began with the formation of the Dutch East India Company in the early seventeenth century, the beginning of three centuries of exclusive Dutch control. Resentment against its colonial status was principally responsible for the revolt of Indonesia against the Dutch which resulted in independence in 1949. Understandably, suspicion of foreign interests is still prevalent there.

Latin Americans have interpreted the Monroe Doctrine to mean that their countries not only were to be closed to foreign interests, but were to be opened to exploitation by the United States. Since the mid-1930's, the United States has disavowed "Yankee imperialism" through its good-neighbor policy, and this policy has done much to change South America's earlier attitudes toward the United States.

It is a circumstance of the greatest importance that the world's richest oil deposits are located in politically and economically underdeveloped countries—countries which today are struggling in a transition from former domination by Big Powers toward a new era of political freedom and national integrity. This struggle has been encouraged by the discredit, since World War I, of political ideas favorable to the preëminence of selected nations and the subservience of others as the natural order of international affairs. The twentieth century awakened in these areas the kind of nationalism which had

[15] Indicative of the long-sustained purpose of the British is the following communication from Lord Milner to Lloyd George, May 16, 1919: "The independence of Arabia has always been a fundamental principle of our Eastern policy, but what we mean by it is that Arabia, while being independent herself, should be kept out of the sphere of European political intrigue and within the British sphere of influence; in other words, that her independent native rulers should have no foreign treaties except with us." David Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, vol. II, p. 900 (London, 1938).

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rocked Europe a century earlier. This twentieth-century drive toward self-determination has fallen within a favorable ideological climate. But, despite this fact, the world-wide, closely knit economic institutions which are built upon the political foundations of colonialism tend to create an unyielding road block. By reason of their deep-rooted colonial traditions, the British and Dutch are especially handicapped in formulating policies which would support the inevitable drive toward political and economic self-reliance by underdeveloped countries.

It is inevitable that nationalism should express itself in the promotion of local industries, in programs of forced social change, and generally in the refusal to accept foreign influence. When external influence is exerted, there results a turbulent agitation against the foreign Powers that extends to resentment against their resident commercial enterprises. Failure to take these national ambitions seriously and to accept them was largely responsible for the Mexican expropriation in 1937 [16] and for the Iranian nationalization in 1951.[17] The distrust of foreign Powers can be seen in the explanation of King Ibn Saud in accepting United States over British oil interests in Saudi Arabia.[18]

The oil industry is not the creator of the political climate in which it must operate today; it is heir to an unsought political situation created by earlier Big Power policies. However, the

[16] By 1912, United States citizens had invested about a billion dollars in Mexico for the development of mines, petroleum, power, railroads and agriculture. Native Indians and mestizos, nine tenths of the population, continued to live in poverty and ignorance, and foreign investors took no note of the smoldering hatred which continued to grow against them. After the Mexican Revolution, the government carried out one of the principles of the Revolution, "Mexico for the Mexicans", and attempted to liquidate foreign economic domination, particularly of natural resources, by bringing petroleum deposits under the ownership of the state. The oil companies refused to obey decrees of the Mexican government and, when the Mexican courts held against them, they ignored the court orders. Expropriation inevitably followed.

[17] Prolonged delay by the British in offering Iran the profit-sharing arrangements prevalent in other oil-producing countries touched off the spark which led to Iran's position—to settle for nothing less than the end of British control over her oil industry.

[18] King Ibn Saud stated that he would not have the British, and accepted the United States only because it was "so far away".

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industry's success will depend upon its acceptance of the necessity of establishing its operations more securely within the political framework of countries whose people are conscious of their political integrity and determined to realize their freedom and its benefits.

Problems of Foreign Petroleum Security

As the center of world crude oil production shifts from the United States to foreign countries, the industry becomes increasingly subject to the control and influence of the seven international oil companies. In foreign operations, production by small companies is not economically practical as in the United States, where a ready open market exists for crude oil. The prospective investor in foreign oil must negotiate with foreign governments who own the subsoil rights, rather than with individuals; he must explore and find new areas of oil, and then produce it. Because of the absence of an open market for crude oil in foreign areas, he must undertake great investments in facilities to process and transport the oil to the distant consuming markets. The investment required is so vast as to discourage any small company from attempting to compete with the international oil companies.[19]

Subject to a minimum of generalized government control, the seven great corporate systems negotiate and contract directly with the world's sovereign nations. They constitute a world-wide industry upon which the sun never sets and upon which the entire free world depends for its liquid fuel requirements. Its size, resources and technology inspire confidence in its ability to supply the world with petroleum in the near and long-term future; but within this great economic power lies danger to the political stability of producing countries, should misguided policies be pursued.

The oil-rich countries cannot attain political security without an expanding economy and an enlightened nationalism to promote internal strength and stability through political par-

[19] Total investment of private companies in foreign oil operations probably exceeds $7 billion. Compensating for the huge capital requirements are the high profits—much of the investment is represented by plowed-back earnings from oil sales in previous years.

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ticipation by their own peoples. Neither can the free world remain politically secure in the long-term future without a positive policy toward these countries. Since the principal revenue and trade of oil-producing countries are generated by petroleum exports, it is essential that an equitable relationship, based on mutual confidence, exist between the company and the country. This arrangement must realistically reflect world conditions as they change. In the absence of an over-all petroleum policy,[20] the industry is called upon to assume a political rôle which, to say the least, is a unique responsibility for private enterprise.

While varying in degree, the following major elements are common to each country's relations with the oil companies:

1) The countries identify the companies with the earlier colonial policies of their home governments. Therefore, in these areas, the industry now operates under the handicap of a political heritage of suppressed or open resentment.

2) The structure, ownership and development of the industry itself have been enormously influenced by policies of the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. Consciously or otherwise, these governments have encouraged the growth of a closely knit industry whose collective economic power can bear heavily upon the small oil countries.

3) Even in the absence of political interference, the impact of the oil industry operations on the economy of the producing countries creates a complex of internal political and economic problems.

4) Permeating the relationship is a psychological clash resulting from the contrast between the old and new: differences in customs, attitudes and beliefs.

Production in overseas areas generally has outraced the formulation of companionate policies aimed at politico-economic relationship between the private oil company and the foreign government. These inherent problems have received little study or examination, except by those few concerned in day-

[20] Attempts to establish an international petroleum policy have so far been abortive. An Anglo-American "Agreement on Petroleum", signed in Washington on August 8, 1944, was never ratified. A much-watered-down version was signed in London on September 24, 1945, but was also rejected by the United States Senate. A similar attempt by the United Nations has met with little success.

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to-day relationships. Only when disturbances or failures occur and are headlined in the world press is any public attention directed to this twentieth-century phenomenon and its twentieth-century problems.

* * * * *

Impact on the Producing Countries

The development of a twentieth-century oil industry in underdeveloped, agricultural, or nomadic societies has created a complex tangle of economic, social and political problems. This is only too apparent from a consideration of the adjustment in national policies required to deal with sudden and vast oil revenues, the industry's employment of native labor, and the growth of a major industry without a concomitant development of balancing and supporting enterprises.

Today, foreign oil-producing countries are confronted with a level of revenue which would have seemed fantastic by calculations before World War II. Production has skyrocketed in many of these countries, while per barrel royalties are two to four times higher. It may be estimated that collectively they receive a present annual income of one billion dollars as oil revenues. By 1975, assuming the same royalty rates per barrel and foreign production of the forecasted level, the collective annual income should exceed $4.5 billion. The adjustment required in the intelligent administration of such vast revenue poses one of the major problems in the long-term security of foreign oil deposits. Present annual oil revenues on a family basis, for example, would probably amount to as much as $500 in Venezuela and $6,000 in Kuwait. If these revenues are used wisely for the benefit of the local population, the people will tend to give to their government and to the company that support which will promote security of the oil operations. If they are unwisely spent, the government as well as the company becomes vulnerable to popular attack.

Almost insurmountable obstacles stand in the way of utilizing revenues for social purposes. At the grass-roots level one finds a growing political consciousness and a demand to share in the benefits of the new-found wealth, but there is generally

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lacking the technical knowledge by which this capital can be put to work in industry, commerce and agriculture. Since very little popular benefit would be achieved by the direct distribution of these revenues to the people, the governments are faced with the tremendous task of undertaking immediate far-reaching social and economic programs. Because this wealth must be nationally administered, these programs tend to become politically vulnerable as are all precipitous social changes undertaken by a government. In some areas, the necessary social programs are hampered by the lack of local political organizations, and yet these programs must accomplish in a few years what has taken other societies, through individually directed adjustments, generations to accomplish.

The oil industry's employment of native labor raises similar problems. The companies are able to pay higher wages than native employers, and in addition provide schools, housing and medical facilities superior to those generally found in the country.[21] The remainder of the population benefits little from the companies' operations, unless the government uses oil revenues for public works, housing and health programs,[22] over which the companies have no influence. If the government fails to undertake such programs, or until the results of such programs are felt throughout the country, the oil companies generally receive no favorable recognition from the people and, in fact, may be resented for creating a small elite working class. If the company does not provide modern accommodations for its employees and pay higher than subsistence wages, it will be charged with exploitation. Inevitably, the technology of oil production requires relatively small numbers of unskilled labor except in the initial construction period. But their wages and other oil company expenditures have a disproportionate infla-

[21] In Venezuela and Arabia, American oil companies have followed a conscientious policy of promoting the welfare of their employees. In other areas, companies have been criticized for failing to carry out such welfare programs by constructing adequate housing, schools and medical facilities.

[22] The Venezuelan government has made a good start in the use of national income derived from oil for public works such as highways, paved streets, schools, airports, port improvements, hospitals, low-cost housing, irrigation, reforestation and agriculture.

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tionary impact on the country's economy which often results in resentment by the many who derive no apparent benefits from company operations.

The fact that the industry requires relatively few employees has another political effect of great importance. Generally, industrialization draws together large groups of laboring people. This concentration facilitates the exchange of ideas leading to a rise in educational levels and in political organization. As national income rises through industrialization, there follows, among other developments, the concomitant growth of a politically articulate group, capable of assuming political responsibility. But the employment requirements of the oil industry are not of sufficient magnitude to accomplish this political objective.

A third problem arises from the sudden growth of a major industry without an accompanying development of collateral industries. In more advanced areas, as a rule, the growth of a large new industry fosters general economic development and prosperity since the new industry must be supplied with many types of goods and services. Because of general underdevelopment in the oil-producing areas, the companies have preferred to import all necessary goods and services from abroad; and in the case of British companies, from home markets. Plentiful foreign exchange from oil revenues likewise tends to encourage the oil country itself to buy abroad instead of fostering local industries. The failure to develop domestic industries retards the formation and growth of a productive middle class.

Political and Psychological Factors

The security of foreign oil reserves is further complicated by the circumstance that they are located in countries formerly or presently dominated by foreign nations. It is also generally the case, as previously pointed out, that companies of the dominating nation have established preëmptive control of the oil resources. These companies are severely handicapped by their own lingering traditional policies, and the continuing distrust of the local people. In this respect, the American companies have a clear advantage over the British companies in the Middle

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East because that area traditionally fell within the sphere of influence of the British. Similarly, in the Far East where the Dutch reigned, the American companies are less handicapped than Royal Dutch Shell. But in Venezuela, British-Dutch and American companies appear to be on an equal footing for the reason that that country has remained free from foreign domination.

The psychological attitudes of local people are of major importance, and yet they are most difficult to deal with. The local citizenry, once aroused, is inclined to favor for many years thereafter the dispossession and expulsion of all things foreign, including oil companies. Little value is placed on the long-term contribution which foreign enterprise can make to the economy. The zealous enterprise of foreign oil companies is regarded, on the whole, as a purely selfish interest motivated by the desire for quick and excessive profits, and indifferent to the local people and the things they cherish. In sum, the people fear eventual exhaustion of their natural resources with little permanent return or benefit to their country.

In a typical operating plant of the oil industry, skilled foreign employees for the most part live and work under "imported" living standards, far higher than those enjoyed by the local population. Unavoidable though this may be, if the skilled services of technicians are to be had, local resentment is stirred by the thought that such "luxury" is paid for by the oil resources, benefiting the foreigner while impoverishing the native. The average native is likely to feel that the wages and taxes left in his country are woefully out of balance and that more of the profit should be reinvested within the country. The company's own local employees, enjoying greater benefits than the working class generally, may not share this feeling, but even among the native employees, resentment normally follows a company's policy of restricting the better jobs to foreign personnel.

The companies, it should be noted, have a psychological attitude of their own to overcome; namely, the tendency to view their operations too strictly as a business venture which must be appraised as a success or failure in purely profit-and-loss terms

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at the end of each fiscal year. A broader understanding and mutuality of interest, based on long-term considerations, must be established if foreign oil reserves are to be made secure for the future.

Conclusion

Whatever stability in foreign crude oil production there was in the Middle East and Far East prior to World War II was brought about chiefly through sheer political domination by the Big Powers. In the present international climate, this relationship cannot make these great foreign oil reserves secure for the future needs of the free world. At the present time no conscious policy for promoting this security is evident on the part of either Great Britain or the United States. While in theory the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands may have applied the laissez-faire doctrine to the oil companies, in practice they have actively supported the industry without assuming any responsibility for its direction. That this traditional policy is suited to modern-day international conditions is open to serious doubt. In fact, since oil security is now a matter of global concern, there is substantial merit in the view that an international petroleum policy, reflecting the needs of all countries, should be developed through the United Nations. But, up to the present, attempts to formulate such a policy have failed at both the Anglo-American and the broader international levels.

This policy vacuum has cast an unusual burden upon the management of oil companies. Because petroleum is so vital, Great Britain, the United States and other Powers cannot avoid intervening in the event of crisis; but, in this intervention, the tendency is to meet critical situations on a piecemeal, *ad hoc* basis, to be guided by expediency rather than by a long-term policy formulated through intelligent planning and foresight. Moreover, the intervention is frequently influenced by the temporary fashions of domestic politics, which tend to aggravate, rather than alleviate, the insecurity and fears of producing countries. Such a state of affairs does not inspire confidence in the long-range security of foreign oil.

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Because colonialism is imprinted in the thoughts of local people, to the discredit of colonial Powers, like the British and the Dutch, these Powers should withdraw from active formulation of policy affecting the interests of these critical areas. In their place, the United States should step forward with an affirmative policy of over-all leadership, which should strive to achieve mutual objectives of economic and political stability. This policy of American leadership could be based in part on idealism, but to a greater degree it should rest on the practical consideration that the United States is increasingly dependent upon foreign oil and that Americans have the greatest investment in the production of foreign reserves and the distribution facilities which supply oil to the free world.

The problem of security of foreign petroleum resources will not be met alone by paying fair-share royalties to the local governments. In the main this has been done, and any inequities can be resolved by negotiation in an atmosphere of good will. The essential problem lies in patiently encouraging and assisting the local governments to devote their newly found income to programs dedicated to the betterment of their people's economic and social welfare. In attainment of these goals, these countries will need the full support of the United States, and the United States should also undertake economic and political programs. These could draw heavily upon: the *Open-Door* policy designed to afford equal access to commercial opportunities to nationals of all countries; the *good-neighbor* policy, designed to support the sovereignty and political integrity of small nations and to accord them favorable trade conditions; and the *helping-hand* policy, to aid underdeveloped countries in their achievement of economic self-sufficiency, primarily by exporting American technical proficiency. It is this practical demonstration of the good will of the United States and the benefit of its technical superiority which the oil countries today need above all else in building up the economic foundations of agriculture, industry and commerce necessary to support internal political stability. If this recommended program should clash with existing policies of colonial-minded nations, the conflict must be resolved by stressing the importance of the oil-

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producing countries and the contribution which they can make to the free world. There must be no doubt as to the sincerity and positiveness of American policy and its rejection of colonial influences or motives.

Similarly, the oil companies themselves, in recognizing their responsibility to the free world as well as in furtherance of their own interests, should implement the broader governmental programs by a "Point Four" type program within their own operations. Nationals should be trained to achieve the maximum employment of local labor and talents, thus minimizing the use of foreign personnel. Maximum reliance should be placed on local industry and agriculture for goods and services. In the contractual relationships between governments and companies, the legal obligations of earlier agreements should be modified realistically, to the extent dictated by present equitable considerations. The companies and the countries should stand ready to reappraise the terms of royalties and concessions where necessary to reflect changing world conditions, recognizing that the economic circumstances affecting petroleum on a world-wide basis are not static.

In addition to building up their economic and political institutions, oil-producing countries, in their own interest, must become well informed on the economics of the international oil industry. They should avoid a state of dependence upon agents or representatives of oil companies for information and analysis pertinent to their negotiations on concessions and royalty payments. Such a condition of dependency breeds fear and suspicion and works as much against the long-term interest of the companies as it does against the countries. A basis of mutual understanding between country and company is possible only with common understanding of the facts arrived at through independent investigation and evaluation by each party.

Just as world peace must be built upon economic and political interdependence among nations, a secure relationship between oil companies and producing countries can be achieved only by a coöperative effort in promoting their mutual interests.

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NOTES ON THE USE OF THE WORD "DEMOCRACY" 1789-1799

THE word "democracy" has today become a general symbol of widely held political and personal values. Four things may be said about it. First, the use of the word is extremely frequent. Second, it is used in a favorable sense by all parties. No one in the United States condemns democracy as such, or by name; disapproval falls only on what are thought to be dangers, misconceptions or perversions in execution of the democratic ideal. Even the Soviets favor a "people's democracy", though one may question the genuineness of their belief, and it is certain that they would not use the word except for its prestige in the West. Third, especially in the United States, the word carries an emotional charge, having a capacity to inspire. Lastly, all these features in its use—the frequency, the uniformly favorable sense, the emotional content—are relatively recent. A study published in 1952 by the Hoover Institute gives statistical confirmation to what we all roughly sense, namely, that the use of the word "democracy", as a frequent symbol of political values, dates from the period of the First World War.[1]

About a year ago, in an article somewhat presumptuously entitled "Reflections on the French Revolution", I ventured to suggest that much of Europe and America, in the 1790's, was seized by a great revolutionary agitation in which the principal issue was the conflict between democracy and aristocracy.[2] While not wishing to exaggerate the significance of this idea, which is after all not very novel, I think it may be said that not everyone was convinced. Some prefer to emphasize the bourgeois or nationalist character of the French Revolution, or its peculiarities of social psychology or quasi-religious faith; and as

[1] Ithiel de Sola Pool, with the collaboration of Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, *Symbols of Democracy* (Stanford, 1952), pp. 6-16.

[2] See the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, March 1952, pp. 64-80.

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for revolutions at the time outside of France, as in the Batavian or Cisalpine Republics, they are commonly regarded as somewhat farcical collaborationism with the conquering French armies. American scholars have been more reluctant than those of other countries to acknowledge the movement of the 1790's as democratic. Valjavec in Germany, Colenbrander and Blok in Holland; Rota, Morandi, Zaghi and Peroni in Italy; Suzanne Tassier in Belgium; Oechsli in Switzerland; Lefebvre, Godechot, Bourgin and Jacques Droz in France; P. A. Brown in England and Meikle in Scotland—all speak without hesitation of a "democratic" agitation in their respective countries in the last decade of the eighteenth century. They use the word occasionally to refer broadly to the general changes then attempted, but more often, and more specifically, to mean small groups on the radical wing of reformist or revolutionary coalitions.

Did these small groups call themselves "democrats"? Did anyone accept the word "democracy" as a fair term for his own ideas? Did the word, at that time, have a "good sense", and if so, for whom? What was its frequency, its connotation, its emotional impact; and at what date did it enter practical politics? Lacking the resources of the Hoover Institute, the present author cannot give a statistical answer to these questions; but he has formed certain impressions.

The word "democracy", like "aristocracy" and "monarchy", was of course as old as Aristotle or his translators, and the three terms were in the common vocabulary of political thinkers continuously since the Middle Ages. There is some evidence that the most rural and innermost of the Swiss cantons, and some of the German free cities, thought of themselves as democratic in the eighteenth century. Except for "monarchy", however, none of the three terms seems really to have entered the common speech. They were political scientists' words, tools of analysis, closely defined, dry in connotation and without emotional impact. It was generally agreed that "pure democracy" could not exist, except possibly in very small states with simple habits. At the most, democracy was a principle, or element, which might profitably enter into a "mixed constitution", balanced by principles of monarchy and aristocracy,

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as was believed to be the case in England or the Venetian Republic. It is rare, even among the *philosophes* of France before the Revolution, to find anyone using the word "democracy" in a favorable sense in any practical connection.

Such a man can, however, be found. He is a French nobleman and sometime minister of the state, the Marquis d'Argenson, who in the 1730's allowed to circulate secretly, in manuscript, his *Considerations on the Government of France*. D'Argenson here reviews French history. He finds that the growing power of the kings has favored equality and democracy as against nobility and aristocracy. He repeatedly uses the term "democracy". He emphatically does not want it mixed with aristocracy. He speaks of "that fortunate progress of Democracy which we admire in the reigns free from civil war." He expects and hopes that this progress of democracy will continue. He is surprisingly like Tocqueville a century later in his view of French history—except that he is more unreservedly in favor of democracy than Tocqueville. We may note, too, in D'Argenson, the tendency to think of democracy as equality rather than as self-government (opposing it to "aristocracy", rather than to "monarchy"), and the emancipation from the traditional idea that democracy could be realized only in tiny and virtuous societies.

The two nouns, "democrat" and "aristocrat", did not exist until the very last years of the Old Regime. No "democrats" fought in the American Revolution; and the Age of Aristocracy, as long as it was unchallenged, heard nothing of "aristocrats". Neither word was used in English before 1789; in France, *aristocrate* crops up in the reign of Louis XVI, *démocrate* not until 1789. It may be that the words were first coined by the Dutch. It seems certain, in any case, that their first currency was in the Low Countries, in the Dutch revolution of 1784-87 and the Belgian revolution of 1789-91. We find *aristocraten* used by Dutch burghers as early as 1784. The Rotterdam patrician, van Hogendorp, writing in the French language in 1786, declares that his country is troubled by a cabal. "People say", he adds, "that this cabal is divided into aristocrats and democrats." Hogendorp thought that the

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House of Orange, while retaining its independence, " should nevertheless incline more to the democrats than to the aristocrats, since the former at least claim to represent the good of the people." " Aristocrat " entered into popular parlance among the Dutch in these years; but " democrat " remained rare, the popular party called itself Patriot. In Belgium, however, that is, the Austrian Netherlands, in the revolt of 1789 against the emperor, the advanced party came to call itself Democrat. By January 1791 its leaders were speaking of *les braves Démocrates* and *les bons Démocrates*. One even wrote, in a letter to a colleague in 1790, " *Vive la Démocratie!* " The Dutch movement was put down by Prussian and British intervention in 1787; in Belgium, the Austrians suppressed the rebellion on the eve of the invasion of France in 1792.[3]

The extreme frequency of " aristocrat " in France during the Revolution is well known, and it seems to us to have been applied indiscriminately, and in fact falsely, to a great many people. To us, the word means a member of an aristocratic class; it does not mean one who is an adherent of, or believer in, an aristocratic society. There is no reason, however, why it should not have had these meanings when it was coined; the word " democrat ", conversely to " aristocrat ", does not mean a member of a democratic class; it does mean an adherent of, or believer in, a democratic society. It is possible, therefore, that " aristocrat " was used less loosely and irrationally than is supposed, since there were undoubtedly millions of " aristocrats " in France in the extended and now obsolete sense of the word.

" Democrat " was rarely used in France, despite its currency in Belgium in 1790 and 1791. It was probably coined, in France as in Holland or Belgium, in contradistinction to " aris-

[3] See " aristocrat " and " democrat " in the *New English Dictionary on Historical Principles* (Oxford, 1888-1928), and in Ferdinand Brunot, *Histoire de la langue française* (Paris, 1905-48), vol. IX; P. Geyl, *De Patriottenbeweging* (Amsterdam, 1947), pp. 113, 124-25, 171, 201; Gijsbert Karl van Hogendorp, *Brieven en Gedenkschriften* (The Hague, 1866-1903), vol. II, pp. 55 and 60-61; Suzanne Tassier, *Les démocrates belges de 1789: Étude sur le Vonckisme et la Révolution brabançonne* (Brussels, 1930), in *Mémoires de l'Académie royale de Belgique. Classe des Lettres*, 2nd ser., vol. 28, pp. 405, 421, 424, 425, 430.

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tocrat". Ferdinand Brunot, in his tremendous history of the French language, lists two hundred and six nouns and phrases designating political alignments during the Revolution. "Democrat" is in the list, but there are many more familiar terms, such as "patriots", "Jacobins" or "sans-culottes". Dubois-Crancé, the future regicide, used it in 1790 in speaking on the military policy suitable to the new France. He describes the citizen soldier—"a patriot, an honest democrat."[4] The word was common enough to arouse the notice of contemporaries. One writer, explaining the various neologisms of the day in his *Nouveau dictionnaire,* observed in 1791: "*Aristocrat.* Arrangement of syllables which . . . produces a most strange effect on the animal called *democrat.* . . . And in fact, what has brought on this revolution? Is it not arrangements of syllables offered by the words *aristocracy, liberty, equality*?"[5]

It is often said, at least in America, that "democracy" and "democrat", as far as they had any currency at all, were foisted by the conservatives upon sympathizers with the revolution—that they were terms of abuse or reproach, smear-words, used to discredit people who would not use them of themselves. This belief, if it exists, perhaps derives largely from the fact that Thomas Jefferson did not feel comfortable with the word "democrat". It may be due to some indirect English influence, for it seems that, although there were tens of thousands of persons, in England and Scotland, who were partisans of the French Revolution and who demanded drastic changes in church and state, they spoke of "democracy" much less often than similar persons in America or Continental Europe. Wordsworth did indeed say in a private letter in 1794: "I am of that odius class of men called democrats."[6] But he said it with a note of defiance which eloquently suggests the disrepute of the word. Even today, according to the Hoover Institute study above mentioned, only 50 per cent of the people of Great Britain think they live in a democracy, whereas 65 per cent in

[4] *Archives parlementaires* (1st ser., Paris, 1867-1913), vol. XX, p. 607.

[5] Brunot, *op. cit.*, p. 652.

[6] *Letters of the Wordsworth Family from 1787 to 1855*, ed. by William Knight (London, 1907), vol. I, p. 66.

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France, 88 per cent in the United States and 95 per cent in Sweden believe their countries to be democratic. A third possible reason for the belief that "democracy" was a word used in the 1790's mainly by conservatives, and always in a derogatory sense, is the analogy to the use of "communism" in recent times. Men have been falsely and loosely called "communists". Hence they were falsely and loosely called "democrats". The analogy is inexact. One is either a Communist or one is not; there is a positive Communist organization to which some belong and some do not. There was no such positive organization of democrats in the 1790's. Democracy in the 1790's was also more of a native American product than communism has been at any time since 1917. If, therefore, a conservative in 1795 called a man a "democrat" there was a strong possibility that he was using a sufficiently appropriate, though admittedly vague, expression.

It is not the purpose of this paper to give examples of "democracy" used in a "bad" sense, that is, by conservatives using the word erroneously or hysterically. Such examples would not be new, and would be easy to find. Thus, Edmund Burke remarked in 1790 that France "affects to be a pure democracy" (which it certainly did not), and that "a perfect democracy is the most shameless thing in the world."[7] In 1791 he advised that Canada must receive an appointive upper house, since an elected one would be "democratical", and in 1795 he declared that some recent proposals for parliamentary reform had threatened England with "the death dance of democratic revolution."[8] William Cobbett, under the name Peter Porcupine, published in Philadelphia in 1796 a pamphlet entitled *History of the American Jacobins Commonly Denominated Democrats*. The intent was clearly to throw a bad odor on the word,

[7] "Reflections on the Revolution in France" in *The Works of Edmund Burke* (Boston, 1839), vol. III, pp. 150 and 116.

[8] *Parliamentary History . . . to the Year 1803*, vol. XXIX, col. 420; and "A letter from the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke to a Noble Lord, on the attacks made upon him and his pension in the House of Lords by the Duke of Bedford and the Earl of Lauderdale . . . in . . . 1796", in *Works*, vol. IV, p. 290. Bedford and Lauderdale, who favored Parliamentary reform, had questioned the propriety of a life pension of £2,500 per annum granted by the government to Burke.

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nor was the allegation true, since the persons in question were not "commonly" called democrats. The same intent (and falsehood) is clear when Cobbett associates democrats with foreigners: "Two thirds of the Democrats were foreigners, landed in the United States since the war." Or when he suggests bribery: "Neither the Malcontents of Geneva, the Patriots in Holland, nor the Reformers in Great Britain and Ireland, were half so well adapted to the reception of Jacobinical doctrines and Louis-d'ors [that is, gold pieces] as the *Anti-federalists* in America." Or that democrats were scum: since Genêt, French minister to Philadelphia, was "unencumbered with the family pride of the French chevaliers, he could visit the democratic club and give the fraternal buss to its shirtless members." The leading American democrats were not shirtless, and Genêt was in fact by origin a "chevalier".[9] That European gentlemen could embrace democratic opinions was very disturbing to certain gentlemen in America.

It is more enlightening to find conservatives using the term "democracy", and its derivatives, in an unexcited, neutral or objective way. They used it, of course, to indicate a political tendency or form of government in which they did not believe. Let us admit, however, that not everyone in the Western tradition has always believed in democracy, that many and indeed most intelligent and well-disposed persons in the eighteenth century did not believe in it, and that disbelief at that time is no sign of prejudice or fanaticism, or even of blind class interest. Let us accept, at least as a hypothesis, that people knew what they were talking about. The conservative use of "democrat", like the revolutionary use of "aristocrat", could at times have an objective meaning.

Sometimes the usage arises from accepted political science, or from existing institutions. In a Westphalian principality both

[9] Peter Porcupine (William Cobbett), *History of the American Jacobins Commonly Denominated Democrats, being a supplement to the History of Jacobinism* (Philadelphia, 1796), pp. 25, 6, 8. *Cf.* the *Pennsylvania Gazette,* October 18, 1797, as quoted by John C. Miller, *Crisis in Freedom: The Alien and Sedition Acts* (Boston, 1951), p. 32, where American "Jacobins" are called "vile organs of a foreign democracy." The foreign democracy is of course France, but the dreaded foreign democrats were English, Scotch and Irish.

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the "aristocratic" and the "democratic" estates are reported to be "murmuring".[10] The pensionary of Holland advises the stadholder, William V, to "yield neither to aristocracy nor to democracy."[11] The British *Annual Register* remarks in 1790 on affairs in France: "The democrates [French spelling] have already stripped the nobility of all power."[12] The consort of Archduchess Marie-Christine, regent of the Belgian provinces, reports to the Emperor Leopold II in 1790 that matters in Belgium "may come to an explosion in which the Democrat party, getting the upper hand over the Aristocrats, will suppress the Congress of Estates and replace it with a National Assembly, on the model of France"—but his sentiments are almost neutral, for the Hapsburg government under Joseph II and Leopold II was no friend of the privileged classes.[13] The Dutch van Hogendorp diagnoses the great problem of the day, writing in Rotterdam in 1791: it is a dispute between an old and a new system, between the idea that some people have a right to govern, and the idea of "Sovereignty of the People, or Democracy."[14] Hogendorp's practical conservative wisdom may be refreshingly compared with that of Burke. The Marquis de Bouillé, a French professional army officer of considerable attainments, observes in 1791, "I am neither an aristocrat nor a democrat." He was able, despite the tensions of revolution, to carry on a rational and courteous conversation with a member of the former Third Estate who disagreed with him.[15] Viscount Castlereagh, the same who after 1814 became the hobgoblin of reaction, served from 1798 to 1800 as Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, which was then in a state of suppressed revolution. He notes that "the general democratic

[10] Joseph Hansen, *Quellen zur Geschichte des Rheinlandes im Zeitalter der französischen Revolution, 1780-1801* (Bonn, 1931-38), vol. II, p. 579, n. 1.

[11] H. T. Colenbrander, *Gedenkstukken der Algemeene Geschiedenis van Nederland van 1795 tot 1840* (The Hague, 1905-22), vol. I, p. 401.

[12] See the *New English Dictionary* under "democrat". This is the earliest case recorded for the word "democrat".

[13] Tassier, *op. cit.*, pp. 330-31. See also pp. 343, 422, 432.

[14] Hogendorp, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 61.

[15] *Memoires du Marquis de Bouillé*, ed. by St.A. Berville and J. F. Barrière (Paris, 1821), p. 207.

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power of the State is increasing daily by the general wealth and prosperity," and that "the Catholics form the greater part of the democracy."[16] That this is a reasonable statement, on the part of an Anglican and aristocrat, is suggested by the fact that another Irishman of extreme opposite persuasion, Wolfe Tone, a Presbyterian and a republican, says the same thing. Tone, like Castlereagh, spoke of the "democracy of new men in Ireland", and believed that many Catholics belonged to it.[17] The difference is that whereas Castlereagh used the word to designate a movement to which he did not belong, Tone used it to describe himself and his party. There was apparently more inclination among Irish radicals than among the Scotch and English to adopt the word.

Among border-line cases, falling uncertainly between an objective and a denunciatory use by conservatives, one may exhibit the following curious miscellany: The King of Prussia, in his proclamation justifying invasion of Poland, leading to the second partition, deplores the anarchy reigning in Poland and the *débordement du démocratisme français* in that chaotic country.[18] Henry Dundas in England, on the eve of British occupation of the Dutch colonies, remarks that there are "too many democrats at the Cape of Good Hope."[19] The British minister to Venice, on the eve of the arrival of French troops and concurrent revolution of the Venetians, reports to his superiors: "If the absolute Democracy takes place tomorrow . . . I shall take down His Majesty's Arms and endeavour to get away."[20] Nor was his apprehension wholly groundless: a

[16] *Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh, second Marquess of Londonderry, edited by his brother* (London, 1848-53), vol. II, p. 140.

[17] *The Life of Theobald Wolfe Tone . . . written by himself . . . with fragments of his diary* (Washington, 1826), vol. I, p. 49. Tone speaks fairly often of a democratic party among both the Irish and the Dutch; see vol. II, pp. 43, 49, 61, 373, 494, and *passim*.

[18] Zajazek, *Histoire de le Révolution de Pologne en 1794 par un témoin oculaire* (Paris, An V—1797), prints Frederick William's proclamation in full, p. 248.

[19] Historical Manuscripts Commission, *The Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue, Esq., preserved at Dropmore* (London, 1892-1927), vol. II, p. 645.

[20] Cecil Roth, "La caduta della Serenissima nei dispacci del residente inglese a Venezia", in *Archivio veneto*, fifth series, 1935, p. 211.

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Venetian named Marcello had already said, in the Senate, that Venice needed a *volontaria democratizazzione del Governo*, and that it was impossible any longer to sustain a discredited aristocracy alongside the new *governo democratico italiano* in the neighboring Cisalpine Republic.[21]

Let us close the conservative list with two contrasting observations, not without an uncanny relevancy to later times. The French royalist, Montgaillard, saw a kind of creeping democracy everywhere. "Old Europe is decaying . . . its blindness is such that the democratic principle spreads even in the cabinets . . . emissaries of the Convention prepare their poison even in the councils of kings." A noted conservative, John Adams, president of the United States, remarked in 1800, after the hubbub of the Alien and Sedition Laws, "There is danger of proscribing, under imputations of democracy, some of the ablest, most influential, and best characters in the Union."[22]

There remain those uses of "democracy", and its derivatives, by persons employing it in a favorable sense, either to denote their own ideas, or to mean ideas or actions of which they could approve. Even with these people, it remained an occasional word. It never became a slogan, a cliché or a symbol (except possibly in Italy, as will be seen); it never took on the frequency, or the appeal, of words like "liberty", "rights", "equality", or "republic". It remained generally a cold and even intellectual word. It had, however, no exactly defined meaning. It signified popular government or equality of rights and of civil status, but it still carried, sometimes, the sense of the traditional political science, that is, the idea of direct democracy in local assemblies of citizens. We shall see Thomas Paine, Robespierre and the Dutch trying to define democracy in a new way, to disengage it from the old sense of direct democracy which was not applicable in modern conditions, but which was the only sense known to serious political theorists,

[21] Annibale Bozzola, "L'ultimo doge e la caduta della Serenissima", in *Nuova Rivista Storica*, vol. XVIII (1934), p. 43.

[22] J. G. M. de Montgaillard, *L'An 1795, ou conjectures sur les suites de la Révolution française* (Hamburg, 1795), p. 5; John Adams, *Works* (Boston, 1850-56), vol. IX, p. 87.

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even including Rousseau—and barring such sports as the Marquis d'Argenson, mentioned above. The problem was, essentially, how any representative government, or government in which legislators and officials could enforce obedience against the citizen's will, could really be democratic; that is, how government and democracy were compatible at all. This difficulty gives a certain sense to conservative apothegms, as when Gouverneur Morris remarked that democracy was no government, and that every society needed an aristocracy; or when a German professor called democracy an *Unding*, an "un-thing", though he was prepared in principle to accept a republic.[23]

There are few examples of the use of "democracy" by Frenchmen, in a favorable sense, in the first years of the Revolution, despite its currency in these same years in Belgium. The word is noticeably absent from the debates on universal suffrage in 1790, though we find Dubois-Crancé mentioning his "honest democrat" in that year. In 1791 Brissot claimed to advocate "a popular monarchy, tending to the popular side. Such is my democracy."[24] In 1793, when Louis XVI was executed, the drums rolled to deafen the last sounds and the crowds shouted "*Vive la République!*" One young man heard, or at least reported, "Long live Democracy!" He was, however, a Greek, writing to a fellow countryman in the Greek language. To him "democracy", not being a foreign or learned word, could convey a feeling that it lacked for western Europeans; he used it naturally, as a translation for the Latin "republic" and for the ideals and passions that he sensed in revolutionary Paris.[25]

With the advent of the Jacobins and the Terror, "democracy" became more frequent, though never common. It was oc-

[23] Gouverneur Morris as quoted by Dixon R. Fox, *Decline of Aristocracy in the Politics of New York* (New York, 1919), pp. 6 and 11; *Deutsches Magazin*, January 1798, p. 3.

[24] *Patriote français*, April 9, 1791.

[25] L. Lair and E. Legrand, *Documents inédits sur l'histoire de la Révolution française: correspondance de Paris, Vienne, Berlin, Varsovie, Constantinople* (Paris, 1872), p. 61. I am indebted to my assistant, Demetrios Pentzopolous, for reading the letters of Constantine Stamati, included in this volume. Stamati dated some of his letters of 1793 "the second year after democracy." See pp. 37, 53, 64, and *passim*.

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casionally used at the Jacobin Club, where Camille Desmoulins cried that "the English people must be exterminated from Europe, unless they democratize themselves!" Herault-Séchelles, submitting what is called the Jacobin constitution to the Convention for adoption, praised it as "representative and democratic". The constitution itself, though in fact democratic, allowing universal male suffrage and providing measures of initiative and referendum, does not use the word.[26]

The *locus classicus* for the word "democracy" during the French Revolution is the speech of Robespierre in the Convention on February 5, 1794.[27] This speech is often quoted. It is the one in which he defines Virtue and Terror. There is a fragment from it in a book of readings currently used by American college students. What is quoted here is Robespierre's moral exhortations rather than his remarks on democracy, although one might suppose the latter to have at least equal educational value. Not counting sporadic occurrences, he uses the word "democracy", while specifically on the subject, eleven times in the space of seven hundred words, or in about five minutes of speaking time.

"It is time", he says, "to mark clearly the aim of the revolution." It is to make better and happier human beings. Only one form of government can accomplish this.

> Only democratic or republican government; these two words are synonymous, despite the abuse of popular language, for aristocracy is no more the republic than monarchy is. Democracy is not a state in which the people, continually assembled, itself directs public affairs; still less is it a state in which a hundred thousand fragments of the people, by contradictory, hasty and isolated measures, should decide on the destiny of society as a whole; such a government has never existed, and if it did could do nothing but throw the people back into despotism.

Robespierre here is not merely criticizing direct democracy in theory, but attacking the "primary assemblies" which were

[26] A. Aulard, *La Société des Jacobins* (Paris, 1889-97), vol. V, pp. 79, 492, 556, 623, and *passim*; *Moniteur*, June 10, 1793.

[27] *Moniteur*, February 7, 1794; see also C. Vellay, *Discours et rapports de Robespierre* (Paris, 1908), pp. 324-328.

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then very active—the local assemblies in which citizens met and voted, and of which those of the Paris "sections" were politically the most powerful. He is asserting the authority of government, duly elected and responsible, over the people.

> Democracy is a state in which the people, as sovereign, guided by laws of its own making, does for itself all that it can do well, and by its delegates what it cannot. . . .
>
> But, to establish and consolidate democracy among us, to arrive at the peaceful rule of constitutional laws, it is necessary to bring the war of liberty against tyranny to an end, and to pass successfully through the storms of the revolution; such is the aim of the emergency régime [*système révolutionnaire*] which you have regularized.[28]

He goes on to argue that the "soul" of democracy is "public virtue" and "love of equality".

> Democracy is the only form of state which all the individuals composing it can truly call their country, and which can therefore count on as many interested defenders as it has citizens. . . .
>
> The French are the first people in the world to establish a true democracy, by calling all men to enjoy equality and the fulness of civic rights; and that, in my opinion, is the real reason why all the tyrants allied against the Republic will be defeated.

Clearly we sense here some of the overtones which "democracy", according to the Hoover Institute study, began to take on during the First World War. Charles James Fox had the temerity to say somewhat the same thing in the House of Commons in 1797.[29] But, on the whole, the ideas just quoted from

[28] For members and adherents of the National Convention after the decree of October 10, 1793, which declared the government *révolutionnaire jusqu'à la paix*, the word *révolutionnaire* meant the admittedly unconstitutional and extra-legal régime believed necessary to win the war, and, in the minds of some, to establish a democratic constitutional government. Comparison has often been made to the Marxist idea of a (supposedly temporary) dictatorship of the proletariat believed necessary to establish socialism. It seems salutary to suggest, therefore, that, in principle, the same idea has existed in the American political tradition. See an article on a wholly different subject, by Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., "The President and the Law", in the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, September 1952.

[29] John Russell, *Life and Times of Charles James Fox* (London, 1866), vol. III, pp. 118-120.

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Robespierre were "before their time"; that is to say, in less metaphysical language, they could not be realized because of the number of people, in and out of France, who did not share them or who positively resisted them.

Soon after this speech by Robespierre the really internecine, and politically least justifiable, phase of the Terror began, culminating in Robespierre's own death six months later. Thereupon there was general agreement, even by revolutionaries far to the left, to regard Robespierre's ambition, or his fanaticism, as the cause of the late troubles. The association of "democracy" with Robespierre, and hence with terror and judicial murder, naturally tended to discredit democracy itself. Except for the victims and their families, it may be said without too much paradox that the Reign of Terror was an extraordinarily fortunate windfall for the conservatives. It "proved" the worst that they could say about democracy.

There remained in France, under the Directory, amorphous democratic groups which looked back with favor on the Constitution of the Year I (1793) and the Committee on Public Safety. They were often quite respectable people, and represented no single social class. At Toulouse, for example, they included a few of the wealthiest citizens, and many business men and lawyers as well as artisans, tradesmen and mechanics.[30] These "Jacobins" even won a national election in 1798, to no avail, since they were put down by a *coup d'état*. How often they employed the word "democracy" is not clear. They were called "anarchists" by the dominant republicans of the Directory, as by the royalists.

Outside of France, the death of Robespierre, and the fact that revolutionaries in France had managed to stop the Terror, came as a great encouragement to partisans of the revolution. It gave grounds for believing that revolutionary changes did not have to end in terrorism and anarchy. Reaction in France stimulated revolutionism elsewhere. French military victories and local revolutionary activity, each taking advantage of the

[30] J. Beyssi, "Le parti jacobin à Toulouse sous le Directoire", in *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, 1950, pp. 29-54 and 109-133.

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other, led to the formation of revolutionary republics in Holland, Switzerland and Italy. In these countries there were many people who called themselves and their program "democratic". There is no time to relate the history here; we must be content with a mere catalogue of semantic items.

In Holland there was an important newspaper at Amsterdam called *De Democraten*.[31] The Amsterdam political club (or "Jacobins") said it wanted the *democratisch systema*.[32] Even the French Directory, which used the word sparingly, declared in instructions for its agent in Holland, in December 1797, that the Dutch people desired a "free and democratic constitution".[33] A democrat, van Leyden, advised against "pure democracy", that is, against undue pressure from the primary assemblies, as Robespierre had done in 1794.[34] The problem, here as elsewhere, was that of developing viable modern democratic institutions in place of the town-meeting type of self-government found in the rural Swiss cantons or in ancient Athens. The French *Moniteur* printed a dispatch from The Hague, calling for "democratic representative government".[35] About a third of the members of the Dutch constituent assembly signed a petition, in January 1798, in favor of "a democratic representative constitution".[36] A constitutional committee, in February, affirmed to the French agent, Delacroix, that the Dutch were "capable of a greater measure of democracy than would be suitable for the French."[37] Even a conservative *émigré*, van Lampsius, advised the Prince of Orange, then in exile in England, that "democracy" had deep roots in the Netherlands, and advised the House of Orange to seek allies among the "democratic" party.[38]

In parts of Germany, notably the Rhenish states, there were

[31] Colenbrander, *Gedenkstukken*, vol. II, pp. cxxvi—cxxviii, 516, 715-16, 780.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 563.

[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 140-45.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 577.

[35] *Moniteur*, February 23, 1798.

[36] Colenbrander, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 190.

[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 867-77.

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a good many people whose ideas were in effect democratic, but they seem to have used the word less often than the Dutch. One clubroom, in 1792, is reported to have had a sign on its wall reading *Vive la Démocratie. Au diable les aristocrates!*—in French![39] The journalist Lange, in an article comparing aristocracy and democracy, boldly declared for the latter, which, he said, offered more freedom to the real inequalities of human talent.[40] Fichte defiantly accepted the word—or, at least, refrained from explicitly repudiating it—when he got into trouble, on the charge of atheism and radicalism, at the University of Jena. He asked:

> What is a democrat? Is it one who regards the democratic form of government as the only right one, and who recommends its establishment? I should think that if, even in a monarchical regime, he did this merely in scholarly writings, the refutation of this opinion, if it is mistaken, could be left to other scholars. As long as he does not engage in *external action*, actually to overthrow the existing constitution, I do not see how his *opinion* can come before a judicial body, which has cognizance only of *acts*.[41]

It is significant that "democracy" was often used in Germany, in a favorable sense, by persons who believed they already enjoyed it, and who employed it as a defense against revolutionary change. It confirms a generalization sometimes made about German history, that the early possession of liberties, or of liberties of a different and corporate kind, kept Germany out of step with the West and with the nineteenth-century liberal-democratic movement. The French invaded the Rhineland in 1792, and again in 1794, this time remaining for twenty years. They began hesitantly to introduce their kind of reforms, which included the abolition of gild privileges and a new municipal organization. Two imperial free cities of the region, Cologne and Aachen, which were in fact dominated by small closed aristocracies, repeatedly protested. They claimed all the

[39] Hansen, *Quellen*, vol. II, p. 345.

[40] *Deutsche Reichs- und Staatszeitung*, July 27, 1798, p. 955.

[41] *Sämmtliche Werke* (Berlin, 1845), vol. III, p. 287. Italics Fichte's.

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values of democracy for themselves. The Aachen burgomaster explained to the French general that Aachen was already "purely democratic and popular . . . we are all equal."[42] Lesser people in the same cities defended their gilds. As the gilds of Aachen put it, the new constitutional principles would violate the "democratic form of government of this imperial free city."[43] The Cologne people, protesting in 1788 against Joseph II's decrees favoring Protestants, declared that "the introduction of toleration at Cologne is incompatible with the democratic constitution of the city."[44] In short, there were many in Germany who, while favoring what they called democracy, understood it in a neomedieval sense. Others believed that all important reforms would be brought about by enlightened governments already in power. In Prussia, the minister Struensee remarked to a French diplomat, in 1799: "The king is a democrat in his way. . . . In a few years there will be no more privileged classes in Prussia."[45] In short, Prussia needed no revolution; democracy, if confined to the idea of equality exclusively, could be well enough managed by the authorities.

In Switzerland, the Constitution of the Helvetic Republic, which was proclaimed by the French in 1798, declared in its Article II that "the form of government, whatever modifications it may undergo, shall at all times be a representative democracy." Of all the written constitutions promulgated in Europe and America, in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, this is probably the only one to call itself explicitly democratic. Its author was the Basel revolutionary, Peter Ochs, who spent a good deal of time in Paris. For the most part, in Switzerland in 1798, the favorable use of "democracy" in a modern sense appears to have been confined to the invading French. The Swiss, when they used the word favorably, inclined (like the people of Cologne and Aachen) to refer to the small historic democracies of the rural cantons, which were in

[42] Hansen, *Quellen*, vol. II, p. 676. See also vol. III, pp. 313, 914, 1075.

[43] *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 68. [44] *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 260.

[45] Jacques Droz, *L'Allemagne et la Révolution française* (Paris, 1949), p. 109.

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fact oligarchic in the eighteenth century. They were assemblies of neighbors, electing officials in public meetings, conservatively Catholic, fearful of absorption into any state beyond their own valleys, and living virtually without taxes, foreign policy or military institutions. Swiss aristocrats and Swiss democrats thus combined to oppose the Helvetic Republic, which, as the people of Nidwalden complained, " seeks to rob us of our holy religion, of our liberty which we have enjoyed peacefully for centuries, and of our democratic constitution inherited from our blessed fathers." [46]

It was in Italy, according to impressions that the present writer has thus far been able to form, that the word " democracy ", in a favorable sense, was most commonly used in the years from 1796 to 1799. This is doubtless in part due to the strength of revolutionary feeling in Italy, among highly articulate though numerically limited classes; it is due also, one suspects, to the fact that since republics were an old story in Italy the new ideas could not be symbolized by the word " republic " as in France.

The best example comes from no less a person than Pius VII, two years before his elevation to the papacy. From 1785 to 1800 he was Bishop of Imola, a town in the northern part of the Papal States. Revolutionary disturbances, which had begun in the Papal States as early as 1794, broke out on every side when the French army, under Bonaparte, conquered Lombardy in 1796. Imola was absorbed into the Cisalpine Republic. On Christmas Eve, 1797, the Bishop of Imola issued a Christmas homily to his diocese. It contains the word " democracy " eleven times within the space of a few hundred words. I know of only two other places, in documents of the period, where the word occurs with equal frequency in a favorable sense: in Robespierre's address already quoted, and in the second part of Paine's *Rights of Man*. The bishop's tone is of course different, because it is Christian. Close inspection would reveal resemblances. He said:

[46] For the text of the Helvetic constitution see J. Strickler, ed., *Actensammlung aus der Zeit der Helvetischen Republik, 1798-1803* (Bern, 1886-1905), vol. I, pp. 567-603; for Nidwalden, *ibid.*, pp. 608-9; see also pp. 495, 525, 530.

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> The form of democratic government adopted among us, most beloved brethren, . . . is not inconsistent with the Gospel; it demands all those sublime virtues that are learned only in the school of Jesus Christ. . . .
>
> The moral virtues, which are nothing else than the love of order, will make us democratic, but democratic in the right sense of the word. . . .
>
> We shall preserve equality in its rightful meaning, which is that the law falls [equally] upon all individuals in society whether to command, to protect or to punish, and which therefore further demonstrates, under the divine and human law, what proportionate role every individual should have in a democracy, with respect to God, himself, and his neighbor. . . .
>
> It should be the bright objective of our democracy to establish the greatest possible union of sentiments, of hearts, of physical and moral forces, whence a gracious fraternity may enter into society. . . .
>
> The Catholic religion is the thing most precious to your hearts. . . . Do not believe that it is opposed to the form of democratic government. . . .
>
> Be good Christians, beloved brethren, and you will be the best democrats.[47]

A biographer of Pius VII, writing in the high royalist tide of the nineteenth century, expressed amazement and incredulity that his subject could have made such a statement. He attributed it to bad advisers, insidious subversives among the bishop's clergy.[48] It is true that relations between the Church and the Revolution became severely strained in Italy in 1798, as earlier in France. It is perhaps true, also, that most historians, affected by later attitudes either of the Left or of the Right, have exaggerated the actual conflict between Catholicism and French revolutionary republicanism. The Church refused to commit itself, at the time, either for or against any purely political form of government. Even the French *émigré* bishops, when requested by Louis XVIII in 1797 to make a public statement as-

[47] The fullest text I have found of the homily is in A. Dufourcq, *Le régime jacobin en Italie: étude sur la République romaine, 1798-99* (Paris, 1900), p. 30, n. 1.

[48] A. F. Artaud, *Histoire de Pie VII* (Paris, 1837), vol. I, pp. 60-72.

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sociating religion with royalism, three times refused.[49] And it is to be noted that the Bishop of Imola, whose Christmas homily was no secret, was the man actually chosen to be the next pope, under the most trying conditions experienced by the Catholic Church since the Reformation, with Pius VI dead in captivity, and the cardinals in flight.

Let us return to the brevity of a catalogue. The Milan popular club (the "Jacobins") announces: "*facciamo uno governo democratico.*" People shout: "*Le Democrazia o la Morte!*"[50] Others wish to *democratizzare il Popolo,* to create *una base democratica.* A newspaper declares that any republic in Italy must be "a democracy, one and indivisible".[51] Pamphlets are entitled *Risorgimento della democrazia oppressa,* and *Dell'educazione democratica da darsi al popolo italiano.*[52] At Venice there is talk of creating a democracy, and Democratic Fecundity is exhibited by an engaged couple marching in a procession.[53] At Rome a man named Martelli speaks casually of what will happen after the "democratization" of Naples and Tuscany.[54] A proclamation reads, "Form yourselves into a democracy, People of the Roman Republic." There is a theatrical production called "The Democratization of Heaven".[55] There is a grand ball in honor of Bonaparte: no "ladies" and very few *seigneurs romains* were present, but this is not surprising, because "the party was democratic."[56] And with repub-

[49] Pierre de la Gorce, *Histoire religeuse de la Révolution française* (Paris, 1912-31), vol. V, p. 270.

[50] B. Peroni, "La passione dell'independenza nella Lombardia occupata dai Francesi, 1796-97", in *Nuova Rivista Storica,* vol. XV (1931), pp. 63, 89. "Liberty or Death" was the usual expression in Italy as elsewhere.

[51] Carlo Morandi, *Idee e formazioni politiche in Lombardia dal 1748 al 1814* (Turin, 1927), pp. 206, 222.

[52] *Ibid.,* pp. 218 and 268; A. Aulard, *Paris pendant la réaction thermidorienne et sous le Directoire* (Paris 1898-1902), vol. V, p. 34.

[53] G. B. McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte* (Princeton, 1931), pp. 230 and 247.

[54] D. Spadoni, "Aspirazioni nazionali unitarie nello Stato Romano dal 1796 al 1799", in *Nuova Rivista Storica,* vol. XXII (1938), p. 79.

[55] Dufourcq, *op. cit.,* pp. 156, 262.

[56] *Moniteur,* January 20, 1798.

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lican Rome facing attack in 1799 by the King of Naples, the leaders try, though in vain, to make it a war for "democracy".[57]

Bonaparte himself, who had been a Jacobin in 1793, but whose views in Italy in 1796 may perhaps best be described as Bonapartist, allowed "democracy" to be associated with his name. He urged the revolutionaries at Genoa to be gentle with the clergy, since many priests were "democratic". At least two decrees of the Cisalpine Republic, published over his name, contain the word. One abolishes titles of nobility, "since all distinctions in a democracy are contrary to equality."[58]

On the other hand, many Frenchmen did not believe in the reality of Italian democracy; and, in fact, the revolution in Italy, far from being induced by, was contrary to the wishes of most people in the French government. Talleyrand, while foreign minister, privately disapproved of the new "democratic" Italian republics, as he called them. An agent reported that the Italians did not understand "democracy and liberty". Another wrote from Rome to Paris, in 1799, that half a dozen families owned most of the land in the Roman Republic, and left most of it uncultivated. "In constituting this country as a democracy," he remarked, "reason would perhaps have suggested a distribution of land on a better system."[59]

In England and Scotland the antidemocrats seem to have monopolized the word. Even Thomas Paine rarely employs it, but in the third chapter of *The Rights of Man*, "Part Two", he does address himself to the meaning of "republic", "aristocracy" and "democracy". "Democracy" occurs eleven

[57] Dufourcq, *op. cit.*, p. 394.

[58] *Correspondance de Napoléon I* (Paris, 1858-70), vol. III, p. 422; C. Montalcini and A. Alberti, eds., *Atti delle assemblee costituzionali italiane dal medio evo al 1831, serie seconda, parlamenti dell'età moderna, divisione prima, repubbliche italiane, sezione seconda. Repubblica cisalpina* (Bologna, 1917-43), vol. I, p. 505, and vol. II, p. 290.

[59] G. Pallain, *Correspondance diplomatique: Le ministère de Talleyrand sous le Directoire* (Paris, 1891), pp. 110-22; R. Belvederi, "La deputazione ferrarese a Parigi presso il Direttorio (1796-97)", in *Nuova Rivista Storica*, vol. XXXIV (1950), p. 428. V. Giuntella, "Le classi sociali della Roma giacobina", in *Rassegna storica del Risorgimento*, vol. XXXVIII (1951), p. 430.

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times within about five hundred words. He distinguishes it from direct or "simple" democracy. "Retaining, then, Democracy as the ground, and rejecting the corrupt systems of Monarchy and Aristocracy, the representative system naturally presents itself. . . . It is on this system that the American Government is founded. It is representation ingrafted upon Democracy." America, by adopting this principle, will be to the modern world what Athens was to the ancient. And he points to the happy prospect if only the English will join in a renovation of the world.

> Never did so great an opportunity offer itself to England, and to all Europe, as is produced by the two Revolutions of America and France. When another nation shall join France, despotism and bad government will scarcely dare to appear. To use a trite expression, the iron is becoming hot all over Europe. The insulted German and the enslaved Spaniard, the Russ and the Pole, are beginning to think. . . .[60]

The British government instituted proceedings against the book, and Paine withdrew to France.

In the United States, where the people were still in large measure culturally British, and in particular those of the educated classes, there was undoubtedly some hestitation by democrats to adopt the word "democratic". The foreign origin of democracy was a favorite theme of Federalist polemics, and the justification for the Alien Act of 1798; and it seems to be true that democracy, as a word, though not the reality behind it, was brought into America by the European revolution. James Monroe, after reading the Anglo-Franco-American Paine's *Rights of Man*, remarks in a letter to Jefferson, in 1791, that he agrees with the author, and that "the bulk of the [American] people are for democracy."[61] In the following years a great many political clubs, not unlike the radical societies of Britain and Continental Europe, began to appear in various parts of the United States. Forty-two can now be identified. The first was established by Pennsylvania Germans in March 1793. It called

[60] *Rights of Man*, Everyman edition (1915, 1935), pp. 176-77, 278-79.

[61] Dumas Malone, *Jefferson and the Rights of Man* (Boston, 1951), p. 422.

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itself the German Republican Society. The third to be organized, and the first to adopt the name "democratic", was the Democratic Society of Pennsylvania. Its members at first planned to use the name Sons of Liberty (recalling the events of 1775-76); it was the French minister, Genêt, who suggested the word "democratic" for this purpose. Sixteen others soon thereafter put "democratic" in their titles.[62] In 1793 we find Aedanus Burke, of South Carolina, impatiently calling Jefferson a "half-way democrat" because of his stand, as Secretary of State, in favor of neutrality in the European war.[63] The implication was that a whole-way democrat would be better. And among the countless toasts then offered at political rallies and banquets was one at Boston in 1795, which, in tones like those of Thomas Paine (or Woodrow Wilson), proposed for the contemplation of all lovers of liberty "one great democratic society comprehending the human race." [64]

The term went out of American popular usage after 1800 (at least, everyone seems to believe so), not to be revived until the founding of the Democratic party a generation later.

The present essay has dealt with words, not things. It is a lexical, not a historical, study. There has been no attempt, or no more than the minimum necessary for understanding, to ask what the democratic movement of the 1790's really consisted in, nor why it took place, nor whether it could possibly have succeeded, nor with what other movements it was in rivalry, nor in what context of interest, ideology, or practical events it was involved. The author hopes to tell the story more fully in another place.

By way of tentative summary, at the semantic level, a few words may be said along the four lines indicated in the opening paragraph. As to frequency, used in a favorable sense, "democracy" and its derivatives were not yet common, though far more common in some countries than in others—more common

[62] Eugene P. Link, *Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800* (New York, 1942), pp. 13-16.

[63] *Ibid.*, p. 127, n. 6.

[64] C. D. Hazen, *Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution* (Baltimore, 1897), p. 187.

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than is probably thought, and surprisingly common for words just emerging from the learned vocabulary into popular speech. As to acceptability, " democracy " was accepted in many countries as the name of a real thing; conservatives by no means used it exclusively as a scare-word or epithet, and radicals accepted it as a fair name for themselves—more so, apparently, in some Continental countries than in the United States. It is clear that Thomas Jefferson was not the most advanced democrat of the day; and it is just possible that those anti-Turnerians in America who have pursued the origins of American democracy from the frontier back to the Atlantic coast should now prepare to cross that ocean. As to emotional impact, in a favorable sense, as a symbol of political faith, the word did not yet serve this purpose, though there are signs of it in Italy. As to dating, within the decade 1789-99, the favorable use of the word, despite its association with Robespierre, seems actually to have increased during these ten years, being most frequent about 1798. After 1799 or 1800, in the Western World as a whole, the use of the word in a favorable sense undoubtedly declined. The democratic movement of the 1790's failed, from internal division, external repression, or Bonapartist transmutation. The tendency of history to follow the big battalions is well known; but it seems hardly necessary to maintain that, because the democratic movement failed, no such thing ever existed. The mere tracing of the word may indicate, if not prove, that there was a Great Democratic Revolution, of international scope, at the close of the eighteenth century.

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WHITE HOUSE INTERVENTION IN LABOR DISPUTES *

TO intervene or not to intervene in labor disputes is a question which has perplexed Presidents of the United States for at least seventy-five years.

When a basic industry is involved in a strike or threatened strike, or when a dispute at a vital defense plant imperils the government's military procurement program, *advocates* of presidential action become vocal. After presidential action takes place—regardless of the form of action or the results—*critics* become vocal. Rarely, if ever, has a President received general acclaim for his handling of a given labor dispute. Even when he succeeds in averting or ending a devastating strike, the wisdom of his action is challenged. Frequently he is accused of having helped or hindered one of the parties to the dispute. If his fairness is not questioned, his intervention is criticized as an action which weakens the fabric of collective bargaining and increases the habit of bringing problems to Washington which might better be resolved elsewhere.

Federal statutes dealing with labor disputes usually have provided areas for exercise of presidential discretion at one stage or another. Frequently, however, the President has acted without specific statutory authority, relying upon the belief that his action is within the scope of his " general powers ".

President Truman's seizure of the steel mills in 1952 was big news, and it probably will have historical importance somewhat equivalent to President Cleveland's use of federal troops in the Pullman strike of 1894, President McKinley's action in the Coeur d'Alene disturbance of 1899, or President Theodore Roosevelt's establishment of the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission in 1902. Other occupants of the White House—nota-

* The views expressed do not necessarily represent those of the National Labor Relations Board of which the author is Executive Secretary.

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bly Wilson, Harding and Franklin Roosevelt—similarly have made history by intervention in labor controversies.

Not only have the methods of intervention varied among Presidents, but individual Presidents have acted differently in various situations. Occasionally a President personally undertakes to mediate a dispute. More often, however, if he acts at all it is to establish an *ad hoc* board for the purpose of investigating and recommending settlement terms, to get a strike enjoined, or to seize a plant. Sometimes more than one of these alternatives are employed in connection with the same dispute.

Most of the critics tend to appraise presidential action by trying to evaluate the methods employed or the immediate results. Witnesses appearing before congressional committees and legislators in their debates often bring into sharp focus the differences of judgment with respect to procedures. As a consequence the President is never without ample advice, albeit conflicting, as to what course he should follow in a given situation. The threshhold question which must be resolved in each case, however, is this: "Shall the President abstain from any or all activity in connection with the dispute?"

Inevitably questions of what to do become intertwined with the question of doing anything or not. To the extent that the latter problem can be isolated, however, it deserves special analysis. In hundreds of disputes, despite ever-increasing pressure on the White House, Presidents have been reluctant to act. There has, of course, been less reluctance on their part in wartime than in peacetime but throughout the years Republicans and Democrats alike apparently have preferred not to intervene except under extreme conditions. Since recent Presidents seem to have acted in more disputes than earlier Presidents, it is pertinent to note that the circumstances presenting the possible need for White House intervention have been increasing steadily. The strikes which occurred in the nineteenth century usually were local in scope, but in the last few decades the growth of national unions and national corporations, together with the growth of multiple-employer bargaining, has brought a larger proportion of disputes requiring treatment by some authority with national influence and nation-wide powers.

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Perhaps the question, whether to intervene or not, has been answered more often by pressure than by careful reasoning. One student of the problem concluded in 1924:

> A study of presidential intervention in labor disputes during the past thirty years makes it apparent that the reason above all others which has caused the executive to exert his influence has been the pressure of public opinion. In the earlier troubles, such as the Pullman and the Coeur d'Alene cases, he was, of course, impelled by the desire to perform his duty as the head of the nation by helping to keep order and by protecting the interests of the public. But, since the establishment of the precedent by President Roosevelt in 1902, whenever a great industrial crisis threatens, the people turn naturally to the White House for help. However little encouragement the President may receive from the parties to the dispute, public opinion alone virtually forces him to intervene.
>
> The public considers that its national executive is the one to represent its interests in such a case, and it has added this to the numberless other tasks it places upon its chosen leader. Failure to save the country from the misfortune of industrial conflict is visited upon his head as surely as failure to prevent any other thing which affects the prosperity of the nation. His party realizes the truth of this statement in the next election if he has no worthy record to show.[1]

This statement appears to be just as true nowadays as it was when written.

In any important labor dispute the pressures for White House intervention usually start developing long before a strike commences. Strike threats often get more newspaper attention than they deserve. The main purpose of a union's threat is to alarm the employer in the hope that concessions will be forthcoming. Sometimes the employer is genuinely alarmed, and the union achieves a better settlement than it could have without the threat. At other times the employer is not alarmed, but the news stories of the union's threat cause alarm among customers and others who rely directly or indirectly upon the products or

[1] Berman, Edward, *Labor Disputes and the President of the United States*, Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, vol. CXI, No. 2 (New York, 1924), p. 248.

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services which may be curtailed. The pleas for extraordinary action following such alarm often grow in size and momentum like a snowball. This is particularly true in situations where one of the parties wants intervention. The *actual* detriment to the public welfare which could possibly result from a strike, however, may be insignificant compared with that which is feared. The process of evaluating the criticality of a strike threat under such circumstances cannot be an exact science. Precise data necessary for such an evaluation could be assembled if enough time were available, but too often some judgment must be reached before there can be a careful study.

Where the United States government itself is the main customer of an employer involved in a labor dispute, data to determine probable effects of a strike can be more readily assembled. The Army, Navy or Air Force, for example, with detailed procurement programs, usually can measure or estimate the amount of production lost by each day of work stoppage in an aircraft plant and can translate such production losses into a reasonably specific estimate of effects upon operations of the military forces. Even when specific impact data are readily available, however, the question of intervening or not intervening remains a difficult one.

It must be understood that any labor dispute ultimately will be resolved in one way or another without any action by the President. One party or the other capitulates, or they reach some sort of a compromise after both parties recognize the existence of a stalemate. This fact makes somewhat speculative any judgment concerning the wisdom of intervention. Who can say when a given dispute would have been settled if the parties had been left to battle it to a conclusion without presidential intervention?

Though the national economy or the defense program might be seriously crippled by a strike continuing for many weeks, it usually can stand a strike which lasts only a few days. Under such circumstances there is often a tendency to let a threatened strike materialize, in the hope that the dispute will work itself out before any real damage is done. Although most Presidents apparently have applied that policy in most situations, there are

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certain risks which must be recognized. Frequently it is more difficult to end a strike than to avert a strike. Also, intervention before an economic battle actually opens is more likely to be strictly neutral than intervention after the battle is well under way. A union calling off a strike pursuant to an injunction or a presidential plea sometimes can honestly claim that it was on the verge of winning, and that it would have exacted more concessions from the employer by economic coercion than it obtained by more peaceful means. On the other hand, an employer in a similar situation may honestly contend that the President " bailed out " the union or " pulled its chestnuts out of the fire."

Although the political hazards involved in intervention to end a strike may thus be greater than political hazards involved in intervention to avert a strike, circumstances seldom permit the President the luxury of resolving the question on the basis of political judgment. There are certain nonpolitical factors which in the long run must outweigh the political.

First, although perhaps not the most important, is the relationship of the government to the industry or establishment involved. The public interest which the government traditionally represents often is difficult to distinguish from the interests of customers or investors. If this bald statement requires elaboration, let it be noted by way of illustration that for at least the last fifteen years the federal government has not only been the biggest purchaser of airplanes in the United States but has also been the sole purchaser of the entire output of certain aircraft plants. In other industries or plants where the government may not be the biggest direct customer, it sometimes is the biggest investor. This certainly has been true in the maritime industry for more than a quarter of a century. The atomic energy program is an even more striking illustration of the government's rôle as investor and customer.

Theoretically the President could be regarded as a sort of general manager simultaneously responsible for the largest investment program and the largest purchasing program in the world. A Secretary of the Air Force responsible for procuring the equipment necessary to maintain the air defense of the na-

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tion is likely to beg the President for action when a strike stops aircraft production about as readily as a housewife appeals to a town mayor when a strike at the local dairy interferes with her keeping milk and butter on the family dinner table. Both the housewife and the Secretary want an early end to the circumstances beyond their control which have interfered with their respective procurement programs. Such identification of the government with consumer and investor interests sometimes explains why the President cannot conscientiously refrain from intervening in a labor dispute, even though it may be politically inexpedient to do so.[2]

Neither can he ignore any dispute bringing hardship and inconvenience to large numbers of people. The habit of looking to the White House for help in times of crisis or disaster has become too well established. A President may lack specific statutory authority to function in some of the important disputes, but his rôle as the No. 1 Citizen of the United States sometimes compels him to say something even when he can do nothing. Moreover, there have been some occasions when he must order an investigation to ascertain if the occasion requires any presidential action, and the mere ordering of the investigation can have consequences amounting to intervention. When a governor calls for federal troops—as the acting governor of Arizona did in connection with the Morenci miners strike in June 1903, and as the governor of Colorado did in connection with the violence among gold miners in the Cripple Creek and Telluride districts in November 1903—the President cannot ignore the plea. As a minimum he must obtain sufficient precise information to decide whether to comply with the request or not, and the mere arrival of federal authorities on a strike scene for the purpose of making an investigation at the request of the President has some psychological effect upon the disputing parties.

In the Arizona strike in 1903 Theodore Roosevelt sent fed-

[2] From a review of presidential intervention in labor disputes in the last sixty years there appears, however, to be no basis for inferring that interests of the procurement or investment agencies of the government play any great part in determining specific *method* or *strategy*.

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eral troops without first investigating. Upon arrival, there was no apparent need for the soldiers and they were promptly withdrawn. The Western Federation of Miners nevertheless denounced the President for unwarranted intervention. In the Colorado gold mine strike later that year, the President ordered an investigation as soon as he received the call for federal troops. An army officer investigated and reported that a state of insurrection justifying the use of the state militia existed but that there was no need for federal troops. Against a background of other situations where federal troops were hastily and perhaps unwisely used, President Roosevelt's restraint upon this occasion was remarkable. Yet possibly it would be naïve to assume that the investigation and report did not in some way affect the attitudes, positions, or behavior of the parties to the dispute. In a sense, the President had intervened.

The President nowadays seldom has occasion to order any such investigation. Officials of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and other agencies, acting within their statutory or delegated authority, usually are sufficiently well informed to give him whatever data he needs. In almost every important labor dispute, however, the President receives telegrams and letters urging him to investigate. If he does so in any conspicuous way, he may be considered as having intervened. To the extent that the Railway Labor Act provides for emergency boards to find facts and recommend settlement terms and to the extent that the Taft-Hartley Act provides for boards of inquiry to find facts without making recommendations, such formal investigations are readily recognized as a form of intervention.

Individuals or groups urging White House intervention often fail to understand the reluctance of the President to heed their pleas. This circumstance results essentially from the dearth of any official explanatory statement when the President decides to do nothing. When he acts it is customary for a proclamation, an executive order, or some other statement to be issued, but inaction is accompanied by silence.

It may be commonly assumed that the President's inaction in labor disputes results from his preoccupation with other press-

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ing duties. Despite the magnitude of his work load, however, there are perhaps even better reasons why he does not normally intervene in labor disputes.

The arguments for nonintervention, which usually outweigh arguments for intervention, normally rest upon long-range considerations. Foremost among them is the belief that when the President intervenes in one dispute the prospects for settlement of future disputes without presidential intervention become lessened. The best way to encourage settlements by direct negotiation and by mediation is to convince representatives of employers and employees that they are " on their own ".

There is a temptation to refrain from making concessions as long as one party to a dispute assumes that some authority or tribunal is available to function after conciliation and mediation are unsuccessful. Representatives fear that if they modify their original positions they will lose some advantage when the dispute reaches its final stage. Alternatively, they are inclined to pass up early settlement offers in the hope that a better offer will be available later. Sometimes it is only when both parties become convinced that the end is in sight that they settle down to the serious give-and-take process of bargaining.

After studying the rôle of fact-finding boards one observer reached the following conclusion:

> Labor leaders have a good idea of what can be gained from management as a result of collective bargaining. However, it is not always politically feasible for them to recognize this in the demands they serve upon the employers. Consequently, they place excessive demands before management. These demands satisfy the rank and file that their leaders are militantly looking after their welfare. The labor leaders, of course, know that the demands are beyond what can be achieved; nevertheless, they adhere to them. A period of formal but fruitless collective bargaining sessions follow. These sessions terminate with a strike threat. Where the strike endangers the public interest—increasingly true in a growing list of industries, because of our highly interdependent economy—the government steps in and appoints a fact-finding board with power to make recommendations. The board holds hearings and issues a decision. The labor leaders drop their earlier demands and base the ensuing and real collective

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bargaining sessions on the board's recommendations. They escape thereby the onus, and consequent political danger, of themselves having suggested the moderate demands recommended by the board.[3]

Representatives of management sometimes behave similarly. Labor leaders are by no means alone in wanting to establish or to preserve their reputations as tough bargainers and zealous watchdogs over the interests of those whom they represent. When labor representatives are afraid that they will be accused of " selling out to the company " or when management representatives are afraid that they will be accused of " giving in too easily ", the difficulties of obtaining a settlement by mediation are obvious. When one or both parties expect the President to act if mediation fails, the difficulties are substantially increased.

Prestige and publicity are other factors which come into play in labor disputes. Labor leaders and corporation executives often have as much interest as movie stars in getting their names into the news and keeping them there. The President of the United States is the biggest of " big shots " in the world, and it is not fantastic to assume that labor leaders and company officials get some satisfaction from being associated with him. Union and company representatives, like so many other human beings, seldom resist the temptation to appear important. It would perhaps be an exaggeration to say that labor disputes often arise because of eagerness on one side or the other for personal publicity or prestige, but it is not too much to say that disputes often are prolonged because of such factors. Mediation frequently is a process of searching for some " face-saving " formula by which representatives of the parties can agree on settlement terms without impairment of their reputations and without any sacrifice of their feeling of importance. Occasionally mediation is a process of stage setting, with the mediator arranging a background which will show the actors off to good advantage.

There unquestionably are disputes in which the prestige or glamour of the presidency contributes substantially to settle-

[3] Gitlow, A. L., " Collective Bargaining and Fact-Finding Boards ", *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, January 1951, pp. 277, 278.

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ment efforts. Where pleas from other government officials have failed, strikes sometimes have been terminated and peaceful negotiations undertaken or resumed upon request of the Chief Executive. Presidential intervention of such limited and innocuous nature apparently has been effective often enough to create sentiment for further utilization of this technique.

The reluctance of Presidents to intervene in this mild way is based upon the following considerations:

(1) The prestige and effectiveness of the executive office would be lessened by frequent involvement of the President in labor disputes. By intervening only rarely, he adds to his effectiveness when his intervention finally becomes necessary.

(2) Presidential intervention usually requires some prearrangement. Unless government officials who are already engaged in efforts to settle a dispute can give some reasonable assurance that presidential intervention will succeed, it is seldom undertaken.

(3) Presidential intervention jeopardizes the effectiveness of the federal agencies primarily responsible for dealing with labor disputes. This factor is not peculiar to the labor relations field or to the government. When any executive himself does the work which somebody under his supervision has been assigned to do, he invariably runs the risk that everybody concerned will expect him to do it again in the future. The President of the United States must be sufficiently informed of problems to do an effective supervisory job but not so directly involved in functions that he undermines the authority and responsibility of agency officials.

Despite the multiplicity of reasons why the President should not intervene in labor disputes and despite sixty years of experience with the problem, there appears to be no sound basis for adopting any rigid policy governing White House action. Indeed, there may be merit in continuing to leave the question of intervening or not intervening as wide open in the future as it has been in the past. It is not likely any new legislation which may be adopted will eliminate the need for exercise of judgment by the President as to whether he will invoke a law or not. Moreover, it is not likely that any law will preclude him from

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trying to persuade the parties to reach a voluntary agreement without recourse to the basic labor relations law.

It is pertinent to note that the Railway Labor Act reserves an area for exercise of discretion by the President. It provides that if a dispute is not adjusted under other provisions of the Act and if it "threatens substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation service, the Mediation Board shall notify the President, who may thereupon, in his discretion, create a board to investigate and report respecting such dispute." [4] The President has exercised that discretion by appointing such emergency boards about five times a year since that provision was written into the law in 1934. On some occasions presidential mediation or seizure of railroads has occurred despite the lack of provisions for such action in this particular statute. The problem is as old as railway labor legislation. The Act of October 1, 1888,[5] provided for voluntary arbitration of railway labor disputes and also provided that the President could appoint a commission of inquiry. When the American Railway Union's strike against the Pullman Company's manufacturing plant in 1893 spread to the railroads, however, President Cleveland did not appoint any commission until too late to deal with the strike. He first obtained injunctions against the strikers and caused the arrest and prosecution of union leaders, backing up the government's program with federal troops over the protests of Governor Altgeld of Illinois. Cleveland ultimately appointed a commission of inquiry under the Act of 1888, but the strike was broken long before the commission made its report. Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson and Harding likewise intervened in railway labor disputes, employing various methods which were outside the scope of authority vested in them by the railway legislation in existence during their administrations.

To an even greater degree in industries other than railroads has the President had discretion to intervene or not to intervene and to decide for himself the method of intervention. Ever since President McKinley's intervention in the lead and silver

[4] 48 Stat. 1186. [5] 25 Stat. 501.

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mine strikes in Idaho, Presidents have taken action more often outside the scope of labor relations laws than within it. President Theodore Roosevelt believed that he was limited only to the extent that he might not do the things which the law of the land specifically forbade.[6] President Wilson and President Franklin Roosevelt likewise engaged in a wide range of activities in connection with labor disputes. The authority for much of what they did rested upon their wartime powers, but they were almost as active in connection with labor disputes during the peacetime portions of their administrations as during the wartime. The bulk of Wilson's wartime program for dealing with labor disputes, including the operation of the National War Labor Board, was carried on without specific statutory authority. Except for the applicability of the War Labor Disputes Act to some of the disputes during a portion of his wartime years, Franklin Roosevelt's intervention was equally lacking in specific authority from Congress.

Except for the Railway Labor Act and such statutes as the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Wagner Act which dealt with only certain specialized problems, Congress enacted no law dealing with labor disputes until 1947. Then it gave the President certain powers which he was at liberty to use or not use. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (commonly known as Taft-Hartley Act) provided among other things a statutory basis for conciliation and mediation.[7] It also provided that when a threatened or actual strike or lockout affecting an entire industry, or a substantial part thereof, imperiled the national health or safety, the President was empowered to appoint a board of inquiry and to obtain a District Court order enjoining a strike or lockout for a prescribed period. There was nothing mandatory in the law as far as the President was concerned. If he decided to proceed under this provision, his opinion with respect to the impact of the dispute would be subject to court review in connection with the injunction procedure, but there was no provision for review of any determination by him not to act. In the first five years following

[6] Roosevelt, Theodore, *An Autobiography* (New York, 1921), p. 388.

[7] Public Law 101, 80th Congress; 29 USCA Section 151 *et seq.*

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enactment the President utilized this provision nine times. There is no record available of the occasions when he was urged to invoke this feature of the law but declined to do so. In connection with a nation-wide steel dispute in 1949 he might have used it, but he chose to create a special board which, unlike a statutory board, would make recommendations for settlement of the dispute.

Adopting a recommendation of the National Advisory Board on Mobilization Policy, the President by executive order in 1951 assigned certain disputes functions to the Wage Stabilization Board.[8] During the next year he referred to that Board an average of about one labor dispute a month, in each case requesting the Board to investigate and report; in one case the union refused to call off its strike and the President invoked the injunction provision of the Labor Management Relations Act. Except for a few industry-wide disputes, most of the cases referred by the President to the Board did not involve an entire industry or substantial portion of an industry and therefore could not have been handled under the national emergency provisions of the Act. Each of the disputes, however, threatened an interruption of work affecting the national defense.

The most important dispute which the President referred to the Board—that involving the basic steel industry—was followed by Congressional action which for all practical purposes abolished the disputes functions of the Wage Stabilization Board. So many newsworthy events accompanied and followed the Board's handling of the dispute that one technical but possibly important point usually is overlooked in discussion of the aftermath of the case. Congress, intending to leave the W.S.B. free to interpret the wage stabilization policies in connection with particular circumstances but to prevent the Board from functioning otherwise in connection with disputes, enacted the following sentence:

> *Labor disputes*, and labor matters in dispute, which do not involve the interpretation or application of such regulations or policies *shall be dealt with, if at all, insofar as the Federal Government is concerned, under the conciliation, mediation, emer-*

[8] Executive Order 10233, April 21, 1951.

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gency, or other provisions of laws heretofore or hereafter enacted by Congress.[9]

This language could be read to preclude the President from acting in any labor dispute without specific statutory authorization as well as to preclude the W.S.B. from doing so. It would be an oversimplification to assume that the language has such an effect, however. As originally introduced in the Congress, this sentence contained the additional words " and not otherwise " at the end. Senator Ives of New York, who offered the amendment, was asked by Senator Douglas of Illinois if this language would preclude the President from establishing a special board to deal with a great national dispute. Senator Ives said it was not his intention to place such a limitation upon the President, explaining that it would be " a grave mistake to prohibit the President from establishing a temporary board which he might select for the purpose of endeavoring to resolve a special situation of a critical nature." He then agreed to clarify the matter by dropping the three words " and not otherwise " from the amendment. In the ensuing discussion both Senator Ives and Senator Douglas indicated that they thought that the President should be free to exercise his " executive powers " in connection with labor disputes, but neither Senator attempted to define such powers.[10]

Constitutional lawyers, statesmen and students of political science may be expected to continue debates concerning the existence or nonexistence of presidential powers as important labor disputes arise from time to time in the future. Perhaps some day there will be a statutory framework for whatever presidential intervention could conceivably be necessary. Unless there is a sharp reversal in legislative trends, however, the President will still have an important area for exercise of discretion. At a minimum he will have to decide whether to invoke a law or not.

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[9] Defense Production Act Amendments of 1952. Public Law 429, 82nd Cong., Section 403 (b) (5) (B). Italics supplied.

[10] *Congressional Record*, June 4, 1952, p. 6618.

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HUMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE STATE AND LAW

THERE is nothing abstract about the state or politics or the law. They are human instrumentalities. They are dynamic institutions. They arise out of the continual need we have as human beings to find satisfactions and avoid pain. In the various enterprises of our lives we seek food, shelter and clothing. We seek social companionship and entertainment. We use our minds, that is, our reason, to discover what will bring satisfaction to us and what will avoid pain. We form for ourselves systems of belief in order to reduce our anxieties about the unknown things of the universe at large and the scarcely known things of the world which we find ourselves unable to control. We have impulses to exercise our capacities and especially those which we find to be more socially acceptable than others within the particular pattern of our own culture. We want above all things to be loved and it is this that makes social beings of us. It is this that causes us to search for satisfying relationships with others and to modify relationships that may no longer seem adequate to give us satisfaction.

It is out of this social search, these social relationships, that there comes about the establishment of states and laws and the interplay of politics. Failure to achieve satisfaction is general. Satisfying one interest may result in the frustration of others with new resulting tensions. It is out of tensions and frustrations that there comes the power struggle with its political process.

It is inevitable that we become frustrated. We often must deny ourselves one satisfaction or one value in order to achieve another. We may wish for honor or love or the accumulation of wealth or power or the chance to gain important public recognition or office or to be a movie star. We may at times overestimate our capacities. The chance to fulfill our great desires may not come or we may not even recognize our oppor-

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tunities when they are present. Someone with power, someone who has greater control of the means of satisfaction than we have may refuse that satisfaction to us. Someone upon whom we are dependent for food or love, assurance or recognition, may reject our advances and repress our attempts to satisfy these needs.

The fundamental human patterns which underlie our lives from infancy follow us, as they develop and deepen, into the very inner councils of industrial and political life and affect social interactions. We find, in many, a tendency to seek dominion over others, frequently to quiet their own anxieties and sense of insufficiency. We find a tendency to preserve dominion over others, to maintain a paternalistic relationship as a parent may toward a child. We find a tendency to attempt to gain equality in order to obtain freedom from various kinds of paternalism; or instead to try to complete through submissiveness the fantasy of an all-powerful parent. There is a tendency, too, to confuse equality with identity and at times to find anxiety in the very differences which are inevitable among people, to feel cheated if identical treatment is not extended even to different situations. There is, too, a tendency on the part of men and women to attempt to compel identical behavior in others because of an implied threat which they may feel to themselves when different behavior gets similar rewards or avoids similar punishments. There is also a need to find security in acceptance of oneself or one's group by others and in the development of our capacities to share our experiences and the fruits of mutual efforts. Finally, there is a need to find security in collaboration, rather than in a search for power and rewards from those in power, to achieve security in brotherhood rather than in competition.

Voting, civil rights, various forms of control over goods and the means of production provide answers to needs. They may afford satisfactions or they may cause deprivations. In this they become, also, elements in power struggles. But civil rights and forms of control over material things do not create themselves. Whether they are institutions or instrumentalities of church, of state, of industry, they arise out of human needs,

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drives or tensions. And in return they stimulate different reactions among different peoples, in different cultures and in different situations.

The important point is that people do not park their impulses, tensions or reactions in some castle of a home when they participate in political or work situations or in other group activities. Whether this participation be active or negative these human impulses, needs, drives and tensions affect behavior. They are both the seed and the heart of institutions in never ending cycles of political processes.

It should be noted that the needs, impulses, drives and tensions of those with power may be quite different from those without power. And therefore the meaning of institutions and instrumentalities will differ. Loyalties, expectations and satisfactions are not necessarily the same for the man in governmental high office, for the manager of industry, for the judge in the court as they are for the average citizen who must pay his income tax, who must appear before the court or tend the mill or work on a typewriter.

Those who exercise power tend to demand an increase of their power. They tend to become power-hungry. They demand a response of docility and sometimes they get it but more frequently there is a truculence, a repressed hostility or indifference, and it is these differences of approach or reaction which create the power struggle. These are not the only causes of power struggle. It may also arise between competitors for power; for,

> the sovereign must continually measure its powers against those of possible opponents, it must count the weapons in its armory and judge the skill of its adherents against that of its rivals; it must trade and deceive and fight to retain its dominance. It can tolerate no near equal if it is to survive.
>
> The maintenance of power is the grim theme of all sovereignty, not merely because there are rival interests ready to snatch the power, but because subjectively the sovereign is unable to yield except under compulsion unless he is prepared for complete surrender. For to one who is in a position of power the loss of that power is psychic death; any diminution of power may arouse

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> fantasies of a failing manhood; and this symbolism accounts for the reluctance of sovereigns to accept modifications of the *status quo* which at times appears to others to be inevitable.[1]

How do people fight the power struggle? They have several weapons at their disposal—force, economic power and what may be classified generally as psychological power. The weapon of force is a weapon of punishment. Economic power and psychological power offer not only punishment but at times reward. They are therefore more economical to use than force.

Furthermore, economic, and particularly psychological, power may involve less hostility and may stimulate more creativity. Psychological power especially offers hope and promise. In this it gives more lasting reward and also may be the more corrupt and corrupting influence. Where rewards are those of group or social acceptance they tend to develop maturity and more lasting satisfactions.

Only when power is diffused, that is when it is not too centralized, is it possible for the affirmative values of group participation and acceptance by the group to be realized.

As André Tarde has said, "Whatever be the method employed to suppress the conflict between beliefs and interests and to establish an accord between them, it almost always happens . . . that the resulting harmony has created a new variety of antagonism."[2] It is in the establishment of such an accord that the institutions of state and law are created; and it is because of the new disequilibriums which they tend to develop that new situations of antagonism arise.

We can look at the matter of the state in another way. One of the principal functions of the state is to handle hostilities with the least destructive effects. This the state does through rewards and punishments, which may be of great variety and administered in many ways. Obviously, problems of hostilities are handled differently in autocratic and paternalistic states from those where independence and free social participation are emphasized. For example, political forms which we call demo-

[1] James Marshall, *Swords and Symbols: The Technique of Sovereignty* (New York, 1939).

[2] André Tarde, *L'Opposition universelle.*

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cratic, which involve such things as the secret ballot and civil liberties generally, afford people avenues through which to release their hostilities. Through these they can engage in political competition in which their hostilities do not tend to destroy the state or the social organism. Economic conflicts, free expression and debate give those involved in them chances to release their aggressions in forms of economic and intellectual competition. The participants need be neither docile nor truculent nor indifferent. They may participate in the cultural, the political and the economic life of their country and have a run for their emotions. Such releases afford satisfactions, that is, they offer rewards. Where these releases exist they are socially acceptable substitutes for destructive aggressions. They are outlets for aggressions which may become at once constructive and satisfying.

There is no clear line of demarcation between the various weapons of power. All the weapons of power have undertones of force. This is most clearly exemplified in that instrumentality of power which we know as the law. Law, education and propaganda are the three great psychological weapons of the state. Behind law, in particular, is always the threat of force, although force may be rarely used because, as Maine said, " The law has so formed our habits and ideas that Courts of Justice are rarely needed to compel obedience to it. . . ." [3] In other words, the authoritarian conscience may be a substitute for force and as such sometimes cause us to forget that underneath it all there is the ever-present promise that force might be used and the ever-present fear of that use.

Consequently we can say that the value of law to the state is that it serves notice upon people as to which occasions and in what circumstances the state will use coercion. An arbitrary use of force, force exercised at the whim of the authorities, would undoubtedly breed ill-will and resistance and as such be a threat to power. It would contravene the need for equality of treatment. Failure to support a command of the state—with force where necessary—could only result in contempt for the state and in some greater or lesser degree anarchy. Never-

[3] H. S. Maine, *Early Law and Custom* (New York, 1886).

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theless, the state being never *de facto* supreme can be defined and limited. This is what law does. Thus the sovereign power can through the medium of statute and decision proclaim on what occasions it will coerce, which interests it will defend, which it will reject, and which persons or groups it will reward and which punish.

Some years ago Charles Gordon Post wrote:

> If the Court was fully conscious that its mandate could not, or would not, be enforced in a particular case, obviously it was more expedient to leave the matter to the political departments exclusively. In general, judicial review or not, the Court has found it more expedient to leave the decision of certain questions to governmental bodies more appropriately adapted to decide them.[4]

This is an example of how that part of the state which expressly administers law, that is, the court of law, will not attempt to do what it has not the power to compel. Not only will the court as one of the arms of the state try not to act beyond the power of the state in international law, but it will also be careful not to try to deliver judgments which it cannot enforce against some other arm of state power—in our country, for example, the executive and legislative branches. There are certain areas in which a president or a governor cannot be controlled by the courts. There are areas, too, in which the legislature cannot be controlled. And some of the great wisdom found in the Constitution of the United States is the recognition of this.

We come then to that confusing subject, the nature of rights. In private law, it would seem that rights are declarations of the circumstances in which the state power will be applied to some private controversy in the interest of social peace, that is, in order to handle hostilities which might otherwise disturb the fabric of society and the authority of the state. By administering rewards and punishments in the name of " rights " the state avoids situations in which physical power, self-help, would be applied and also in which physical power in the form of governmental action might have to be called upon to pacify the

[4] *The Supreme Court and Political Questions* (Baltimore, 1936).

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contestants. Thus the state posits certain conditions in which it asserts that its full power if need be will be applied to the support of one or other of the contestants. In other words, psychological power is institutionalized as a surrogate for force.

Rights in public law are the rights of the state. They are co-extensive with its power. They are limited internally by the powers of those governed, their powers to sabotage, to act negatively, to protest, to strike, to rebel, to vote where freedom to do so exists. Externally the power of the state is limited by the power of neighboring sovereigns. Thus today it is more than ever idle to talk of state sovereignty as if it were absolute. A large part of the thought, of the economy and of the use of men and materials in the United States is dictated not by the American government or the American people but by real and imagined threats by Communist lands and Communist weapons from the atom bomb to psychological warfare. And our tax rates have to a considerable degree been fixed by Hitler and Stalin for more than a decade.

In public law, also, law is a definition of those powers which the state believes it is able to defend and not afraid to admit it possesses. "Law", as Schopenhauer said, "is only the measure of power."

As has been indicated, law cannot generally be irresponsible if it is to prove to be serviceable as a weapon of sovereignty. For to be effective, it must aim to achieve unity, an absence of those disintegrating conditions in which a competitive power might find support. Consequently, as Laski said, legal systems tend to become "the beatification of order", of order and certainty, rather than arbitrariness, irresponsibility or imaginativeness.

The value of law as a psychological weapon of power depends upon the degree to which it can give the appearance of justice, of treating different interests with equality. The law must consequently avoid the rule of individual passion, discrimination or favoritism. In the interests of stability it must avoid irrational change which would of itself stimulate anxiety. Courts of law provide an outlet for hostile drives, generally a harmless outlet, though today often archaic and wasteful. If

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the courts are to be a safety valve for hostilities they must afford litigants that run for their money which we call due process of law. For, while a defeated litigant may feel aggrieved and still be hostile, he will find few supporters if neutrals believe that he has been treated with fairness, has been given a full opportunity to make his point.

In biological terms something is right when it gives satisfaction and relief from tension. It cannot be right where hate and hostility are component parts of the satisfaction, because these only stimulate new chain reactions of dissatisfaction and tension. Satisfactions which are right to us are based upon acceptance of ourselves by others, on participation with others in joint endeavors, and ideally on love. Here the psychological sciences and ethics have a point in common. For it is in this sense that right is an ethical value, that is, when right is not used as a weapon of power, as the state uses it, when it is not used as a measure of conformity to authority.

On the political scene the need for action is so pressing that it is not possible to gain sufficient perspective to measure behavior and purposes against any standard of this sort. The proof of the pudding in politics is in terms of immediate pain and pleasure that are measured in degrees of power. Acceptance, participation and love are all used as instruments of power and measuring rods of the satisfactions of power. Hostility, overt or suppressed, is an inherent element. Consequently what is right in the power struggle represents a low level of ethics.

The distinction is between right as a symbol of power and right as a symbol of satisfactions achieved through communion. It is only if one is able to work, play and live with others on a basis of mutual acceptance and participation in communion, without hostility, that ethical right exists. This is another way of saying that the symbol of the Golden Rule is the only definition of right which is not by its very nature destructive, because that alone represents a definition which avoids force and hostility as means or motivations.

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LAND, DEBT, AND THE MAN OF PROPERTY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS

WHEN Alexander the Great's father, Philip II of Macedonia, organized the Greek cities into a League of the Hellenes, one important task of the new body was the suppression of sedition in the Greek world. The catalogue of seditious acts included redistribution of the land and cancellation of debts.[1] For Plato these two measures betokened the tyrant and the demagogue.[2] All the citizens of Itanos in Crete swore, "I will not bring about a redistribution of lands or houses or building lots, nor a cancellation of debts," in an oath preserved on a marble pillar of the early third century before Christ.[3] Earlier, a law of Delphi, the city of the great oracle, made it a crime under pain of malediction merely to propose either step in the Assembly.[4]

The common theme is no mere rhetorical stereotype but the reflection of a deep concern solidly grounded in the character of the Greek economy and the history of Greek political struggles. Beginning no later than the eighth century B.C. and continuing uninterruptedly for more than five hundred years until the Roman conquest, Greeks were constantly on the move, either as migrants (singly or in groups) or as exiled revolutionists. The Athenian military-agricultural colonies (cleruchies) of the fifth century B.C., totaling some 20,000 men at the peak according to one estimate;[5] the huge number of

[1] [Demosthenes], *On the Treaty with Alexander* 17.15. (Square brackets around an author's name indicate that the work is incorrectly attributed to him in the tradition.)

[2] Plato, *Republic* 565E, *Laws* 684D, 736C; *cf.* Aristotle, *Politics* 5.4.3, 1305a2; Isocrates, *Panathenaic* 12.259.

[3] *Inscriptiones Creticae* III iv, 8.21-24.

[4] Lines VII 2-6 in the edition of Th. Homolle, *Bull. de correspondance hellénique*, vol. 50 (1926), pp. 3-106.

[5] Max Wagner, *Zur Geschichte der attischen Kleruchien* (diss. Tübingen, 1914), pp. 50-51.

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fourth-century Greek mercenaries, of whom Xenophon's Ten Thousand are but the most famous example; the civil war in third-century Sparta under Agis, Cleomenes and Nabis—these are instances that can be repeated everywhere and at any moment in Hellenic history, if not always with the same dramatic impact. And it was land hunger that was the driving force. Land hunger, in turn, stemmed frequently from private expropriation, with debt the effective instrument.

The debt-ridden farmer may be a universal figure in one sense, but he is at the same time a personification of economic factors that change; and as they change, he, too, takes on an altered appearance, sometimes radically so. Natural conditions apart, significant variables would include the market, the size and type of the holding, the land-tenure régime, the division of labor between town and country, the quality and extent of credit facilities and operations, the economic position of the moneylender, and the degree and kind of intervention by the state. To say flatly, with a leading economic historian, that "like the consumption loan . . . the agricultural loan becomes a basis for extortion and oppression," [6] is to formulate a generalization which, though undoubtedly valid, also conceals a trap for those who ignore the variables. The elimination of such a trap at a focal point in Greek history is one aim of this paper.

I

Solon is the Greek name that comes first to mind when land and debt are mentioned together. Shortly after 600 B.C. he was designated "lawgiver" in Athens, with unprecedented constitutional powers, because the demand for redistribution of land and cancellation of debts could no longer be blocked off by the landholding oligarchy through force or minor concessions. In one of his poems, Solon spoke of the "dark earth, whose *horoi* affixed in so many places I once removed; once she was a slave, now free." [7] Just what measures Solon had in mind when he wrote these two lines is widely disputed today,

[6] H. Sieveking, "Loans, Personal", *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 9 (1933), p. 562.

[7] Quoted by Aristotle, *Constitution of the Athenians* 12.4.

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as are most aspects of his economic reform program. It is certain, however, that in some fashion he lifted the encumbrances that were squeezing the small Attic farmers off their land.[8] *Horoi* were slabs of stone used to mark boundaries between adjoining holdings. At some point, the Athenians found another, quite distinct, use for the *horoi,* and it was this second type that Solon removed, markers which creditors had placed on their debtors' farms in order to make public the fact that those particular holdings were legally encumbered. In a sense, the Athenians had hit upon a very crude way of achieving some of the purposes of the modern register of titles and deeds. Removal of the stones symbolized cancellation of the debts.[9]

Whatever Solon may have accomplished for the farmers of his day, he neither intended nor effected a prohibition for all time of land-secured loans. Farmers continued to fall into debt, and now that they were no longer permitted to offer their persons or their families as security—a permanent reform of Solon's—only their land gave them borrowing capacity. The use of *horoi* for public notice continued, too, not merely for agricultural property but eventually also for houses in the city when they were put up as security. Archaeologists have discovered more than two hundred of these stones in Attica and in four Aegean islands under Athenian influence. The time period for these finds is roughly 400-250 B.C. The texts of 222 have been published so far; 182 of them are in a sufficiently complete state to be analyzed.[10]

A typical *horos,* translated very literally, read as follows:

[8] I have refrained from speaking of mortgages primarily because the word, as it has been used throughout the history of Anglo-American law, has several connotations that render it inapplicable to ancient Greece.

[9] Land tenure shows sharp distinctions in various parts of the ancient Greek world. For that reason alone it cannot be assumed automatically that whatever was true of Athens was equally true of Sparta, for example, or of Greek Sicily. The present article deals solely with Athens unless otherwise indicated; more narrowly, with Athens from the establishment of a democratic government to the Roman conquest of Greece, 500-200 B.C. in round numbers. This time limit is somewhat longer than the traditional "classical age".

[10] These figures are valid as of the end of 1951. The full documentation is given in my book, *Studies in Land and Credit in Ancient Athens* (New Brunswick, 1952).

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> In [the archonship] of Praxibulos [i.e., 315-314 B.C.]. *Horos* of the land and house put up as security to Nikogenes of [the deme] Aixone, 420 [drachmas], according to the agreement deposited with Chairedemos of [the deme] Rhamnus.[11]

Few of the stones have longer texts; most are shorter, for a date is given in only 27 or 28, a written agreement is mentioned in but 15, even the name of the creditor and the amount of the debt are sometimes omitted. Thus, one marble block found in the city of Athens proper says merely: "*Horos* of a workshop [*ergasterion*] put up as security, 750 [drachmas]"—three words and a numeral in the Greek.[12]

Such a concentrated, homogeneous body of texts from a single community is a rarity in Greek source materials. The time is significant, too, for the fourth century B.C., in which the majority of the *horoi* can be placed, is the century of the "breakdown" of the Greek city-state, however historians may understand and interpret that phenomenon. And there lies the trap. The considerable number of fourth-century *horoi* is regularly adduced to prove that, during that critical century, "the small farmers ran more and more into debt, and were frequently forced to give up their farms."[13] The memory of Solon and the picture of the mortgaged homestead farm of today are easily discernible, for, in fact, the *horoi* tell us nothing whatsoever about the small farmer and his debts. They stood on the property of the wealthier landowners.

[11] *Inscriptiones Graecae* II^2 2726. Three different verbs appear on the *horoi*, all of which I have translated "put up as security" because the juristic distinctions are not relevant to the question under examination. Brackets indicate words that do not appear in the Greek original.

[12] *Ibid.*, II^2 2760.

[13] Victor Ehrenberg, *The People of Aristophanes. A Sociology of Old Attic Comedy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), p. 93. The identical view will be found, for example, in F. Oertel, *Klassenkampf, Sozialismus und organischer Staat im alten Griechenland (Kriegsvorträge . . . Bonn,* No. 55, 1942), p. 30; H. Michell, *The Economics of Ancient Greece* (New York, 1940), pp. 85-86; A. Jardé, *Les Céréales dans l'antiquité grecque* (Paris, 1925), pp. 118-19; R. Pöhlmann, *Geschichte der sozialen Frage und des Sozialismus in der antiken Welt* (Munich, 1925), vol. 1, p. 185; E. Kornemann, "Bauernstand", *Real-Enzyklopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft,* Supp. vol. 4 (1924), col. 89; Georg Busolt, *Griechische Staatskunde* (Munich, 1920), vol. 1, p. 179.

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But, first, what was a large holding in ancient Athens? The persistent failure of the sources to give figures is a notable instance of the nonquantitative approach that characterizes Greek writing whenever it touches upon economic matters. I know of precisely five land figures in the whole of Athenian literature and not one usable figure in the Athenian inscriptions. In a forensic speech written somewhat later than 330 B.C., the estate of a man named Phainippos is given in linear measure; the acreage was somewhere between 700 and 1,000, depending on the contour of the land.[14] Then there is Alcibiades' patrimonial estate of some 70 acres, matched by the holding of a certain Aristophanes, not the playwright, confiscated by the state in 390 B.C.[15] In these three instances, the rule is broken and the dimensions given because the speakers wished to emphasize that they were large holdings. The fourth figure is 45 acres, the land in Euboea given by the Athenian state to Aristeides' impoverished son Lysimachos in the latter part of the fifth century B. C.[16] Finally, there is a 14-acre figure in an oration dated about 389 B.C.[17] This last figure was given to underscore the small size of the farm.

There is good reason to believe that 45- and 70-acre holdings, though not unusual, were above average. Phainippos' farm was certainly in the very highest bracket, shared by few Athenians. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a proposal was made and rejected in 403 B.C. to restrict political rights in Athens to landholders, which, if carried, would have disfranchised 5,000 citizens.[18] The figure is difficult to control, for Dionysius lived 400 years later, but if it has any basis in fact it means that only 20 or 25 per cent of the Athenian citizens owned no land of any kind at the end of the fifth century B.C. Some support comes from the estimate that nearly two thirds of the citizen

[14] [Demosthenes], *Against Phainippos* 42.5.

[15] Plato, *Alcibiades I* 123C, and Lysias, *On the Property of Aristophanes* 19.29, respectively.

[16] Demosthenes, *Against Leptines* 20.115. Plutarch, *Aristeides* 27.1, puts the size at half that figure.

[17] Isaeus, *On the Estate of Dikaiogenes* 5.22.

[18] Dionysius, *On the Orations of Lysias* 32.

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population lived in the rural districts in 430 B.C., slightly more than half one century later; and many of the city dwellers were themselves farm owners.[19]

Calculations of yield offer additional confirmation. Solon's constitutional reforms rested on a fourfold division of the citizen body according to their holdings in land. The highest rating consisted of the *pentakosiomedimnoi,* men whose estates yielded at least 500 *medimnoi* a year (a little more than 700 bushels or an equivalent in liquid measure). Gustave Glotz has calculated that 75 to 145 acres of grain land, but only 20 or 25 acres of vineyards and olive orchards, were needed to qualify.[20] These are admittedly rough approximations, but they serve to set the scale of "small" and "large" holdings. And they are as valid for the fourth century B.C. as for the seventh or sixth, for there were no major technological advances in Greek agriculture in the intervening years.

Since no *horos* indicates the dimensions of the holding which it marked, the determination of the stratum of landowners involved must be somewhat circuitous. Thirty-two of the stones are linked with dowries. In Athenian law the dowry did not become the outright property of the husband. Under certain conditions, the death of a childless wife for example, the marriage portion had to be returned to her father or guardian. To guarantee the dowry's return in such cases, the dowry-giver often demanded adequate security, usually in the form of real property. The property remained the husband's, but, should he become obligated to surrender the dowry and fail to do so, then he would lose the security exactly as if he had offered that piece of property to guarantee a loan. Of the thirty-two *horoi* that indicate this type of legal situation, seventeen give the amount of the dowry. The range is from 300 to 8,000 drachmas, with the median 1,900 and the average 2,650.[21]

[19] Estimates of population are those of A. W. Gomme, *The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.* (Oxford, 1933).

[20] Gustave Glotz, *Ancient Greece at Work* (London and New York, 1926), p. 247.

[21] There are certain complications which have been ignored in this summary: a different interpretation of one or two of the texts would increase the 2,650-drachma average slightly.

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These figures are easily evaluated. There was no law requiring a man to dower his daughter. Economic and social pressures, however, not only made dowries more or less mandatory, they also tended to fix the amount appropriate for a given social status. Roughly, 3,000-6,000 drachmas seems to have been the accepted standard for the wealthiest Athenians. Authenticated dowries exceeding 6,000 drachmas are so rare that we may set that figure as the normal maximum. The *horoi* linked with dowries therefore take us into the world of the wealthier, indeed of the wealthiest, Athenian citizens. There are only three sums under 1,000 drachmas—one of 300 and two of 500—and even they are dowries far beyond the reach of the poorer section of the population.

Sums inscribed on the other *horoi* represent debts of various kinds, rarely specified. They range from a low of 90 drachmas to a high of 7,000, with a median of 1,000. For proper application in the present context, these figures require a substantial upward adjustment. In the first place, the property involved need not have been the whole of the individual debtor's holding. In the second place, some of the smaller debts were secured by houses alone. The farm-secured debts, in other words, would show a median substantially greater than 1,000 drachmas. Even 1,000-drachma debts, like 1,000-drachma dowries, were not possible for the small farmers. In 322 B.C. the Macedonian general Antipater, wishing to establish an oligarchy in Athens, imposed a 2,000-drachma property qualification on the right to vote and hold office, thereby disfranchising a majority, perhaps 70 per cent of the citizen body.[22] If we assume that the property marked by a *horos* was as a rule worth at least twice the amount of the indebtedness—an assumption for which there is some supporting evidence—then considerably more than half these landed estates fell within the aristocratic range as defined by Antipater.

The astonishing point is that, once the *horoi* have been eliminated as evidence of the decline of the small farmer and of the growing concentration of agricultural properties in fourth-century Athens, no evidence at all remains. An examination of the authorities cited early in this discussion reveals that their

[22] See Gomme, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-19.

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picture of a shift from small to large holdings, mediated through land credits, is drawn from a combination of two arguments: a misreading of the significance of the *horoi* coupled with an analysis of the economics of agriculture (capital needs, markets, and the like) that pertains to modern farming, not to the ancient Greek, and that rests on no discoverable basis in Athenian sources. Ultimately we seem to be reduced to the conviction that the small farmer "must have" been squeezed off the land in the fourth century as he had been in the seventh. But why? According to the best estimates of population, the citizen body increased steadily in the fourth century (at least until 322 B.C.), following the sharp drop during the Peloponnesian War; the rate of urbanization seems to have been no greater than the growth rate; nor is there any evidence of increasing size of families. More important, there is no trace in Athens of a genuine demand for, or even fear of, redistribution of land and cancellation of debts at any time during the century.[23] In this respect, Athens was not typical of the Greek world, as the program of the League of the Hellenes demonstrates.

That the fourth century was the finale—and not a pretty one—of the classical Greek *polis* is indisputable. That the democratic *polis* had lost its vitality, even where it maintained a formal existence, is clear. That in Athens the rich were living more comfortably, the poor more miserably, is probable. But that all this had anything to do with a shift in the property régime on the land seems quite certainly wrong.

II

"Where a loan is involved," wrote the Peripatetic author of a book of *Problems* attributed to Aristotle, "there is no friend, for if a man is a friend he does not lend but gives."[24] This

[23] After Solon, the issue seems to have reappeared but once, when the democracy was reëstablished following the bloody and confiscatory oligarchic government which ruled Athens after its defeat by Sparta at the end of the fifth century B.C. The leaders of the democratic restoration were conciliatory in all matters, including property questions, an attitude for which they were later commended by Aristotle: "In the other cities . . . the *demos*, taking power, . . . brings about a redistribution of the land." *Constitution of the Athenians* 40.3.

[24] [Aristotle], *Problems* 29.2, 950a28; *cf.* 29.6, 950b28.

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ethical judgment, like Plato's recommendation that interest-bearing loans be prohibited altogether,[25] no longer coincided fully and literally with prevailing Athenian norms, but it still reflected a substratum of aristocratic solidarity which remained operative in the fifth, fourth and third centuries B.C. For that we have indisputable testimony, for example in the case of Apollodoros.

After the death of his father Pasion, the most successful and most famous of all Athenian bankers, Apollodoros involved himself in a series of legal maneuvers, probably in the years 368-365 B.C., against a certain Nikostratos and the latter's brother. Nikostratos had been captured in some war and then ransomed. He had succeeded in repaying 1,000 drachmas of the ransom money but he could not raise the balance and was threatened with enslavement, in accordance with Athenian law on the subject. In this emergency, he appealed for help to his boyhood friend Apollodoros. What happened is told to the court by Appollodoros in the following way:

> "Nikostratos," I said, ". . . since at the present time you cannot find the entire sum of money, nor have I any cash any more than yourself, I will lend you as much of my property as you wish and you shall hypothecate it for as much money as is lacking; you may have the use of the money for one year without interest and pay off the strangers. When you have collected the *eranos*-loan, as you yourself say, release my property." Hearing this, he thanked me and urged me to act as quickly as possible . . . I therefore hypothecated my multiple-dwelling to Arkesas of [the deme] Pambotadai, whom this man himself recommended to me, for 1,600 drachmas at interest of 8 obols per mina per month [i.e., 16 per cent per annum].[26]

The *eranos*-loan which Nikostratos was to arrange in order to repay Apollodoros was a familiar and very common device all over the Greek world. It was a friendly loan tendered by an *ad hoc* group (more properly, a plurality) of individuals; it was characterized not only by the fact of group participation

[25] Plato, *Laws* 742C.

[26] [Demosthenes], *Against Nikostratos* 53.12-13. Only the relationship between Apollodoros and Nikostratos is under consideration. It is therefore unnecessary to examine certain apparent contradictions and difficulties in the passage.

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but also by the absence of interest and by a provision for repayment over a period of years in regular installments. *Eranoi* were resorted to by everyone, from slaves who raised money in this fashion to purchase their freedom (more often than not it was the master who assembled the loan) to the wealthy landowners and social leaders of the community. Willingness to lend ranked high among the civic and social virtues; [27] it was perfectly consonant with the Peripatetic's "if a man is a friend, he does not lend but gives." Aristotle's pupil and successor, Theophrastus, reflected the same notion when he depicted a braggart as one who ran up on his abacus the fantastic sum of ten talents (60,000 drachmas) in paid-out *eranoi*.[28]

Nikostratos needed financial assistance to extricate himself from his ransomers. In probably the best known of all Athenian instances of personal indebtedness, the fictional case of Strepsiades in Aristophanes' *Clouds*, the rich, elderly, old-fashioned farmer went to Socrates to learn how to cheat two creditors from whom he had borrowed 1,500 drachmas for the purchase of horses—not farm animals, the playwright underscores, but show horses for the conspicuous consumption of Strepsiades' socially ambitious wife and son.

A third example of motive in borrowing is given us in another of Apollodoros' lawsuits, a successful action against the leading Athenian general Timotheos to recover a total of nearly 4,500 drachmas that Pasion had lent the latter on several occasions in 373-372 B.C. According to the plaintiff, Timotheos was in a hopeless financial position when Pasion out of friendship lent him various sums with which to meet obligations incurred in the course of his military and political activities on behalf of the state. The loans were made without witnesses or documents, they were unsecured, and they bore no interest. After Pasion's death the general denied the existence of the obligations, hence the suit by Apollodoros as his father's heir.[29]

Eranoi, ransom, conspicuous consumption, the personal financial troubles of generals in the turbulent fourth century—the

[27] See [Antiphon], *Tetralogy* I β 12. [28] Theophrastus, *Characters* 23.6.

[29] [Demosthenes], *Against Timotheos* (orat. 49). There is no suggestion of political corruption in the picture.

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pattern that emerges is one of borrowing for nonproductive purposes. The distinction between personal, consumption loans and business, productive loans is not always easy to draw. "From a historical point of view," Sieveking points out, "the differentiation . . . became possible only when the merchant began to maintain special accounts for the management of his business undertakings and when the firm became clearly distinguished from the private household." [30] Apollodoros was entitled to sue Timotheos because Pasion's "firm" and private household were one and the same; there was no distinction, in fact or in law, between bank property and the banker's personal wealth. Apollodoros' claim against the general rested on his position as son and heir, not on the continuity of the bank, with which he never had any connection. Nevertheless, the difference between personal loans and business loans does emerge with considerable clarity, especially when the transactions under consideration are counterposed to maritime loans, which were indubitably business operations on both sides.

It seems to have been almost a fixed rule of Athenian commercial practice, attributable to the great risks of sea traffic and the inadequate accumulation of liquid capital, that merchants used borrowed funds, in whole or in part, for their maritime ventures. In the fourth century B.C., from which our information about bottomry comes, a set pattern can be seen. The loans rarely, if ever, exceeded 2,000 drachmas; they were made for the duration of the voyage (weeks or months, no more); the articles of agreement were detailed and always in writing; interest rates were high, even an annual figure of 100 per cent was not unheard of; all the risks of the voyage, though not of economic failure, were borne by the lender, who held the ship or cargo or both as security for prompt repayment once the vessel was safely back in the harbor of Athens. Land-secured loans, in contrast, averaged only a little less than the maximum for bottomry and frequently ran to far larger sums. They were often arranged verbally and without interest. When interest was charged, the rate was roughly 10 to 18 per cent. One year seems to have been a common term, perhaps the cus-

[30] Sieveking, *op. cit.*, p. 561.

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tomary one. And of course the kind of risk element inherent in bottomry transactions was lacking.

The available information is altogether too meager for any sort of statistical presentation. But it is significant, even decisive, that in the instances known to us from our best source, the Athenian orators, whenever a substantial sum was borrowed on real security, the borrower's purpose was not a productive one. Occasionally landed Athenians no doubt did borrow on their holdings for productive reasons, but the pattern was unmistakably in the opposite direction: " to cover the conventional needs of a social class accustomed to elaborate expenditures." [31]

Paramount among the conventional needs, in Athens as in all earlier socio-economic systems, were the financial requirements of marriage, in particular a large dowry. Fully one third of the *horoi* are explicitly linked with family matters; how many of the others may also have been is not determinable from the texts and their elliptical language. Thirty-two *horoi* indicated dowry security, as we have already seen. Twenty-one others were connected with an institution known officially as " leasing of the family estate " (*misthosis oikou*). If a guardian designated by will was unwilling or unable to administer the child's property, he could arrange to have the estate leased by auction, under governmental supervision, for the duration of the child's minority. The successful bidder was required by law to offer adequate real security guaranteeing payment of the annual rent and the return of the estate when the orphan attained his majority. The twenty-one *horoi* stood on properties so encumbered. The lessors of course acted from motives of gain, not charity. However, these texts contribute nothing to the discussion of the motive for indebtedness on the part of men of property who *borrowed* on their holdings. Leases are not under consideration, and the *misthosis oikou* was nothing but a lease under peculiar circumstances.

Apart from dowry and *misthosis oikou*, the *horoi* maintain almost complete silence about the reasons for the indebtedness they publicized. But the orators and other literary sources leave little doubt that in most instances the underlying obliga-

[31] Sieveking, *ibid.*, writing in general terms, not about Greece in particular.

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tion was like those described by Apollodoros. Particular stress must be given the point that, whereas the modern mortgage loan serves primarily to finance either the purchase or the improvement of real property, these two reasons for borrowing were virtually unknown in Athens.

Among the Greeks, sales were cash sales in fact as well as in law. The Greek city-states never recognized a promise to buy and sell to be a legally binding contract, not even when accompanied by transfer of possession and partial payment. In this respect the law merely kept step with actual practice. Some credit sales were made, to be sure, but they constituted the exception and they could be given legal force only through a fiction, usually in the form of a loan agreement. I know of exactly two unequivocal references in the Athenian sources to a piece of real property being put up as security to cover its purchase price. One is a *horos*, found in a rural district and dated in either 340-339 or 313-312 B.C. It marked a plot of land that was encumbered for 2,000 drachmas owing on the price.[32] The other is in a speech by Demosthenes, probably dated 346-345 B.C., written for a lawsuit in a very complicated case involving an ore-crushing mill in the silver-mining district of Attica, purchased together with some slaves with the help of a loan of 10,500 drachmas, by far the largest private credit transaction in extant Athenian records.[33]

The fact is that there was no real-estate market, properly speaking, in Athens at all, that land was not a commodity in any significant sense. The Greek language had no word for "real property". Nor was there a word for "seller of real estate" or "broker"; "grain-seller", yes, "perfume-seller", "bread-seller", even comic inventions like Aristophanes' "decree-seller", but no "land-seller" or "house-seller". Not one Athenian is known to us who earned his livelihood by dealing in real estate. The city itself kept no formal record of property holdings and no record of any kind of transactions on property. That explains why a creditor posted a *horos* in order

[32] *Inscriptiones Graecae* II^2 2762. Fritz Pringsheim, *The Greek Law of Sale* (Weimar, 1950), pp. 163-64, offers another interpretation which would remove the credit-sale element and leave us with but one firm example.

[33] Demosthenes, *Against Pantainetos* (orat. 37).

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to protect himself against possible legal complications, should the owner be tempted to borrow further on his already encumbered land or to alienate it. A would-be buyer or lender could not turn to registers of deed or title, but he could see the telltale stone markers.

Not a single Athenian text is available to exemplify the modern practice of mortgaging property in order to raise funds for purposes of building and improvement. All in all, there are not a dozen references in any context in Greek literature to increasing the value of a farm or of urban realty. And the few to be found scattered in the sources attribute the results to zeal, hard work, temperance, or some other moral quality, rather than to an outlay of funds or skillful managerial manipulation bringing about a change in the economic quality and potentiality of the property.

One group of documents is particularly instructive in this respect. It was a standard practice for Athenian cult associations, public, quasi-public, and private, to rent their land to individual farmers on long-term leases (ten to forty years). Some twenty individual and model agreements have been preserved on stone. They are rather detailed: among the provisions to be found in one or another are clauses requiring the tenant to restore the property at the end of the rental period with the same number of trees and vines he had received, to keep the buildings in repair, to cut the olive trees in a designated way, to employ the fallow system, and the like. Only once is there mention of improvements in the proper sense of the term, and that a singularly unimpressive one. The fourth-century B.C. lease of a garden owned by worshipers of the Hero Physician gave the tenant, who took a thirty-year lease, the right to make any construction he wished, at his own expense, in a designated section of the property. At the end of the term, he was to remove the roof, doors and window frames, unless a prior agreement was made to the contrary.[34]

That farmland was maintained for years and years on a fixed

[34] Lines 11-23 of the inscription, as reproduced in *Rev. des ét. grecques*, vol. 63 (1950), pp. 148-49. It was sometimes the practice, still to be found in places in modern Greece, for rural tenants to provide their own roofs and woodwork and to take them away when they left.

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level of operations is revealed most clearly by the inventories of the temple of Apollo on Delos.[35] Whatever it was that prevented the Delian temple from developing its landed holdings, it was not lack of cash, for the temple possessed large sums, some of which it hoarded while the remainder was placed on loan, always at 10 per cent. The Athenian man of property may or may not have had the cash. If he did not, neither did he borrow on his property for economic expansion. His mentality was nonproductive. Freedom from the burden of earning one's living was what distinguished the *plousios* from the *penēs*; this standard Greek antinomy has a shade of meaning that differs significantly from our "rich" and "poor". For the latter word-pair there is no precise rendition in Greek, except through a circumlocution. Wealth was good and desirable, in fact necessary for the life of the good citizen. But its function was to liberate its owner from economic activity and concern, not to provide him with a base for continued effort toward more and more acquisition.[36]

Institutionally, a major inhibition to the building of a bridge between property and money was the citizen's monopoly of land ownership. All Greek cities limited the right to own land to their citizens; noncitizens could acquire the right only by special enactment and there is ample evidence that such privileges were not easily obtained except in times of gravest crisis. The Athenians in particular jealously guarded their prerogative. Obviously, a man who could not own land would not accept land as security for a debt; such security would be worthless to anyone who could not seize the property in case of default.[37] Noncitizens played a leading rôle in the economic life of Athens, particularly in financial dealings. As noncitizens, however, their financial activities were necessarily cut off from the

[35] See J. H. Kent, "The Temple Estates of Delos, Rheneia, and Mykonos", *Hesperia*, vol. 17 (1948), pp. 289-90.

[36] One need only read the Socratic parables in Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 2.7-10. There was another, money-getting strain to be found in the Athenian world, to be sure, but our concern is solely with the wealthier landowning stratum and only with the dominant attitudes among them.

[37] That this was the situation in Athens is explicitly stated by Demosthenes, *For Phormio* 36.6.

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economic base of the society, its landed property. They could lease farms, houses and mines, but they could not purchase them or lend on them.

However one may explain the unbroken insistence upon the citizens' monopoly of real property, the fact remains that in large measure land and money remained two separate spheres; for a large section of the financial community, entirely so. There were twenty or thirty thousand metics (permanently resident aliens) and an incalculable number of transients in Athens. Their contribution to the city's economic life was welcomed, even sought after. In the fourth century B.C., important changes in legal procedure were introduced to facilitate and expedite the settlement of disputes in which they were involved and to make their commercial and financial dealings simpler and therefore more attractive. But their exclusion from the land remained untouched; as far as we know, no one ever proposed a change in that law. It follows that there were not productive drives sufficient in strength to overcome the political-psychological resistance of the traditional land-citizenship tie. And neither a genuine market in land, a significant concentration of holdings, nor a continually intensified exploitation of the land was possible divorced from fluid wealth.

III

Moneylending was fundamentally noninstitutional and discontinuous. Neither the firm nor true partnership made an appearance; agency was known in a rudimentary way, but it was very much the exception. In the overwhelming mass of land-secured debts, individual X was directly and personally indebted to individual Y, no more.[38] Though there is little information about the Y's, that few of them were vocationally

[38] It is necessary to reiterate that neither petty lending nor bottomry operations are under consideration. Even such activity, I may add, will show the same characteristics summarized here, though not so rigidly. Sizable loans for manufacture, like extensive agricultural credits, were unknown. The one exception to the rule that moneylending was noninstitutional is found among demes and other subdivisions of the state, temples, and private cult bodies. Many of them made loans at interest, but the sums were almost invariably small, and, important as the activity may have been in providing funds for sacrificial animals and ceremonial banquets, there is no evidence that it contributed measurably to the economic life of the community.

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lenders of money seems certain. Not thirty Athenians are known from the whole of the fourth century who are specifically identified as bankers, a reflection of the rarity of the occupation, not of a defect in the available sources. Most often the loans came either from merchants and *rentiers* who seized a particular opportunity to make a profit or from men of wealth willing to assist a friend without any monetary return. Occasionally two or more men made a loan jointly. Their relationship, too, like that between creditor and debtor, was accidental and disjunctive. Thus, the two men who made the 10,500-drachma loan on the ore-crushing mill and slaves, already cited, were neither business associates nor even friends; and this is the largest transaction of its kind on record.

From the whole pattern it necessarily follows that no continuity or rationality of financial connection was established; that "credit rating" was a matter of gossip and repute, not of economic analysis; and that no machinery existed for building up large cash funds in private hands, not to mention credit balances, which would transcend the relatively small sums any given individual was able and prepared to venture in any single, isolated loan transaction. When the loan was sufficiently large and when the creditor was a citizen (or one of the rare noncitizens who had received from the state the privilege of owning realty), he often requested land or a house as security, at times even for an interest-free, friendly loan. This practice is not to be confused with investment in mortgages.

In the first place, short-term lending was the rule. For the lender this meant a brief outlay of cash for a high return, not a long-range placement of capital. For the borrower it meant generally the satisfaction of a social-personal need, not the expansion of his economic potential. If the mere number of *horoi* now available proves anything, it is the wide prevalence of indebtedness among the propertied Athenians in the fourth and third centuries before Christ.

In the second place, book clearance and negotiable paper were foreign to the Athenian economy. The banker was little more than a money-changer and pawnbroker; his system of deposits and payments did not rise even to the *giro* level. Much of the

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available coin never found its way into the banks, but remained in homes and buried hoards. The state, too, handled its money in a rudimentary, strongbox method, doling out coins as needed to the appropriate officials.[39] Oral transactions were common. The receipt was unknown: proof of payment was secured by the presence of witnesses. " Some of you ", Demosthenes says to the jury, ". . . [saw Theogenes] count out this money [a 3,000-drachma payment] in the Agora." [40] If there was a written agreement in existence, it was destroyed and that was the end of the affair. A clearance procedure and, to a lesser extent, negotiable paper are essential for payment in credit, in turn a necessary technical condition if the economy is to grow beyond the narrow limits imposed by the necessity of holding and transporting large quantities of coin or bullion. And there is a simple, logical connection between nonnegotiability and a legal system that clings to the strict principles of cash sale.

In the third place, security was substitutive, not collateral. In its early form, security is always substitution, a forfeit. X owes Y something, an object, money, a performance, which he does not render, and Y accepts a substitute—land for money—in full satisfaction of X's obligation to him. Athenian security practice remained on that level right down to the Roman conquest, and perhaps for centuries thereafter. Occasional exceptions were made when the two parties had special reasons for introducing them, but the original conception continued unbroken. Collateral security involves economic thinking of quite another order. The security now becomes a guarantee of payment, not a substitute; default entails not simple forfeit but compulsory sale and a division of the proceeds according to the respective monetary values of the debt and the property. Between substitution and collateral there lies a profound economic transformation. " We are not to seek in the law of pledge itself for the reasons of the change. The change came about as soon as the community recognized credit widely and developed

[39] Nothing could be more striking than the description of the sacred chest and the public chest of second-century Delos, given by J. A. O. Larsen, in *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, ed. by Tenney Frank (Baltimore, 1938), vol. 4, pp. 340-44.

[40] Demosthenes, *Against Aphobos I* 27.58.

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varieties of obligation and forms of action for them." [41] Conversely, failure to make the change suggests failure of the community to recognize (that is, need) credit widely.

It scarcely requires demonstration that an investor must have collateral security as much as negotiability. The average, casual, nonprofessional Athenian lender of two or three or even ten thousand drachmas was seeking either the emoluments of friendship or 10 or 12 per cent together with the return of the principal at the end of perhaps a year. He would have preferred not to take the security as a substitute, not merely because of the nuisance involved in foreclosure but because he might very well be burdened for a considerable period with a farm or house for which he had no use or desire. If he did take the security, under the law it could be only as a substitute, in full and final satisfaction of the debt.

It is commonly said today that land was a "preferred investment" in ancient Greece because it was less risky than any other form of "investment". How strange, then, that the numerous cult bodies, whose psychology was certainly not that of the speculator, did not put their money into land but always put it to work in small loans, when they did not simply hoard it. Only one instance is known of the purchase of property by such a group, and that one in the first century after Christ.[42] The great majority owned some realty, no matter how small a plot, *which they invariably acquired by gift.* But they did not "invest" their funds in land when they sought a regular, secure cash income with which to meet the expenses of their religious activity.

In so far as land was in fact preferred to other forms of wealth, the choice was a psychological, social and political one: land was the proper wealth for a self-respecting gentleman and citizen. No economic judgment about investments was implied, merely a generally nonproductive mentality. But when a man made a loan at interest, he was seeking profit, not social

[41] J. H. Wigmore, "The Pledge-Idea: A Study in Comparative Legal Ideas", *Harvard Law Review*, vol. 10 (1896/7), p. 332 (stated in a discussion of late medieval Germanic law).

[42] This statement is based on the exhaustive investigation of these groups made by Franz Poland; see his *Geschichte des griechischen Vereinswesens* (Leipzig, 1909), p. 487, note 10.

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standing, and he wanted his own money back and more, not a substitute in realty.

When Lord Nottingham in the seventeenth century ruled that "The principal right of the mortgagee is to the money, and his right to the land is only as security for the money," the collateral idea was finally triumphant in England.[43] Implicit in that transformation was a conception of property whereby everything is readily translated into money. The post-Nottingham English creditor who accepted a landed estate as collateral security thought of it not so much as land but as so many pounds sterling concealed in the form of land, valuable to him only because in that form his money could not easily escape him. With pardonable exaggeration we may say that his Athenian counterpart saw nothing but the land.

Hazeltine has interpreted the shift from substitution and forfeit to collateral and the right of redemption as, in part at least, a victory of the debtor class in England.[44] It is doubtful that this line of reasoning offers a useful analogy for classical Athens. Under Solon there was a debtor class and it did score some sort of victory. But the relatively heavy, land-based indebtedness of the fourth and third centuries B.C. was largely an intraclass phenomenon. There was no struggle then between small farmer and usurer or between landowner and merchant capitalist. The usurer was not missing from the picture, to be sure, but we find him—and the complaints against him—circulating among the petty shopkeepers and craftsmen in the market place and the harbor, not in the countryside. Interest rates were untouched by legislation. Plato proposed the abolition of interest in his *Laws*. This he did as a philosopher with a fully systematized ethical theory, not as the spokesman of a debtor class. There is no trace in classical Athens of any popular agitation against usury, just as there is no serious evidence of a demand for cancellation of debts—and for the same reasons.

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[43] Thornbrough *v.* Baker (1676), 1 Ch.Ca. 284. On the historic significance of this case in English law, see R. W. Turner, *The Equity of Redemption* (Cambridge, Eng., 1931), chap. iii.

[44] H. D. Hazeltine, General Preface to Turner, *op. cit.*, pp. xlviii-xlix, lxi-lxiii.

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Economic Stability in a Changing World: Essays in Economic Theory and Policy. By JOHN H. WILLIAMS. New York, Oxford University Press, 1953.—vi, 284 pp. $5.00.

These essays, in so far as they are topical, are concerned primarily with the international problems of the post-war world. The comments on theory, however, are wide in scope and raise disturbing questions as to the adequacy of existing theory as a guide to economic policy.

Looking back over a long experience as economic adviser, John Williams feels that formal theory provided few principles that were helpful in dealing with the problems he confronted. He attributes the shortcomings of these theories, whether classical or Keynesian, to their pretensions to universal validity. In his opinion the wide acceptance of systematic theories arises less from the rigor of their logic than from their apparent relevance to the problems of their day. Keynes is quoted as saying that the completeness of the "Ricardian victory" was "due to a complex of suitabilities in the doctrine to the environment into which it was projected" (p. 46). Williams observes that both the origin and adoption of the Keynesian views were also due to a complex of suitabilities. With some sense of foreboding he warns that if conditions to which Keynes's theory "was mainly directed should reappear, we shall probably find ourselves swept far beyond the kinds of remedies he favored, and forced into things he thought his theory and policies would avoid" (p. 63).

In his own thinking Professor Williams regards relevance rather than internal consistency as the jewel. He formulates no general doctrines of his own, but his mood and approach are evident throughout the essays, particularly in the series of six papers discussing the Marshall Plan which appeared serially between 1947 and 1952. It is a severe test of topical essays to reread them in the light of subsequent events; by this test these essays deserve a high score. An analytical narrative presenting a record of events, analyzing problems and appraising policies is itself a form of theory. This form, as demonstrated in these essays, makes possible a combination of timely and relevant comment with basic analysis. Thus the general value of the essays

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extends beyond the episodes observed, for they illustrate a habit of thinking appropriate to similar types of policy problems.

The method of approach can only be intimated in any brief summary. The perplexing questions are viewed in perspective, since they are not entirely new and are likely to persist into the future. Larger problems are broken down into their parts; over-all solutions are shied away from and attention is focused on correction of key situations. The twin problems of internal inflation and external deficits are considered in all their interwoven complexity, including such policy choices as between emphasis on investment as against current output —a subject on which economists have held a disparity of views. Frequently the reader is reminded that international difficulties are not exclusively foreign in origin since the problems of Western Europe are greatly influenced and sometimes complicated by the behavior of our own economy. In view of these many-sided problems no wonder Professor Williams doubts the adequacy of an approach that attempts to embrace all phases in a single general theory. He realizes that at any given time only partial solutions may be feasible; but he accepts the problems in their own setting and does not project them into an unknown future beyond the range of present action. To maintain such an attitude under the pressure of the day's work requires extraordinary patience, a degree of initial skepticism sufficient to protect one from subsequent disillusionment, and fortitude enough to persist in the face of heavy odds.

In general this seems to be Professor Williams' dominant mood. He confesses that for him policy questions present themselves as dilemmas and frequently leave him in a quandary. Most economic policy decisions must be taken without benefit of all the evidence and without complete certainty of outcome. Before all the facts can be assembled, when very little is entirely clear, and yet before it is too late to act, a decision must be reached—if only a choice of evils. The art of economic advising, like other arts, requires certain traits of personality as well as information and ideas. Those who would cultivate the art might well ponder these essays in the hope of absorbing some of their accumulated wisdom, tempered with experience.

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The Carthaginian Peace, or the Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes. By ÉTIENNE MANTOUX. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952.—xx, 210 pp. $3.00.

The figure of John Maynard Keynes is assured of a large place in the history of the development of economic doctrine, no less than in the tale of practical experiment. Lord (then Mr.) Keynes was attached to the British delegation and participated in 1919 in the Peace Conference of Paris that was struggling with the task of putting together again the pieces of a broken world.

The results of the Paris peacemaking have been the object of much criticism and of many attacks. Those of Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace,* saw the light of day in the very year 1919.[1] The book was a sensational and immediate success, which quality and style alone would hardly have sufficed to insure had it not suited the mood (which in turn it did much to foster) of cynicism and disillusionment that was beginning to prevail.

Keynes capitalized on the prestige of a "scientific" analysis, or one presumably such, arguing "that the perils of the future lay not in frontiers and sovereignties, but in food, coal, and transport". The importance of economics no one would gainsay, though Mantoux rightly makes the point that, if frontiers were such secondary matters, Keynes seems to have been unduly exercised over the issue of those of Germany.

Étienne Mantoux was the son of Paul Mantoux who, as official interpreter, participated in the same Paris Peace Conference which provoked Keynes's wrath and sarcasm. A young man of the highest promise, as his brilliant but all too brief record shows,[2] before rejoining the army he spent some time in the United States. The present book, completed in 1944, is the result of his American sojourn. Published in England in 1946, it has only recently been issued in the United States. The lapse of time does not detract from the interest and value of this analysis, "an answer which comes from that generation" (p. 203) to which Keynes dedicated his own book.

It is an answer written from the heart, reflecting the resentment at what Mantoux believes to have been the harm done by Keynes, though not one in the writing of which the head has abdicated. The book falls into two parts: an analysis of the more narrowly technical aspects of Keynes; a discussion of the broader question of the political

[1] It appeared in the United States in January 1920.

[2] He was killed while fighting with the Free French Forces in Bavaria in the very last days of the war.

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and moral consequences of Mr. Keynes. Such a rubric, in fact, might have been a more adequate subtitle.

Apart from minor, though significant, details such as evidences of Keynes's looseness (e.g., pp. 103-4), the author's central point is that reparations *could* be paid. Indeed they could, as was shown quite conclusively by the thorough and effective German plundering of Europe during World War II. And it is also true that the Third Reich, before going to war, managed to raise vast sums for its rearmament. But whether these facts are proper evidence is another question again, for the self-limiting conditions of a free capitalist economy must be borne in mind. At the same time, the point that the productive and recuperative capacity of modern industry was vastly underestimated is a good one.

The discussion of the political aspects of the matter is on more solid ground. It is both well done and effective. The loose and fallacious thinking of Keynes and others is ruthlessly exposed. It is well to be reminded of Allyn Young's statement: " it is hard to be patient with men who point to the economic dissolution war has wrought and say: 'There are the fruits of your peace'" (quoted p. 170). In the light of so much misplaced sentimentalizing as subsequently prevailed, it is well to have it pointed out that to exact reparation is not so much to perpetuate old grievances as to remove existing ones.

And thus we are brought back to fundamental issues of justice and morality. These may be irksome and regrettable sources of complicating distortion to the economist; they are none the less real and potent movers of men's actions. To forget them is not to procure a saner settlement, but is the height of unrealistic blindness. It is easy—and sound as far as it goes—to point out, for instance, the economic virtues of the old Dual Monarchy. But merely to turn the tables and forget that the force of nationalism was at the root of the First World War and that it was proper that it should have been heeded in 1919 would amount to a dangerous obliviousness toward previous history. There is after all a component of elementary justice in the desire for self-determination.

Economics and economists may not without risks be ignored. There is, in fact, little danger that they will be. An economist himself, Mantoux is the first to acknowledge that men cannot live without bread. All the more reason for welcoming the accomplishment of a gifted young economist in his effort to restore to its proper perspective a story the misunderstanding of which has weighed heavily on two decades of history.

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René Albrecht-Carrié

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The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo. Edited by PIERO SRAFFA and M. H. DOBB. Vol. I: *On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.* Vol. II: *Notes on Malthus's Principles of Political Economy.* Vol. III: *Pamphlets and Papers, 1809–1811.* Vol. IV: *Pamphlets and Papers, 1815–1823.* Vol. V: *Speeches and Evidence.* London and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1951 and 1952.—lxii, 447; xviii, 463; viii, 437; vi, 422; xxxiv, 534 pp. $4.75 each; 24s.

Few figures occupy as high a rank as David Ricardo in the history of economic thought; and fewer still have been the object of as much controversy both in his lifetime and subsequently. The controversies have concerned not only technical points of doctrine but also enduring questions of economic policy. They have ranged from the theory of value and distribution to the gold standard and free trade. Much of the controversy has been the result of fairly exclusive reliance on the famous *Principles* and such additional items as were to be found in McCulloch's one-volume edition of his writings, or in E. C. K. Gonner's edition of Ricardo's *Economic Essays.* Additional writings of Ricardo have gradually come to light. Several collections of his correspondence have appeared. Cannan and other scholars made available accounts of Ricardo's activities in the House of Commons, as revealed especially by Hansard's *Parliamentary Debates.* Then in 1928, Ricardo's extensive notes on *Malthus's Principles of Political Economy* were published.

There has long been a need to bring this scattered material together. This was intensified as the problems of the period after the First World War recalled those of the post-Napoleonic time in England, an era that saw the beginning of that dominance of English economic thought and policy by the views that are associated with the name of Ricardo.

Now, thanks to the sponsorship of the Royal Economic Society, all these published materials, and more to boot, have been collected. A large amount of hitherto unpublished material has been included. Adding a romantic touch is the story of successive accidental discoveries of new batches of manuscript that necessitated resetting of type for the volumes ready for printing, of the postponement of publication over the years, and of the stretching of the projected edition from six to ten volumes.

The editor and his aides have spared no pains in making the collection as complete as possible. Extensive introductions, notes, and appendices of a factual nature enable the reader to reconstruct circum-

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stances and the stimuli of Ricardo's manifold writings and speeches. Such material more than makes up for the lack, if it be considered such, of the customary general introduction evaluating the rôle of the central figure in history.

In the first volume, the three editions of *On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* that appeared in Ricardo's lifetime have been effectively collated, and even "a table of corresponding pages" prepared that enables comparisons to be made with the heretofore standard editions by McCulloch and Gonner. In the second volume, Ricardo's notes on Malthus' *Principles of Political Economy* have been integrated with the relevant passages of Malthus' treatise in the most satisfactory manner, short of reprinting the entire Malthus text. The two volumes of pamphlets and papers devoted to his "shorter writings" contain largely the famous pamphlets in favor of the resumption of specie payments and the attacks on the corn laws in the name of free trade. There will doubtless be considerable interest in a hitherto unknown paper on "Absolute Value and Exchangeable Value", which, as the editorial note states, "develops an idea which existed previously in Ricardo's writings, only in occasional hints and allusions, namely the notion of a real or absolute value underlying and contrasted with exchangeable or relative value" (vol. IV, p. 359).

The fifth volume, devoted to his addresses in the House of Commons, testimony before the parliamentary committees, and speeches before the General Court of the Bank of England, the General Court of the East India Company and before gatherings of reformers, will probably attract the most attention for these important items had heretofore not been collected, let alone reprinted from the contemporary records. The editorial note on the manner in which Ricardo obtained his seat in the era of rotten boroughs should, incidentally, be of use to students of political history.

The revelation of the loose manner in which speeches were recorded in Hansard's *Debates* will come as a surprise to most readers, unaware that the official shorthand reporting of today is of recent origin. In addition to the barriers a suspicious House of Commons continued to interpose to accurate reporting, there was the prejudice among the reporters themselves against verbatim recording, on the ground that this would be attending to the words without entering into the thoughts of the speaker; as it was succinctly put, the reporter should give "eloquence to the stammerer and concentration to the diffuse." Ricardo, himself, complained that "the reporters, not understanding the subject, cannot follow me—they often represent me as uttering perfect nonsense." Fortunately, an original transcript of a lengthy speech in Ri-

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cardo's own handwriting has been found and, with this at hand, the reader can take the greatly reduced report of the speech in Hansard as a standard by which to judge the quality of the others.

The editorial "Notes on the Evidence of the Resumption of Cash Payments" (vol. V, pp. 350-370) is a pithy condensation of that famous chapter in English monetary history in which a Tory ministry, reluctantly bending to the "weight of talent and influence" spearheaded by Ricardo, put through the restoration of the gold standard.

Among the editorial accomplishments is some good detective work. The anonymous "ingenious calculator of the Bank of England cash and discounts" turns out to be the actuary William Morgan, and not Thomas Tooke; and the "very eminent continental merchant", who testified before the famous Bullion Committee in 1811, was not Nathan M. Rothschild, but John Parish, Jr., of the Hamburg House of Parish & Co.

Joseph Dorfman

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The Development of Economic Thought: Great Economists in Perspective. Edited by Henry William Spiegel. New York, John Wiley & Sons; London, Chapman & Hall, Limited, 1952.—xii, 811 pp. $6.50.

Of the forty-two appraisals of great economists by other great economists, three are printed for the first time in this volume and eight others are translations by the editor. The new essays are by J. M. Clark on J. B. Clark, Frisch on Wicksell, and Colin Clark on Pigou. The translations are Einaudi on Galiani, Marx on the Physiocrats, Halévy on Sismondi, Schmoller on Roscher, Walras on Gossen, Hayek on Wieser, Schumpeter on Böhm-Bawerk, and Demaria on Pareto. Although the reviewer disagrees with Kenneth Boulding's statement in the Foreword that "There emerges from this collection of essays a sense of the progress through time of a true science . . . ," Professor Spiegel's selections suggest a cosmopolitan outlook and a broad tolerance and appreciation of all schools of thought. The Romantics are omitted, but this may be justified in terms of the emphasis on economic theory as distinguished from economic thought in the broad sense. There are important omissions (Aquinas, Mun, Steuart, Senior, for example), but these may result from the double coincidence required for selection—that the economist be great and that he has been the subject of an appropriate essay by another great economist. This twofold requirement probably accounts for the less

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satisfactory nature of the selections for the early period of economic thought. Ten economists appear in the dual rôle of author and subject (Smith, Mill, Marx, Jevons, Walras, Marshall, Veblen, Mitchell, Keynes and Schumpeter). Professor Pigou is the only living economist included as the subject of an essay.

Among the new appraisals the one by J. M. Clark on J. B. Clark is of special interest. It contains the literary charm characteristic of the author's other writings plus the filial warmth of a great son for a great father. Professor Clark renders a negative answer to the question whether his father changed from a liberal crusader in the *Philosophy of Wealth* (1886) to a *status quo* conservative seeming to justify the existing order in his later works. On a still more delicate subject, J. M. Clark does not deny that his father used his specific productivity theory to give ethical sanction to capitalistic distribution, which, as he points out, has been the subject of more criticism than any other feature of his father's system. However, the motivation is said to have been a desire to refute Marx, an explanation which might seem to take some of the sting out of the charge of lack of ethical neutrality. J. M. Clark writes of his father's marginal productivity theory: "But probably the key fact is that his statements are oriented at Marx, and are best construed as an earnest, and not meticulously-qualified, rebuttal of Marxian exploitation theory" (p. 610). This interpretation is somewhat surprising in view of J. B. Clark's own statement: "It was the claim advanced by Mr. Henry George . . . that first led me to seek a method by which the product of labor everywhere may be disentangled from the product of co-operating agents and separately identified; and it was this quest which led to the attainment of the law that is here presented, according to which the wages of all labor tend, under perfectly free competition, to equal the product that is separately attributable to the labor." (*Distribution of Wealth,* p. viii.) These two statements concerning the motivation of J. B. Clark's specific productivity theory are not necessarily contradictory, but one would like to have the concrete evidence, if such exists, that J. B. Clark was reacting to Marx rather than to the native American radicalism of Henry George. The rise of European marginalism after 1870 is frequently explained as a reaction against Marx, but the influence of Marx's ideas in the United States is generally viewed as too slight to have had much impact on the origins of American marginalism. To explain the emergence of significant new orientations in economic theory is, perhaps, the fundamental task of investigations into the history of economic thought.

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Since J. B. Clark is the undisputed founder of marginalism in the United States and since marginalism became the dominant type of American theory, great importance attaches to the genesis of the elder Clark's theory. As much as one may appreciate Professor Spiegel's eliciting this essay, there is still need for a more detailed treatment by J. M. Clark of his father's life and work.

All the essays are not of the caliber of the Clark article, but the quality is uniformly high for the reason that great economists have long been interested in appraising the work of their fellow economists and because Professor Spiegel has executed the task of selection with rare judgment and discretion.

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New Fabian Essays. Edited by R. H. S. CROSSMAN. Preface by the RT. HON. C. R. ATTLEE. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1952.—xv, 215 pp. $4.00.

Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain, 1919-1931. By Sister M. MARGARET PATRICIA MCCARRAN. Washington, The Catholic University of America Press, 1952.—xii, 612 pp. $4.00.

New Fabian Essays is the product of a recognition that the completion by the Labor government of 1945-51 of the earlier Fabian program of reforms has produced a dangerous hiatus of thought and action within the Labor party, and that by 1951 the party did not know where it was going. A number of Fabians, convinced that a new analysis of the political, economic and social scene was required in order to reformulate socialist principles, began in 1949 the group discussions out of which this volume has grown.

The titles of the eight essays give some indication of the scope of the subjects treated. Richard Crossman opens the discussions with one of the most provocative of the essays, "Towards a Philosophy of Socialism". This is followed by an able analysis of "The Transition from Capitalism" by C. A. R. Crosland. Roy Jenkins writes on "Equality", while Margaret Cole, Austen Albu, Ian Mikardo, and Denis Healey contribute chapters on "Education and Social Democracy", "The Organisation of Industry", "Trade Unions in a Full Employment Economy", and "Power Politics and the Labour Party". John Strachey concludes with an examination of "Tasks and Achievements of British Labour".

Mr. Crossman's chapter provides one of the most striking contrasts with the tone of the original *Fabian Essays.* His thesis is that the

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Labor party cannot regain its sense of direction until it has attained a sound theoretical basis for practical programs of action, and he attempts to lay the foundations for an adequate philosophy of democratic socialism. He rejects the Benthamite approach to socialism and the reliance on pragmatic social reform and emphasizes the need for an adequate philosophy of history. The point of departure for a modern theory of socialism, he declares, must be a recognition that history shows no steady advance toward freedom, but rather that exploitation and slavery are the normal state of man and the brief epochs of liberty tremendous achievements.

Crossman believes the mission of the Fabians today to be the development of a "Promethean social conscience" to prevent the control of thought and life by centralized coercion. "The main task of socialism today", he observes, "is to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of *either* industrial management *or* the state bureaucracy . . ." (p. 27). This task, he finds, was not even begun by the Labor government.

The essayists maintain that Britain has not yet achieved the "classless society" which is socialism's ideal, and they devote much of their attention to the problem of how a more egalitarian society can be developed. Wholesale nationalization of industries is no longer considered to be the chief answer to this problem, and Mr. Crosland and Mr. Albu make suggestions for the reform of company law in order to achieve a more democratic organization of industry.

There is throughout the volume a preoccupation with the international scene and the changed rôle of Britain therein, and American readers will doubtless find the observations about the United States of particular interest.

It is doubtful if the publication of this book is "a political event of enormous significance", as the publisher's blurb claims, but it is well worth the attention of those who wish to gain some insight into the problems with which British socialists are wrestling at present.

In her doctoral dissertation, *Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain, 1919–1931*, Sister M. Margaret Patricia McCarran examines the influence of Fabianism during a period generally considered to have been one when the Fabian Society itself was dormant. She rejects this view (p. 231, n. 81), and holds that Fabians "shaped the Labour Party and assumed command thereof" (p. x).

The author asserts that the "Anglo-Christian mentality lent itself to Social Democracy as a restatement of its Protestantism" (p. 470), and that Fabian socialism captured the force thus lent to socialism to produce a "social religion secular in spirit" (p. x).

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The core of Fabianism is identified as statism, and the author is convinced that the Webbs and their colleagues sought to build a "monolithic state" which would be a totalitarian, one-party state.

Sister McCarran is particularly critical of the Webbs, and brings some serious charges against them. She describes the method in their writings, for example, as "data piled upon data critically evaluated, followed by bold generalizations having scant relation to the data" (p. 103).

In the detailed analysis of the influence of Fabianism on political events, it seems to this reviewer that too great influence is attributed to the Fabians. One wonders whether the assertions that the 1924 Labor government was a "Webb construct" (p. 330), that Fabians "permeated and liquidated" the I. L. P. (p. 108), that the Fabians built the Labor party "as a robot to express themselves" (p. 245), and that the Webbs were responsible for MacDonald's ruin in the eyes of the Labor party after 1931 (pp. 491 *et seq.*) are not far too sweeping.

The author's conclusions seem to indicate that Fabian socialism stands condemned, together with communism, as incompatible with the doctrines of the Catholic Church as enunciated, for example, in Pius XI's encyclical, *Quadragesimo Anno*. Doubtless the tendency apparent in this volume to equate Fabian socialism with communism will provoke vigorous dissent among many readers.

The book is marred by a number of typographical and factual errors. Some of the most glaring of the latter type are the statement that T. H. Green lectured at Thomas Davidson's Glenmore Summer School (pp. 4-5, n. 5); the listing of H. N. Brailsford and Lord Parmoor as "Protestant ministers" (p. 15, n. 35); and the startling identification of Naomi Haldane as the daughter of the bachelor Lord Haldane (pp. 323 *et seq.*).

WILLIAM C. WILBUR

MUHLENBERG COLLEGE

The Trend of Government Activity in the United States since 1900. By SOLOMON FABRICANT, assisted by ROBERT E. LIPSEY. New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1953.—xix, 267 pp. $4.00.

This is an economic analysis of government, an analysis of the magnitude of government activity in the national economy in terms of labor, capital assets, and goods and services employed for various purposes. This is more than an attempt to refine one vital sector in

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the national income accounts of the country. It is rather an effort to examine systematically what government contributes to and requires from our economy.

Few of us need to be reminded that government in 1950 is something different from 1900. But Mr. Fabricant at least supplies us with the evidence. In 1900 all our governments—local, state and national—employed one million persons. By 1949 the number had risen to seven million, including the armed forces. In 1900 one out of every twenty-five employed workers was on a government payroll; in 1949 one out of every eight workers was a government civilian employee or member of the armed forces. As of 1902 government property acounted for 6.6 per cent of total capital assets; in 1946 government property represented 20.6 per cent of the nation's capital assets, even excluding military property and roads and streets. Government purchases rose from 721 million dollars in 1903 to 18.7 billion dollars in 1949. As of 1929 government purchases amounted to 4.4 per cent of consolidated net sales of private industry; in 1949 the proportion was 8.7 per cent. In summary, the author tells us that government expenditures in this country have climbed from 1.7 billion dollars in 1903 to 59.8 billion dollars in 1949.

The division in this use of resources between levels of government may come as some surprise. For example, federal civilian employees and armed forces were 50.9 per cent of all government workers in 1949; the other 49.1 per cent were employed by state and local government. But to be sure the first half of the twentieth century has witnessed a sizable shift in this relationship; in 1900 over 73 per cent of all government workers were employed by state and local government. In 1930 this relationship still held true. Excluding roads and streets and military property, we find that 45 per cent of government capital assets belonged to the federal government in 1946, compared with 16 per cent in 1902. In 1929 federal purchases were 11.3 per cent of all government purchases; in 1949 they were 65 per cent. Moreover, the author has noted that government payrolls and purchases tend to be "cyclically stable".

Mr. Fabricant then turns his attention to the important but complicated matter of classifying government activities. At the outset the difficulties seem to me to be compounded by an attempt to relate government functions to those of private enterprise. Classifications of economic data do not reveal the subtleties of fine distinctions which are so important in this field. Thus, for example, my own study convinces me that government and nongovernment activity in

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higher education is not so much competitive as mutually stimulating. Such a fact is not readily revealed by statistics which compare the relative standing of the two in terms of students enrolled or amounts expended. In any event, the data are highly interesting in revealing such facts as these: in 1903 state and local governments spent one-fourth of their outlay on schools, one-fifth on highways, and some one-sixth on general control. In 1942 the big expense was still schools, taking 28 per cent of the total, with highways still second (16.1 per cent) and with public welfare now third (13.5 per cent as compared with 5.5 per cent in 1903). In so far as the federal government was concerned, national defense obtained 30 per cent of all expenditures in 1903 and 18 per cent in 1939; veterans' benefits amounted to 24.4 per cent in 1903 and 8.4 per cent in 1942. So-called public enterprises spent 23.6 per cent of federal funds in 1903 and 26.5 per cent in 1942. These public enterprises were the postal service, hydroelectric power plants, river and harbor facilities, airports, and similar endeavors. Mr. Fabricant concludes that various government activities have their ups and downs in expenditure levels, as with veterans' benefits, but he decides that the big percentage expansions in the last fifty years have come in activities which government in this country had performed throughout the whole period. "Measured by input . . . there has been change, but no revolution, in the functional pattern of government activity" (p. 83). He adds that "encroachment by public enterprises" upon private industrial activity "accounted for substantially less than a tenth of the increase in government activity" (p. 109).

In discussing interstate differences in expenditure levels on a per capita basis for various functions, Mr. Fabricant unfortunately has to use 1903 and 1942 data. He finds considerable variations among states. My own impression is that these differences have substantially narrowed in the past ten years.

Finally in chapter 7, Mr. Fabricant discusses the factors which have influenced trends in government activity. Every student of government and economics may well profit from this calm, objective summary. Certainly the author has performed a notable service for future textbook writers. Mr. Fabricant writes that "the major theme is growing economic interdependence" (p. 144). And he suspects that "the rising trend of government activity also is a concomitant of economic growth" (p. 149). In the end he points out the challenges which confront our society: the effect which recourse to government as "an agency of national progress and social betterment"

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may have upon the efficiency with which resources are allocated to alternative uses, upon the rate of economic progress, and upon social behavior and personal freedom. Mr. Fabricant asks the questions. He projects no answers.

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The Struggle for the Mediterranean, 1939-1945. By REAR ADMIRAL RAYMOND DE BELOT. Translated by James A. Field, Jr. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1951.—xix, 287 pp. $4.00.

Although victory over the Axis Powers was gained in Northern Europe, the importance of the Mediterranean theater during World War II was second to none. Mr. James A. Field, Jr., in his short but brilliant introduction to the work under review points out what might have happened had the Allies lost complete control over this "dangerous sea".

> For Axis control of this sea would have linked Italy's Mediterranean possessions with those in East Africa, and led to the irruption of commerce raiders into the Indian Ocean. These events in turn, lacking naval strength at Singapore, would presumably have resulted in the immediate entrance of Japan into the war. Control of the Mediterranean would have given Germany and Italy access to the Middle Eastern oil, thus alleviating a critical shortage, as well as to Balkan raw materials otherwise cut off by British dominance of the eastern basin. Finally, following the German attack on Russia, Axis control of the Mediterranean would have permitted support of that campaign by the way of the Straits and Black Sea, and would have threatened, if not prevented, use of the Persian Gulf as the route of classical western support of the eastern front.

The author, a distinguished French naval authority, discusses the Mediterranean policies of Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain during the various stages of World War II and gives details of naval battles indicating their effects. These discussions are of great value to students of international affairs as well as of naval warfare.

Admiral de Belot points out that, after the fall of France, German policy was primarily concerned with isolation of Britain and at the same time with leniency toward France. The Germans did not demand from France any control over African ports. This proved to be a mistaken policy, if not a blunder. "The Axis blunder regarding North Africa might have been easily rectified by an attack on Gibraltar. For

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the Germans had occupied the western coast of France as far as the Pyrenees; they were thus in contact with Spain and might logically have expected to penetrate into the Iberian peninsula."

It is known that at one time the German army was anxious to occupy Gibraltar, but Hitler held that the Germans should enter into Spain only after Spain entered the war in favor of the Axis Powers and should not invade Spain. On November 12, 1940 Hitler signed a directive to this effect:

> On November 12, 1940, Serrano Suner, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, was summoned to Berchtesgaden. *Prior to his departure a conference was held between Franco, Suner, and the military leaders; all were of the opinion that involvement in the war was to be avoided at any cost.... On 7 December, Admiral Canaris, chief of the German intelligence, and one of the strangest figures of the war, came to Madrid to renew pressure on the still reluctant Franco.* [Italics mine]

Franco's continued evasion of the plan led Hitler to give up the idea and on December 11 he so informed General Keitel. This indicates a vital piece of information regarding Franco's indirect contribution to the Allied cause by preventing Germany from getting control of Gibraltar which would have been of serious consequence to the later African campaigns.

By February 8, 1941 Hitler definitely gave up the idea of conquering Gibraltar, as they were planning to use the troops which might have been used for the conquest of Gibraltar for invasion of Greece and Russia. This was a grave blunder. It was felt by Admiral Raeder and others that ultimately the United States would come to the aid of Great Britain and thus "it was essential to solve the Mediterranean question before having to cope with American power."

In the spring of 1942 Hitler moved toward the Mediterranean and even tried to get as far as Suez, but then Germany had as enemies Great Britain, the U. S. S. R. and the United States, and it was too late.

Just as the Germans failed to take Gibraltar, so the Italians after the fall of France did not try to take Malta, which later on played such an important part in the defense of the Mediterranean area. Although the British had a very difficult situation to face in various theaters of war in 1940, they not only kept their partial control over the Mediterranean, but they destroyed an important portion of the Italian fleet at the battle of Taranto. This and other successes of the British fleet in the Mediterranean weakened the Italian position in Africa and Greece which made it necessary for the Germans to intervene in favor

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of Italy. It is needless to emphasize that victories in the African campaign, the Italian surrender, and the landing in southern France were made possible through Allied control of the Mediterranean. This had decisive effects in Allied campaigns in Europe as a whole, not excluding the Russian conquest of Central Europe.

TARAKNATH DAS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

France under the Fourth Republic. By FRANÇOIS GOGUEL. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1952.—xiii, 198 pp. $3.00.

M. Goguel's new book has a dual purpose. First, it presents an analytic review of French politics since the Liberation and thus provides a supplement to the author's estimable *La Politique des partis sous la Troisième République.* It is much terser than the earlier work, and perhaps less detached in point of view, since the author does not dissemble his preference for the M.R.P. and, latterly, the R.P.F. However, he gives a fair presentation of the position of the other parties, and, taken as a whole, his essay affords us one of the best available guides to the snarled politics of France in recent years.

While recognizing the remarkable continuity in French political life between the Third Republic and the Fourth, M. Goguel points out several new phenomena in French politics since the Liberation. One of these is the emergence of the R.P.F., which he believes is to be distinguished from the antiparliamentary groups on the Right under the Third Republic by its concern for effective government and social progress; another is the appearance of the M.R.P.; and another is the evolution of the Radicals to a position of avowed conservatism. Moreover, the author is confident that a revision of the constitution in the near future will correct some of the notorious political maladies, such as the too-rapid succession of cabinets, which the Fourth Republic has inherited from its predecessor.

But M. Goguel is not seeking merely to clarify recent history; he is also defining what seems to him the basic problem of French politics and proposing its solution. This problem, as the author sees it, is to withstand the menace of the Communist party while maintaining representative government and furthering economic and social progress. Hence he accords praise to the M.R.P. for its crucial rôle in breaking up the tripartite alliance of Communists, Socialists and M.R.P. which had emerged on the morrow of the Liberation. He recognizes merit in the conception of the "Third Force", which thereafter sought to

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create a governing alliance of Socialists, M.R.P., and other elements of the Center, but he believes its failure was foredoomed. Yet "tripartism" and the "Third Force" were only stages in an evolution; the definitive answer to the problem did not become clear until the emergence of the R.P.F. in 1947. To be sure, M. Goguel does not give the R.P.F. an unreserved endorsement. He acknowledges that some of its leaders misconceived its purpose as merely the elevation of General de Gaulle to a position of political leadership, and that, on certain issues, the organization adopted too rigid and doctrinaire an attitude. On the other hand, the author believes that the Socialists and some of the M.R.P. were unwise in labeling the R.P.F. as fascist. And he remains convinced that France will find no other solution to its problem than in a league, such as was the original conception of the R.P.F., binding together all political parties which are dedicated to national progress and the struggle against the Communists.

In an appendix, written in the summer of 1952, the author evinces pleased surprise at the success of the Pinay government. He is dubious, however, of its prospects in the long run, and he is certain, at any event, that the basic problem cannot be solved without a reform of the constitution which will strengthen the cabinet as against the National Assembly.

This is not the place for an evaluation of the policy which M. Goguel advocates. Yet American readers would be ill-advised to accept his argument merely because it is addressed to a laudable aim. Few would doubt that France has need of political reform in order to meet the threat of communism. But there are ominous overtones in an argument which calls for the merger of rival political parties in a single new political association, pledged to "national regeneration" and warfare against the Communists; which demands a stronger executive in order to overcome the impotence of Parliament and envisages a wider use of decree-law; which praises the revision of the electoral law in 1951 on the ground that the voters did not know their own best interests and had to be protected against themselves; and which includes a vague endorsement of the corporative organization of capital and labor.

M. Goguel believes it would be unfair to call the R.P.F. fascist, and unquestionably it would be unfair to call his proposals totalitarian. Yet all too often, totalitarianism has gained unwitting agents among those who believe themselves concerned only for the preservation of the democratic heritage.

PAUL FARMER

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

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The New State of Israel. By GERALD DE GAURY. New York, FREDERICK A. PRAEGER, 1952.—260 pp. $3.95.

This volume is a significant addition to the vast and rapidly expanding literature on Israel. A student of Arab affairs for many years and particularly interested in the modern development of the old desert civilization of Saudi Arabia, Colonel de Gaury decided to visit the new state of Israel in order " to record all that I could about it, as accurately as possible, in a factual way, avoiding controversial politics of the past and that aftermath of the war, the Arab refugee problem " (p. 11). In brief compass, the author discusses various phases of Israeli life paying particular attention to political and economic developments but not neglecting entirely the religious, cultural, educational and social problems. He has a particularly keen eye for administrative organs and procedures and in this respect his book may serve as a handy manual for visitors, business men or foreign diplomats. He describes in particular detail the structure and operations of the various ministries and other major government agencies.

It is not De Gaury's fault that the book is no longer up-to-date. In a dynamic society like that of Israel many statements become obsolete between the period of writing and publication. By the time a review appears they may be completely outdated. For example, the recent major changes in Israel's economic policy from strict governmental controls to the fostering of private enterprise and competition has greatly altered the economic image of the country. So has the sharp curtailment of immigration. In all of 1952 only some 24,000 Jews entered the country, a figure frequently exceeded in a single month during the preceding three years. It is doubly remarkable, therefore, that De Gaury's observations have frequently retained their freshness even under the changed conditions. His thumbnail biographical sketches, for example, of the cabinet members in power in 1951 (pp. 91 *et seq.*) are still of considerable interest despite the breakup of the old coalition between the Labor party and the Religious Bloc and the latter's replacement by the so-called General Zionists and Progressives, champions of a secularized state and a free-enterprise society. In fact, it is truly astonishing how, despite the great social and political changes in the country, essentially the same men have remained in power through the five years of Israel's independence as had been in charge of the development of the Jewish settlement through the two and a half decades of mandatory Palestine. If anything, De Gaury does not pay sufficient attention to the overshadowing rôle played by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion in the

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destinies of the country before and after 1948. Compared with the numerous statements concerning Chaim Weizmann, which occupy a whole column in the Index, the few references to Ben-Gurion give a somewhat wrong slant on the respective contributions of the two men to the new state. However, these are but minor flaws in an essentially useful handbook.

SALO W. BARON

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Costa Rica: A Study in Economic Development. By STACY MAY and Associates. New York, The Twentieth Century Fund; London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1952.—xiv, 374 pp. $3.00.

This book should be read by the two men now running for the presidency of Costa Rica. For them it presents a blueprint of what can be done in terms of economic development of their small but important Central American nation. In a detailed analysis, sometimes more drily written than one might hope, it sets forth the possible fields of economic advance in agriculture, public utilities, transportation, and industry; it suggests, also, the changes in the banking and credit system, in the tax structure, in the regulation of public utilities which would make for more confidence among foreign and national business men who are potential investors in Costa Rica's economy.

For all North Americans interested in the economic development of backward countries, and Point Four, or in the problems of Inter-American relations, this book by Stacy May and his associates should be of considerable interest. It presents in a single volume the whole range of economic problems which face a little country of modest resources, anxious to diversify and intensify its economic activity and raise the levels of living of its people.

Costa Rica is a test-tube case in the field of development of backward nations because it is not burdened with many of the problems which plague other such areas. Costa Rica is a small nation, and a homogeneous one. With minor exceptions it does not have deep and searing problems of race antagonism. It does not have vast and almost unconquerable distances. It does not have anywhere near the degree of antagonism toward foreign coöperation in development often found in underdeveloped areas.

So, if Point Four and the general program of aid from the economically more advanced nations to their less developed neighbors are to work at all, they should certainly work in Costa Rica. And in the

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present volume the authors present a varied prescription for the kind of a program which they deem should be put into effect in Costa Rica.

They were sent to Costa Rica as a mission of The Twentieth Century Fund, and this study is one of a series on the problems facing countries which are trying to improve their economies radically and quickly. Predecessor volumes in the series have dealt with Greece and Turkey. All of the authors are trained in the particular fields of inquiry to which they have devoted themselves in this volume. Mr. May himself is an old acquaintance to those who follow this general field, as the author of an excellent study of Cuba's economy several years ago.

The authors make varied and detailed suggestions of the rôle which Point Four can play in Costa Rica—principally technical aid, such as drawing up an over-all development program, improving the country's statistical services, help in scientific research, in surveying the nation's resources, and in improving the country's fiscal practices and policies. However, they lay much emphasis, too, on the rôle which private investors can play. In this connection they have many words of praise for the efficiency of the United Fruit Co., and the contributions which it is making toward a more stable and varied economy in Costa Rica.

Although it probably was not strictly within the authors' terms of reference, the political and social aspects of an economic development program are a necessary part of any assessment of its feasibility. There is one chapter on present-day labor and social conditions, but it seems to this reviewer that the picture is not complete until attention has been focused more clearly on the political implications and social relationships of the kind of program suggested in this book.

Particularly is this true of the operations of the United Fruit Co. The company has made many notable contributions to the country's economic life, but certain questions should be raised about increasing any further the already giant share which this foreign-owned company has in the Costa Rican economy. Attention should be centered, too, on the labor policies which this company and other United States enterprises have followed in Costa Rica.

Such questions and investigations would indicate the necessity for a rather fundamental reorientation of the outlook of the United Fruit Co. and other foreign businesses there, in their approach to Costa Rica and things Costa Rican. Fundamentally, they must accustom themselves to the idea that they are guests in a strange house, not masters in their own.

ROBERT J. ALEXANDER

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

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Brazil: An Interim Assessment. By J. A. Camacho.—vii, 116 pp. $2.50.

Chile: An Outline of Its Geography, Economics, and Politics. By Gilbert J. Butland.—vii, 128 pp. $2.50.

Uruguay: South America's First Welfare State. By George Pendle.—viii, 100 pp. $2.50.

The three volumes are published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London and New York, 1951 and 1952.

Sudents of Latin-American affairs will welcome this new series published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The volumes on *Chile, Uruguay* and *Brazil,* which will be followed in 1953 by studies on Colombia, Paraguay and Ecuador, provide convenient and suggestive introductions to the contemporary social, economic and political conditions of these countries. They reflect the multidisciplinary area approach whereby the interrelationships of political patterns, social structures and economic institutions are described in the perspective of their historical and geographical setting. In their bibliographies, footnote references and text evaluations these volumes also present and appraise the growing number of Latin-American governmental and statistical publications. Withal the books are more than an expanded statement of such competent summaries as can be found in the *Americana Annual;* to the factual material found in the latter they add interpretation and evaluation.

The best analysis is provided by Gilbert J. Butland, author of the study on Chile and the only trained social scientist of the three writers under review. Since 1948 Butland has been a lecturer in geography in the University of Birmingham, and a sojourn of five years in Chile enabled him to visit all but three of the country's 25 provinces. J. A. Camacho, who writes on Brazil, knows this country well from frequent visits and as a result of his experience as organizer of B.B.C. programs for Latin America. George Pendle revisited Uruguay in 1950 while preparing his study on this country but his acquaintance with Paraguay (the subject of his forthcoming book) is more intimate after spending the years 1942-44 in Asunción as Professor of English History. Both Pendle and Camacho are experienced political commentators in the B.B.C.'s Latin-American service.

Butland's comprehensive outline of the modern Chilean scene includes a survey of the geographical conditions, a consideration of the people and their way of living, a statement of the political situation since 1925, a summary of the general economic and social conditions

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(which occupies about one half of the book), and a brief review of Chile's foreign relations. The author has selected problems for consideration with unusual skill and has indicated succinctly the significance of the copious statistical data he has employed throughout the book. An indication of Butland's suggestive approach may be seen in his discussion of the location of industry (pp. 83-85) where a description of the availability of labor, power, transport facilities, raw materials, and markets shows meaningful correlation with the growing development of manufacturing areas.

The study on Brazil by J. A. Camacho has been subtitled *An Interim Assessment* because that country is changing so rapidly. In organization and content the book differs from the other two studies in that it is more determinedly historical and cultural in approach. Accordingly, there is a greater preoccupation with patterns of the past and a certain necessary repetition which becomes a luxury when such a comprehensive subject must be considered within the confines of so few pages. It may be that this treatment lends itself readily to a popularization of style appreciated more by the general reader than by the student of social sciences. The book is simply arranged. An introductory chapter describes contemporary geographic and demographic conditions. Thence political, economic and cultural conditions are traced historically: the period of the empire until 1889, the republic from 1889 to 1932, and the scene today, 1932-1950. Two more chapters describe foreign policy and economic planning (the Salte Plan) briefly.

Uruguay, by George Pendle, like the others, has an introductory chapter on the land and people, followed by a short historical statement, with subsequent chapters on political organization, finance, production, foreign trade, and cultural activities. A concluding chapter deals with such unrelated topics as foreign relations and party politics. The book is shorter than the others and relevant interpretive material accompanying the abundance of statistics is frequently lacking. It is particularly unfortunate that publication of this study could not have waited for a more adequate political assessment of the recently introduced plural executive system.

Short comprehensive surveys such as these inevitably impose a problem of selection and condensation. Butland's volume may evidence the fact that social scientists are better able to present meaningful material. It is true, however, that none of the studies has attempted to describe underlying attitudes and opinions in the respective countries. The current political success of symbols of xenophobic nationalism, for example, might have been anticipated, had problems of national behavior

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warranted analysis. The books are, however, without doubt, the best contemporary introduction for the countries they describe that can be found anywhere else in such concise form.

MARTIN B. TRAVIS, JR.

DUKE UNIVERSITY

Public Administration in Siam. By W. D. REEVE.—vi, 93 pp. $2.00; 8*s.* 6*d.*

Public Administration in Ceylon. By SIR CHARLES COLLINS.—viii, 162 pp. $3.00; 15*s.*

Public Administration in Hong Kong. By SIR CHARLES COLLINS.—ix, 189 pp. $3.00; 15*s.*

The three volumes are published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London and New York, in co-operation with the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951 and 1952.

The English have a detachment in regard to life about them which is a joy to behold. One feels that the sun cannot fail to shine forever upon a people who produce such calm and intelligent servants of the state as W. D. Reeve and Sir Charles Collins. Reeve is a recently retired Adviser to the Royal Siamese Government who spent some twenty years in the work of that government. Sir Charles Collins served thirty-eight years in the Ceylon Civil Service.

Public Administration in Siam describes, for the first time, the functions of the Siamese government, with the sympathy and understanding of an Englishman long rooted in public service in Siam. This book is of special interest today because Siam is the only land in Southeast Asia not touched by the Communists. There are chapters dealing with finance; the general structure of the administration; the civil service under the absolute monarchy, the constitutional régime, and post-war problems; and the merits and defects of the administrative system. Reeves concludes this succinct and informative study with the comment that Siam has only one "serious administrative problem, that of eradicating the widespread bribery and corruption in the civil service, chiefly engendered by post-war conditions" (p. 87).

Public Administration in Ceylon is the first of a series on public administration in the lands of eastern Asia. Sir Charles Collins divides this study into fourteen chapters. These are: pre-British times, with a brief account of the early history and administration; the Portuguese period and the Dutch period; the administration by the British East India Company; Ceylon as a Crown Colony; the administration of the Kandyan provinces; and a summary of the period from 1818 to 1832.

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Other chapters include the reforms of 1832 which led to the unification of Ceylon; the legal changes and the problems of land policy and compulsory service; the administration under the Constitution of 1833; the Constitutions of 1912, 1920, and 1924; and a brief discussion of Ceylon's responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations.

The author points out that the separation of Ceylon from India and the creation of a separate government and a Civil Service of selected men, who made their careers in the country, were wise moves. Ceylon also was strengthened by instituting a system of provincial administration, which included the recognition of the headmen. These were important steps in a country like Ceylon, which had ancient traditions and customs, and a conservative population. The English can be congratulated for the many years of cordial relations existing between the government and the people of Ceylon. This harmonious spirit, according to Sir Charles Collins, was due mainly to the labors of government agents and other officials of government and the cooperation between them and the headmen.

Public Administration in Hong Kong, also by Collins, contains eleven chapters and a bibliography tracing the history of Hong Kong's public administration from the days of the British East India Company to the years since the defeat of Japan. Sir Charles, with that British mixture of faith and detachment, ignores the menace of communism. He takes for granted the fact that the Union Jack will fly through the centuries over that rock called Hong Kong. Chapters x, "Developments in the Early Twentieth Century", and xi, "The Japanese Invasion and After", will be of value to all students of history and international relations. Chapter x contains a description of relations with China; the opium trade; education; social welfare; and expansion of government departments. The author discusses the Anglo-Chinese agreement of May 1911 which stipulated that no Indian opium would be imported into China unless accompanied by a statement from the government of India that this opium was destined for China. A state monopoly of opium was set up in 1913 in Hong Kong and the opium farm was taken over by the government in 1914. This move toward the gradual eradication of the opium traffic was undertaken at the same time other commercial activities were initiated. In this way the prosperity of the Colony was not injured. The procedure followed in Hong Kong is an effective solution of the opium problem and ought to be emulated in other parts of the world.

THOMAS E. ENNIS

WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY

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Dizzy: The Life & Personality of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield. By Hesketh Pearson. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1951.—ix, 310 pp. $4.00.

Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield. By Cecil Roth. New York, Philosophical Library, 1952.—viii, 178 pp. $3.75.

With a dozen or more biographies to his credit, it was only a matter of time before Hesketh Pearson, whose forte has been the delineation of striking personalities in popular style, would turn for a subject to the most glamorous and theatrical of Britain's prime ministers. Materials were easily available: the six-volume *Life* of Disraeli by Monypenny and Buckle (already the sire of a goodly biographical progeny), Disraeli's novels (with Philip Guedalla's introductions in the Bradenham edition) and his published letters; in addition to which Mr. Pearson has consulted, so he tells us, more than a hundred books relating to the man and his times.

An adventurer in politics, Disraeli could never lose himself in a cause, because he was his own cause, though this is not to say that he was an exponent of pure expediency who never showed political courage. At an early age, before he had entered Parliament, he told Lord Melbourne of his ambition to become prime minister some day, and years later, when he had risen to the leadership of the Tory party in the House of Commons, the old statesman exclaimed, "By God! the fellow will do it yet." But it was for reasons of personal ambition that he aspired to the premiership, not in order to carry out any policy or program to which he was dedicated nor to effect any great reform which he had espoused. He did not believe in crusades in politics. "Look at it as you will," he once said to a fellow-member of Parliament, "ours is a beastly profession." He was not selfish in the usual meaning of the word, but he was intensely interested in himself, as every good careerist must be, and that interest makes comparatively simple, if not quite easy, the task of a biographer who is more concerned with the man than with the statesman. It requires no arduous feats of psychological insight to see Disraeli as he saw himself, because, conveniently for the biographer, he dramatized himself in his novels. "My works", he once wrote, "are the embodification of my feelings. In *Vivian Grey* I have portrayed my active and real ambition." The novels, in general, contain much fictionalized autobiography, and it is small wonder that Mr. Pearson finds them interesting primarily for the light they throw on their author.

He does justice to Disraeli's more obvious traits: his desire in early

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life to be conspicuous and his sublime audacity, his anxious concern about the impression he was making, his histrionic posing and cultivated inscrutability in public, his skill in repartee, epigram and irony, his virtuosity in parliamentary debate, his use of flattery as an instrument of personal advancement and social ease, his vaulting ambition and eagerness for fame and power—and with all these, to his domesticity and devotion to his wife, his love of country life, his generosity, his capacity for friendship, and his preposterous love affair at the age of threescore and ten.

Disraeli is not in all respects a hero to his biographer, yet Mr. Pearson tends to see things and people—especially Gladstone—too much through his eyes. Disraeli's great antagonist could not have been the malevolent and contemptible madman depicted in these pages; and there were worthier elements in the free-trade movement than Mr. Pearson has detected. He has not, indeed, seen to the bottom of all the pools he has had occasion to glance at. It was not, for example, a mere point of etiquette that caused Peel to decline office at the time of the Bedchamber crisis in 1839, when Queen Victoria refused to change her ladies-in-waiting at his request. Peel was acting on what had been a recognized assumption of the English Constitution, namely, that a prime minister should have the personal confidence of the sovereign as well as the political support of a majority of the House of Commons.

There was much in the English way of life that appealed to Disraeli, and he liked to think of himself as a stalwart champion of English institutions—the throne, the altar, and the empire, among others. But though he lived all his life among the English, he was never one of them. He was the most dramatic and exciting of prime ministers mainly because he was so un-English, so outlandish, in the original meaning of that word. His Jewish inheritance colored his outlook on life throughout, and it goes far to explain his most distinctive traits and points of view. It explains, for instance, his unshakable determination to be a success. " You and I ", he once told a Jewish boy, " belong to a race which can do everything but fail." No real Englishman ever thought of the East as he did, and what Englishman would have described the Church of England as " the only Jewish institution that remains " ?

The Jewish element in Disraeli, which is peripheral and subordinate in Mr. Pearson's biography, is central and dominant in that of Mr. Cecil Roth, the distinguished authority on Jewish history and former President of the Jewish Historical Society of England. The most original and valuable chapter in Mr. Roth's book is entitled " Disraeli,

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Judaism and the Jews". On a very shaky and unsound genealogical basis, and with benefit of an exuberant imagination, Disraeli, who aspired to the leadership of the most aristocratic of the English political parties, gave himself a pedigree as good as, if not better than, any in England. "Fancy calling a fellow an adventurer," he said, "when his ancestors were probably on intimate terms with the Queen of Sheba." The fullest information about his ideas regarding Judaism and the Jews, as about so many of his other ideas, is to be found in his novels, and Mr. Roth has made excellent use of them, especially of *Alroy* (perhaps the earliest of Jewish historical novels), *Tancred*, *Lothair*, and *Endymion;* and even in his biography of Lord George Bentinck, Disraeli devoted an entire chapter to his own views on the Jewish question. In *Alroy*, written before he was thirty years old, he identified himself, more or less, with his medieval hero, who conceived the idea of reconquering the Holy Land and restoring the independence of the Jews. In *Tancred* his main theme was the essential aristocracy of the Jewish people. According to Disraeli, it was temporary circumstances, both in England and on the Continent, that had led the Jews to side with liberal parties, but instinctively and fundamentally they belonged with the conservatives. This thought was expressed clearly in his biography of Bentinck.

Disraeli was baptized in the Church of England at the age of twelve, and thenceforth he was a professing, and apparently a sincere, Christian —of a kind. Mr. Roth sees little reason, however, to doubt that he remained Jewish in sentiment to the end of his life. He believes that the Christianity which Disraeli professed was not that of the Church of England, but "a Judaic ethical monotheism, of which the Jew Jesus was the last and the greatest exponent." Disraeli saw Christianity as the fulfilment of Judaism, not as a departure from it; and he advocated Jewish emancipation not on the ground of general religious equality but because of the special relation of Judaism to Christianity. Speaking of the original Christians, he asked the House of Commons, "Where is your Christianity if you do not believe in their Judaism?" And he closed a speech in support of Jewish emancipation with words that made no appeal to his Tory Anglican followers: "Yes, it is as a Christian that I will not take upon me the awful responsibility of excluding from the legislature those who are of the religion in the bosom of which my Lord and Saviour was born."

Mr. Roth sees Disraeli as a forerunner of Nazism—in reverse. That is to say, he was a racialist, and his pro-Semitism, like the Nazis' anti-Semitism, was racial. There is no doubt that he was obsessed with the importance of race, on which subject he held views fully as unsound as

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those of later racialists, and with the preëminence of the Jews as a race, a preëminence which he ascribed to their spiritual force. Did he foresee the possibility of an unholy crusade against the Chosen People in the name of Aryan racialism, or was it just Disraelian flamboyancy that put these words into the mouth of one of the characters in *Lothair*:

> Welcome to an Aryan clime, an Aryan landscape, and an Aryan race. It will do you good after your Semitic hallucinations.... Semitism has destroyed art.... The Renaissance gave the Aryan art, and it gave that art to a purely Aryan race. But Semitism rallied in the shape of the Reformation, and swept all away.... Nothing can be done until the Aryan races are extricated from Semitism.

It is tempting to think of Disraeli as a Zionist before Zionism, though the temptation had better be overcome. A man who looked upon the Jewish religion as a faith incomplete and truncated without the Christian supplement could hardly have been a wholehearted Zionist. Yet the Holy Land made a powerful romantic appeal to him, and Zionism, as Mr. Roth suggests, would no doubt have stirred his imagination to the depths. " Who ", Disraeli asked, " can believe that a country once sanctified by the Divine presence can ever be as other lands? Some celestial quality, distinguishing it from all other climes, must for ever linger about it." He was disturbed by the plight of persecuted Jews in eastern Europe, and Mr. Roth has been informed, so he tells us, that there is a marginal note in Disraeli's hand on one of the Foreign Office minutes relating to Cyprus " to the effect that this territory might possibly serve as a place of refugee settlement for persecuted Jews." It may even be true that Disraeli contemplated the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine and intended to have the question considered at the Congress of Berlin. That this was the case is the principal thesis propounded in a Hebrew monograph by Dr. N. M. Gelber (Tel-Aviv, 1947), which has been translated into English by T. H. Gaster with the title *Lord Beaconsfield's Plan for a Jewish State.* Mr. Roth, however, gives weighty reasons for regarding the thesis as certainly unproved and as probably untrue.

ROBERT LIVINGSTON SCHUYLER

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Abraham Lincoln. By BENJAMIN P. THOMAS. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1952.—xiv, 548, xii pp. $5.75.

The last quarter of a century has been an unusually productive period of research about Lincoln which has engaged the efforts of many competent historians. Mr. Thomas' one-volume biography offers the

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modern reader a convenient way of discovering the latest findings of Lincoln scholars about such questions as Lincoln's paternity, Nancy Hanks's illegitimacy, the authenticity of the Ann Rutledge legend, Lincoln's relations with his wife, or his religious beliefs. On these points, and many others, the author has furnished the reader with the means of checking and comparing scholarly researches by means of critical bibliographical notes.

Mr. Thomas' portrait of Lincoln for posterity may conveniently be examined in two parts. In the first third of this biography, he is concerned with explaining Lincoln's rise to political leadership and social respectability in Illinois. Mr. Thomas refuses to accept either Lincoln's characterization of his early life as " the short and simple annals of the poor " or the more exaggerated " log-cabin to White House " myths which have grown up in American popular thinking. Lincoln's father, Thomas, is no longer presented as a lazy ne'er-do-well who had never known anything but hard poverty, but rather as a man who had stood well with his neighbors in worldly goods and personal reputation before he was broken by the hardships of pioneer farming in Indiana and Illinois. Abraham Lincoln escaped a similar fate by using politics as a ladder on which to climb to social and economic success in Springfield. Many would agree with Mr. Thomas that, in this phase of his career, Lincoln was moved primarily by self-centered ambitions.

The second and larger portion of Mr. Thomas' biography is built upon Lincoln's " re-entry " into politics in 1854, his emergence as a national political leader, and his activities and purposes as President. It is at this point that the reader can find the key to Mr. Thomas' interpretation of Lincoln. Lincoln's " new seriousness " about the slavery issue after the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska acts marks the beginning of a personal transformation in which Lincoln is increasingly motivated by " devotion to a cause " outside of and beyond his personal ambitions—" The impact of a moral challenge, purging Lincoln of narrow partisanship and unsure purpose, is about to transform an honest, capable, but essentially self-centered small-town politician of self-developed but largely unsuspected talents into a statesman who will grow to world dimensions " (p. 143).

This regeneration thesis controls the rest of the conclusions in Mr. Thomas' biography. Lincoln's unceasing political maneuvers on his own behalf to win political office thereafter represent ambitions " restrained " by " devotion to a cause ". Pressed, in his debates with Douglas, about his inconsistencies concerning Negro equality, Lincoln met the challenge with his best and clearest statements of the moral

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issue of slavery. In this process of growth, Lincoln came to emphasize, also, that the solutions for the problem of slavery must be found by the people of both sections, *within the Union*. Facing the unbearable pressures of the Presidency in the crisis of Civil War, Lincoln's actions and decisions brought him to an enlarged conception of the mission of American democracy by which he revealed to Americans that " to them it had been given " (in Mr. Thomas' words) " to make democracy succeed, to cleanse it of the hypocrisies that deprive it 'of its just example in the world.' "

Many historians will refuse to forgive so easily the many inconsistencies and compromises of Lincoln. But, however that may be, Mr. Thomas has done his task honorably, he has reckoned with the many critical studies of every aspect of Lincoln's life and career, and he has exercised his right to make his choices as a historical interpreter —let the chips fall where they may.

EDWIN C. ROZWENC

AMHERST COLLEGE

The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt. Edited by ELTING E. MORISON. Vol. I: *The Years of Preparation, 1868–1898.* Vol. II: *The Years of Preparation; 1898–1900.* Vol. III: *The Square Deal, 1901–1903.* Vol. IV: *The Square Deal, 1903–1905.* Vol. V: *The Big Stick, 1905–1907.* Vol. VI: *The Big Stick, 1907–1909.* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951 and 1952.—xxix, vi, 1549 pp.; xvi, vi, 1438 pp.; xxvi, viii, 1715 pp. $20.00 each set of 2 volumes.

In his illuminating and provocative introductory essay to the fifth volume of this admirable edition of Theodore Roosevelt's letters, Mr. Morison discusses what a number of critics have termed the " diminishing " stature of the twenty-sixth President of the United States. This brief review hardly provides an opportunity to consider what may be the ultimate place in history of that exuberant, many-sided and dynamic figure who left so deep an imprint on his own times. What may be said without fear of contradiction, however, is that these volumes contain a great mass of material which cannot be ignored in any assessment of Roosevelt's importance.

To comment that entirely apart from their political significance these letters are fascinating is trite—but fascinating is, of course, exactly what they are. As every person who has ever used the Roosevelt letters well knows, it is almost impossible in going through them to concentrate on any one phase of their author's career. Try to ex-

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amine his ideas on foreign policy, for example, and one is soon beguiled from any such serious pursuit to read with rapt wonder the letters on contemporary literature, on nature fakers, on language teaching at West Point, on the uses of history, or on any number of other digressive subjects.

Here is Roosevelt taking time in his crowded life to write four full pages to John Morley about Comte's lamentable exclusion from his encyclopedia of the great men of the Byzantine Empire. A few days later he is excoriating the State Department for the "fatuous and absurd" address provided him for the reception of a new Chinese ambassador. His interest then shifts abruptly to the problem of obtaining stone bison heads (more appropriate, he felt, than lion heads) for the State Dining Room. And some time later there is a note seeking advice on the best air gun for killing English sparrows.

It is sometimes confusing in the midst of an engrossing exchange on government and politics to come across such letters, but the inclusion of trivia helps to round out the picture of Roosevelt. Certainly no one can say that he does not come very much alive in these pages. Here is the entire career from schoolboy to President, with all the stages en route, and also much on the family relationships of one who never failed in his rôle of affectionate husband and father.

If it is difficult to concentrate on any single phase of Roosevelt's life, the effort to search out the material on such a topic as his attitude toward foreign policy nevertheless is highly rewarding; for it immediately becomes clear how unsatisfactory a symbol for his views is the traditional reference to the "Big Stick". These letters repeatedly reveal a far broader understanding of international realities than this phrase suggests. Roosevelt's ideas on the world rôle the United States was destined to play were perhaps more sound, and more honestly and consistently maintained, than his views on any other phase of the national life of his day.

In his letters no more than in his public documents has Theodore Roosevelt made a great, enduring contribution to literature. There is nothing here comparable to the writings of a Jefferson, a Lincoln or a Wilson. However, Roosevelt's astounding breadth of interests, his keen intellectual curiosity, and the reflection in almost everything he wrote of a warmhearted as well as vigorous personality make his letters absorbing and happy reading.

This is not, of course, the whole Roosevelt. The six volumes here presented (two more are promised) comprise a careful selection from his overwhelming correspondence for the years from 1868 to 1909.

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The specialist can always point out (for the record) what he considers unfortunate omissions. Nevertheless these volumes contain a highly representative selection of the letters. They are ably and unobtrusively edited in conformity with the highest standards of scholarship. They are splendidly published. To Mr. Morison and his staff all students of the period, and both friends and critics of Theodore Roosevelt, owe a very real debt.

FOSTER RHEA DULLES

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Rendezvous with Destiny. By ERIC F. GOLDMAN. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1952.—xiii, 503, xxxvii pp. $5.00.

This study of American reform from its anti-Tweed days to the present is welcome. There have been too few efforts to build up our understanding of the theme, in terms of strategic or neglected individuals—" Golden Rule " Jones, Pingree, Pinchot, Whitlock, Thomas J. Walsh, La Guardia, to mention a few—or in terms of synthesis. Strategic movements in the East, South, and different parts of the West have hardly been exhausted from the historian's viewpoint. In addition, the nature of liberalism and reform has been controversially interpreted over the years, and wants more adequate assessment.

Scholars of liberalism will be first of all concerned with the present work's treatment and interpretation of reform. Mr. Goldman finds tendencies of the period after the Civil War to converge from the " best people " and from those at the bottom to give us our era of reform before World War I. His treatment is largely ideological, and is capped by an effective analysis of " reform " Darwinism as an opposition force to the better-known " social " Darwinism of Herbert Spencer and his followers. An interesting thread of inquiry is pursued throughout the book in terms of minority group relations. Details of this subject merit further analysis. Thus, if it is true that " progressivism " of the 1930's derogated Anglo-Saxonism, so did leaders of an earlier progressivism: Steffens, Phillips, Russell, Sinclair and others of their type consciously separated themselves from others, including progressives like Beveridge, when the latter advanced racist views. Mr. Goldman interests himself, rather bookishly, it must be said, in such figures as Rauschenbusch, Veblen, Dewey and Beard, and provides a most useful analysis of Herbert Croly's work. Though recognizing its totalitarian potential, he does not probe its meaning; and, indeed, the fateful period from the elections of 1912 to our

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entrance into war is treated enigmatically. The first Wilson administration is a " period of sweeping achievement ", but its transformation into a machine for war—of which Mr. Goldman is apparently less uncritical—is not elucidated.

Mr. Goldman has resolved problems of paternity and relationship in reform by labelling reform movements " by the terms that they applied to themselves," and by concentrating upon individuals and tendencies which interest him. But the problem of liberalism and its meaning at times becomes acute. Thus, the Henry Adams type of reformer is recognized as an élitist, but the significance of élitism in later decades is not probed. *Did* the " new reform " rule the White House under Theodore Roosevelt? If so, who were the reformers of T. R.'s official family? Mr. Goldman refers to the " magnificent delaying action " fought by liberals in the 1920's, and, strangely, does not mention the Sacco-Vanzetti case. Liberalism in the 1930's is discussed with what must be termed inadequate consideration of its " Left-wing " issues and connections.

The style of the book is intended to carry the reader along, and may do so. An odd emphasis has been placed on personal—and not always illuminating—interviews. Numerous passages or anecdotes are cited during which individuals are reported to have reddened, chuckled, sneered, yawned, growled, and been glum, gloomy, gay, or snappy. Samuel J. Tilden strode " to the rostrum at Cooper Union, straightened his Prince Albert with an emphatic tug, and declared. . . ." The crowd which heard Theodore Roosevelt at Ossawatomie is said to have been " gay with Sears Roebuck gingham and fresh blue denim." It is, of course, to be expected that numerous details can be controverted: whether, for instance, the American Winston Churchill was a " muckraking " writer, or the *Independent* a " muckraking " magazine, and whether muckraking was, indeed, " dying " by 1909. Mr. Goldman to the contrary, David Graham Phillips *was* concerned with the " woman question " from his literary beginnings. But, more important, it is to be hoped that more coöperative work in the field will reduce the more obvious types of error or misunderstanding eventually. Meanwhile, scholars in the field must continue to weigh additions to it which help provide the grounds for pointed analysis and evaluation.

LOUIS FILLER

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Within Our Power: Perspective for a Time of Peril. By RAYMOND B. FOSDICK. New York, London, Toronto, Longmans, Green and Co., 1952.—vii, 114 pp. $1.75.

Mr. Fosdick writes for what has been called the " Age of Anxiety ". He analyzes with shrewdness the ills that beset the present generation. He notes the obvious menace of the atom bomb. " But ", he adds, " there is a real sense in which the danger lies, not so much in the bomb itself as in our fear of the bomb, and in the paralysis of judgement and common sense which that fear engenders. Fear is a corrosive that can eat away both intelligence and conscience and sometimes the process of disintegration is ominously rapid." For the magnetic field of fear generates subversive forces that menace our civilization. " One of the most insidious and subversive forces in the world today is the constant suggestion by cynics and sensationalists that war is inevitable. . . . It rouses and stimulates a primitive suicidal fear, deep rooted in the dark emotions of all our past." The other subversive force is " moral defeatism ". " It expresses itself in our temptation to apply the label ' communist ' to all diversity from a prescribed standard of thought." This urge toward standardization, this drive toward conformity stands in strange contrast to the American tradition.

The Republic began as an experiment, and experimentalism has been a basic element in the American cast of mind. Mr. Fosdick in describing this tradition suggests the falling off in our day and the implications of that falling off for our civilization. The democracy that is central to the American tradition, says Mr. Fosdick,

> is built, not on a fixed creed or on a system of regimented concepts, but on the sure knowledge that frontiers are never stationary, that the thrust of events is steadily forward, that there are no privileged ideas around which magic circles can be drawn to protect them from competition. It is only free men who dare to think, and it is only through free thought, freely expressed, that the soul of a people can be kept alive.

If ours is an unstable age, Mr. Fosdick reminds us that all ages are unstable, for risk is inherent in life. And instability does not prevent greatness. On the contrary it may well call it forth. If the vision of one world seems to the " realist " to be a fantasy appropriate to a fairy tale, it can also be a " symbol of belief in the power of history to afford a measure of correction to its own past mistakes and bring to some future fruition the need and promise of the present." Our century has practiced violence on a scale unequaled by any previous

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age. But we can return from violence. The process begins in the mind and heart of the individual, the center of life where wars begin.

But our century along with violence has achieved triumphs of humanity as spectacular as its wars—its conquest of malaria and yellow fever and its advancing combat lines in the battle against other diseases that have been the ancient scourge of mankind. "A generation that can register an achievement like this is not a generation whose influence on the future can be waived aside." Mr. Fosdick rejects all deterministic interpretations of history. He insists that man holds his destiny in his own hands. A better world is "within our power".

This is a thoughtful, cogent and eloquent book. It has not been outdated by the partial relaxation of tension between the East and West. This reviewer hopes it will have a wide reading.

RALPH H. GABRIEL

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The American Record in the Far East, 1945-1951. By KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1952.—vii, 208 pp. $3.00.

The United States and the Far East, 1945-1951. By HAROLD M. VINACKE. Stanford, Stanford University Press; London, Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1952, under the auspices of the American Institute of Pacific Relations.—vi, 144 pp. $3.00.

Popular dissatisfaction with the Truman Administration's handling of Far Eastern problems probably contributed more to the Republican victory in the 1952 national election than any other single factor. With the change in leadership in Washington, a fresh approach to policy in this critical area is being made. In this situation it is particularly appropriate that public understanding of the record of the post-war years and of the issues presently confronting American statesmen be deepened. The American Institute of Pacific Relations has performed a useful public service in making available these two short accounts by respected scholars. These small volumes are directed to the general reader and do not claim to be extensive or definitive studies, but the expert also will find in them new insights and suggestive lines of inquiry.

Of the two books, that of Professor Latourette is generally the more satisfactory. Its greater length enables the author to draw upon his rich experience as observer and interpreter of Far Eastern history.

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In three comprehensive introductory chapters and one concluding chapter he places the post-war record in the context of American pre-war commitments and attitudes and offers penetrating generalizations concerning recent affairs. Professor Vinacke briefly contrasts American policies toward Europe and Asia, explaining the major emphasis on the former in the initial post-war years, but otherwise he does not probe the pre-war setting, nor does he attempt broad generalizations and conclusions.

Three quarters of the Latourette volume and almost all of its companion are devoted to a country-by-country summary and analysis of the American post-war record. Professor Latourette includes brief treatment of India, Pakistan, Southeast Asia, and the Philippines; Professor Vinacke includes but a sketchy account of Southeast Asia. As might be expected, the chapters dealing with China policy are the longest in each volume. Both give adequate coverage to Japan and Korea.

Although both authors emphasize the complexities of the problems facing American policy makers, they do not fail to point out errors of judgment where they find them. Professor Vinacke concludes that "policy has followed change rather than anticipating it," and he suggests that this situation was due in part to "the development and application of policy on hypotheses or assumptions the validity of which was not subjected to constant reexamination." He declares that "The Chinese Communist Party was too long viewed as essentially a party of agrarian reform which would participate in national politics within a democratic framework." Professor Latourette is somewhat less critical. With respect to China policy, for example, he suggests that "when once the defeat of Japan had been made sure . . . [no] program adopted by the United States short of a complete and costly occupation of China . . . [could] have prevented the Communists from taking the country." Although certain United States policies may have handicapped the Nationalist government, its collapse appears to have resulted from its own basic weaknesses and the elements of strength possessed by the Communists. Both Latourette and Vinacke agree that the cease-fire arranged by General Marshall may have worked out in favor of the Communists, but they point out that this device was designed to be a part of a broader political settlement which was considered essential for Nationalist survival. Professor Vinacke concludes that "although it was American policy to support the Nationalist Government, the methods of expression of policy actually served to weaken it."

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The record in Japan receives qualified praise, although, in the words of Professor Latourette, "whether the final verdict would be success or failure, no one could know for many years." Both authors emphasize the alterations of basic United States policy toward Japan resulting from the deterioriation of East-West relations and Communist success in China. Professor Latourette concludes that "it was distinctly conceivable that the Japanese had permanently joined the ranks of those peoples who were democratic as the United States and the British Commonwealth understood that term."

In their treatment of the Korean conflict both authors devote considerable attention to the "great debate" that followed the recall of General MacArthur, presenting the alternative approaches to the problem of bringing the war to a conclusion. Although rejecting the MacArthur formula for victory, Professor Latourette agrees with the General's proposition that the problem in the Far East "basically is theological." The outcome in the Far East, as in the rest of the world, he suggests, will be determined primarily "not by armies, navies, or air power, but by what men really believed concerning the universe, the nature of man, and the relation of men to one another and to the universe." American ideas of democracy cannot be completely reproduced in the Far East, and can be realized only slowly. Communism, in one form or another, probably will be in Asia for many years, but eventually it will be "denatured and diluted". Americans must be "patient and not expect perfection of their representatives or a quick release from their perplexities and burdens. They would need to be prepared to adjust their policies to changing circumstances."

These two books can contribute in considerable measure to an appreciation of the complex and varied nature of problems in the Far East and of the interrelatedness of policy decisions. It is to be hoped that they will be widely read.

JOHN W. MASLAND

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The Third Force in China. By CARSUN CHANG. New York, Bookman Associates, 1952.—345 pp. $4.50.

Carsun Chang, founder and chairman of the Chinese Democratic-Socialist party, is the first Chinese statesman with neither Kuomintang nor Communist affiliations to provide an authoritative account of the negotiations surrounding the ill-fated mission of General Mar-

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shall. Mr. Chang played an intimate rôle as intermediary between the Kuomintang and Communist representatives in 1945-46 and also drew up the original draft for the constitution which now provides the legal framework for the Nationalist government of Formosa. It is therefore lamentable that his forthright and revealing study of Chinese politics should be badly organized, poorly proof-read, and burdened with tendentious argumentation.

Despite its title, this book throws little direct light on any " third force " in China, though perhaps the very absence of such information suggests the impotence of this group. Mr. Chang never estimates the actual following of the Democratic League and its affiliates although he confidently predicts that China's future lies in the hands of those opposed to both Kuomintang and Communist totalitarianism. His frequent recourse to the term " if only . . ." in speculating on the " why " of China's recent past indicates the wishful, almost nostalgic tone in which the story of the search for moderation in China unfolds. The detailed account of totalitarian trends in the two main rivals for power and of the dominance of armed force in China's politics since 1911 contradicts Mr. Chang's final chapters which argue the theoretical proposition that China's basic *Weltanschauung* is democratic, not authoritarian.

Far more valuable than the " third force " treatment is Mr. Chang's examination of the Kuomintang and Communist movements. Neither Peking nor Taipeh will welcome his remarks for he apportions praise and criticism on both sides. Perhaps his bitterest criticisms are of Chiang Kai-shek for defeating what Mr. Chang believes to have been China's greatest opportunity to build a unified, democratic republic. His many contacts with the Kuomintang élite make this section especially fruitful, inasmuch as most previous appraisals have come from Western observers. No less stimulating, however, is the author's account of Soviet-Chinese Communist collaboration in the Manchurian imbroglio of 1945-46. His brother, Chang Kia-ngau [*sic*], served as Chairman of the Economic Mission of Nationalist China for the immediate post-war restoration of Manchuria. Mr. Chang describes in detail Soviet obstructionism, maneuvering and duplicity. The complexity of Soviet post-war diplomacy paralleled that of 1924 when Leo Karakhan simultaneously negotiated a treaty for Russian privileges in Manchuria with the *de jure* government in Peking, negotiated a second treaty in violation of the first with the *de facto* government in Mukden, sent assistance to the revolutionary government in Canton, and supported a Chinese Communist movement whose ulti-

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mate aim was seizure of the Canton régime. Similarly in 1945-46, the Russians in Manchuria maneuvered among Nationalist forces, Chinese Communist forces, and Russian-trained Chinese to assure future Soviet influence in this strategic territory.

A central portion of Mr. Chang's study offers much previously unpublished information concerning the Marshall mission and negotiations between Kuomintang and Communist representatives in the vain effort to compromise on a new constitution. No brief summary can do justice to the author's balanced and judicious evaluation of Marshall, Chiang Kai-shek and Chou En-lai. American readers, accustomed to the simplistic charges and denials of partisan politics, will find much to ponder in Mr. Chang's critical appraisal of why the Chinese puzzle proved insoluble to American efforts, well-meaning as those efforts may have been.

Students of Chinese government and politics will find a detailed examination of the Kuomintang and Communist governmental organizations coupled with penetrating observations on the nondemocratic implications of Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles. Mr. Chang's criticisms of Dr. Sun as well as his rejection of both Peking and Taipeh spring from a fervent faith in Jeffersonian democracy and Western liberties. The courageous independence of his faith is highlighted by his infrequent references to the majority of his colleagues who presently hold posts in the Communist government.

Although this book is invaluable for the Sinologue, it poses many problems for the nonspecialist. With no bibliography, no chronology, few footnotes, and with frequent errors in dates and transliteration, the study tends to confuse rather than clarify recent events. Mr. Chang attempts to argue United States policy in China by drawing a highly tenuous parallel with post-war Greece. His thirty-page introduction and foreword seem contradicted by the factual body of his study. Where he presents first-hand material based on his participation in the Kuomintang-Communist struggle for power, however, Mr. Chang provides a wealth of evidence to be carefully considered by future historians of post-war China.

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BOOK NOTES

Mr. H. G. Richardson and Professor G. O. Sayles, generally recognized as the foremost living authorities on early English parliamentary history, have made several contributions to the history of the medieval Irish parliament, the first of which was published twenty-five years ago. They have now, in *The Irish Parliament in the Middle Ages* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press; London, Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1952; x, 395 pp. $8.50), made what they correctly call the first attempt to give a comprehensive account of this subject. The result is, as was to be expected, a work of impressive scholarship, based upon long and painstaking study of source materials, published and unpublished, and showing thorough familiarity with the relevant secondary literature. Without question it takes its place in the worshipful company of standard historical treatises. If the authors' point of view is to be summed up in a sentence, perhaps it cannot be done better than by saying that they have (as in their writings on medieval English parliamentary history, and like other twentieth-century scholars who have made significant contributions in the same field) looked at medieval parliaments as medieval phenomena rather than as precursors of a modern institution. It has been said that Stubbs's account of the beginnings of the English parliament resembles the opening chapters of *Genesis* in two respects—in that it describes an act of creation, and that it is no longer generally believed. The essence of Stubbs's teaching on this subject, which plays a leading part in his *Constitutional History of England,* cannot fairly be summed up in a single sentence, humorous or otherwise, but he did attribute conscious design to those whom he regarded as the creators of parliament, the design being to establish an institution representative of the nation. Stubbs went to his sources with a nineteenth-century preconception of parliamentary democracy and English nationality, of which he was probably unconscious, but it affected his point of view, and against such a point of view Richardson and Sayles write in explicit reaction. The period of medieval Irish parliaments lasted for approximately two centuries and a quarter, beginning with the earliest known parliament, held at Castledermot in 1264, and ending with the parliament at Drogheda in 1494, which passed the famous Poynings' Law, a convenient terminal point for the

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history of Ireland's medieval parliaments. Separate chapters are devoted to the components of the Irish parliament (the council in its various forms and the peerage), taxation, bills and statutes, and the relation of Ireland to the English crown. Appendices contain a variety of illustrative source materials and a comprehensive list of medieval parliaments and councils. The claim was made in 1460 that acts of the English parliament were in force in Ireland only if they were approved in Irish parliaments or great councils, a claim that was to be reasserted with great political effect by Irish patriots in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In view of the differences of opinion on this constitutional question that have been expressed in recent years it is worth noting that Richardson and Sayles think that there was no historical foundation for such a claim. R. L. SCHUYLER, Columbia University.

The promise of a "social history" influenced by such writers as Mannheim and Fromm leads the reader of Priscilla Robertson's *Revolutions of 1848: A Social History* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1952; xi, 464 pp. $6.00) to expect a more novel interpretation than that which is presented. Mrs. Robertson has not availed herself of some of the socio-psychological tools which are at the disposal of the contemporary social scientist. Though beautifully written and generously garnished with numerous anecdotes, her account of events casts no new light upon the failure of the revolutions in continental Europe. Mrs. Robertson proclaims at the outset that the conflict of social groups is to form the core of her interpretation; "no leader was really important . . . except as he typified . . . the ideas current in some class or group" (p. vii). But the leading characters in the revolutions refuse to obey this injunction and after a brief struggle overwhelm Mrs. Robertson and dominate the better part of her book. The result is neither a "social history" nor a number of "biographical frames" such as Arnold Whitridge gave us a few years ago, but a rather entertaining description of a series of tragi-comedies. Groups, variously referred to as "mobs", "people", "races", "workers", "peasants", remain indistinct and are nowhere clearly defined, a serious shortcoming if the author's thesis is to be sustained. It is the author's contention that all of the revolutions followed a basic pattern —the anatomy of revolutions—and by concentrating on the revolutions in France, Prussia, Vienna, Hungary and parts of Italy, she seems to sustain her argument that the "conflict of nationalities" was only "a screen to hide the conflict of classes" (p. 412). Unlike

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Charles Edmund Maurice and Rudolf Schlesinger, who considered the struggle of nationalities paramount in the Central European revolutions, she almost entirely ignores the rôle of the Slavs, particularly the Czechs—she omits the Prague uprising—and, therefore, tells only part of the story. Less preoccupation with " the same pattern " and a more careful consideration of the conflict of nationalities might have yielded a somewhat different explanation for the failure of the revolutions. Her topical approach to her selected case histories compels the reader to flit about in space and time and tends to obscure the all-important interconnection between the various uprisings and the contradictions between the objectives of the different national revolutions. Mrs. Robertson is not particularly generous with objective data which might make the events more meaningful, and such as she presents are often meaningless. While it is one of the great virtues of the book that it is free of ubiquitous footnotes, even that becomes occasionally irritating to a reader curious to know the source of some of the numerous quotations which the author has skilfully woven into her narrative. Anyone familiar with the revolutions will find little that is new in this account, yet it presumes a good deal more familiarity with nineteenth-century history than the average lay reader will possess. The seven pages on " The Workings of British Justice " might have been entirely omitted. They certainly seem out of place in a " Conclusion ".—LEWIS J. EDINGER, Woman's College of the University of North Carolina.

The subtitle of Waldemar Gurian's *Bolshevism: An Introduction to Soviet Communism* (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1952; xii, 189 pp. $3.25) should be taken more literally than this well-known disclaimer often intends. Since the distinguished editor of the *Review of Politics* disavows, in his preface, an intention of competing with " specialized investigations and monographs ", comparison with most of the recent studies in the field would be beside the point. The book is essentially a primer, and therefore a necessarily broad interpretive overview of the origins and development of Bolshevik theory and practice. Regarded as such, it will undoubtedly serve a useful purpose for those who want a brief, panoramic introduction to the subject. Its usefulness to the sophisticated student of Soviet politics is less clear. From such a little book, intended to survey the system as a whole, one cannot expect much in the way of new data; but one would like to be able to say, in the light of the author's expressed hope that " it may occasionally contribute to a comprehension of the forest

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to which certain trees belong," that it contributes fresh insights to illuminate some of the data we already have. But, although Dr. Gurian's interpretations are generally sound, they are far from innovative. Thus the thesis of his opening chapter, that Marxist-Leninist ideology functions for its communicants as a "secular religion" opposing a "naturalistic-immanentist" process and a this-worldly Hereafter to the theisms that would otherwise enlist loyalties, is thoroughly in accord with prevailing ideas but adds little to them. Similarly, few are likely to take serious exception to Dr. Gurian's view of the realities of the Soviet power system and the goals and methods of Soviet foreign policy, although it may be felt that the analysis would have benefited from greater attention to the causal rôle of social, economic and strategic factors. (So far as ideology is a determinant of practice, this reader is impressed anew by the vitality still displayed in this realm of exegesis by Bertrand Russell's prophetic little book of thirty years ago, his *Practice and Theory of Bolshevism*.) A fifty-page appendix of excerpts from Marxist-Leninist literature, documenting the various sections of Dr. Gurian's text, rounds off the volume.—NORMAN ROSENBERG, College of the City of New York.

Eugene P. Dvorin became interested in Africa and its racial and political problems when he was located in South and West Africa as an officer of the United States Maritime Service during World War II. After the war, he began extensive research for the book, *Racial Separation in South Africa* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1952; xii, 256 pp. $4.50). He completed his work while in residence study at the Universities of California and Chicago. The main undertaking of his book is an analysis of the *Apartheid* theory. Briefly, the theory is, in the words of Dr. H. F. Verwoerd, Nationalist Minister of Native Affairs: "The lion and the elephant can live, but they live better apart." The uniqueness of the *Apartheid* theory is that it seeks to give national status to classism. Whereas segregation has always existed in South Africa, the Nationalist party, which came into power in 1948, bases its whole right to existence upon the theory that the populations of South Africa must always remain apart. It seeks to establish as the philosophy of the nation, politically, socially and religiously, that the four racial or color distinctions—the white population, the native population, the colored or mixed population, and the Indian or alien population—must forever live apart. It is to be, in essence, "parallel development for each group within its own sphere, but always the white group must be at the top." *Apartheid* says in

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effect, " It will be the understanding that the black man shall merely assist and not compete with the white man " (p. 2). There are, in South Africa, over thirteen million persons. Two and three-quarter million are European in origin; 60 per cent of these are Dutch and 40 per cent are British in background. One million are colored or are mixtures of white and black. Three hundred thousand are Indian or other Asiatics. Nine million are natives, mostly Bantu. Even the white population is not a unified population. The Afrikander, or people of Dutch background, existed for some centuries on the productivity of slavery. They have believed slavery is essentially moral and ethical. Their church, the Dutch Reformed Church, cites scriptures from both the Old and the New Testament, to prove that Afrikanders are God's chosen people and that the native black people are destined forever to be their servants, or second- or third-class helpers. To the Nationalist or Afrikander party, therefore, the theory of *Apartheid* is both logical and moral. There are other groups in South Africa, both black and white, which do not agree with this. The emerging labor movement and religious groups other than the Dutch Reformed Church oppose the idea. To such, Mr. Dvorin says the *Apartheid* theory " is the most significant and disheartening movement in contemporary South African politics " (p. 202). Mr. Dvorin does not write a hotly partisan book; rather, he lets the facts reveal that South Africa is in a crisis from which the *Apartheid* theory can effect no rescue. Every student of South Africa will want to examine this carefully prepared book.—D. W. BITTINGER, McPherson College.

The name of " E. S." or " Solly " Sachs is well known in South Africa, and is beginning to be known around the world. He is South Africa's most prominent present-day labor leader; he is beginning to inject a labor party into South African politics with considerable political force. In 1951 he was chosen by ballot to represent the South African Trades and Labor Council, which includes all the groups of South Africa—European, African, Indian, and colored—at the labor conference in Geneva. The minister of labor refused to appoint him even though he was elected; but he made the trip to Geneva on his own to argue his case, and thus achieved some international prominence. Mr. Sachs's book, *The Choice Before South Africa* (New York, Philosophical Library, Inc., 1952; ix, 220 pp. $5.75), delves into politics freely, but it is not to be characterized as a partisan book. The author has written it for the people of the Union of South Africa. He says, " My book is dedicated to the people of South Africa. I have

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tried to get away from warped thinking and emotional prejudices. I write because I wish to see South Africa a great nation." Mr. Sachs believes that South Africa can take a significant place in the world family of nations if its people will overcome internal dissensions and work together. South Africa should become one body of people instead of four conflicting groups—the European; the native; the colored, which is a crossing of the first two; and the Indian, or so-called alien people. Mr. Sachs says, "A truly democratic way of life can only be achieved by concentrating our national effort on work instead of race hatred" (p. 209). It is his belief that the period of English domination is over: "The English-speaking people in South Africa should surely realize that they are no longer 'sahibs' and 'colonizers,' but ordinary citizens of a new country with all the duties and privileges of citizens. They are not 'Empire Builders' but miners, artists, industrialists, and professional people, whose destiny is inseparable from that of the rest of the people of South Africa" (pp. 211-12). His general conclusion is that South Africa is in a tremendous crisis and that coöperation is the only thing which can save it. The book is well written. Its arguments are concise and clear, its research is extensive, and it points a direction which South Africa needs carefully to consider.—D. W. BITTINGER, McPherson College.

Basil Davidson, the author of *Report on Southern Africa* (London, Jonathan Cape; New York, British Book Centre, 1952; 285 pp. 16s.; $3.50), is a newspaperman. He made his study among the people of whom he was to write; he wrote in the first person of things he had heard and seen. This does not mean that the book is hurried or impressionistic. Rather, Mr. Davidson undertook to make a thorough study of South Africa, and of some of the provinces which lie close to it. The general thesis of his book is that the day of white domination of slavery or unreasonable servitude on the part of the native population and of the colored or mixed population has ended. It is his claim, however, that the psychology and the superstructure of slavery still continue. This keeps the white population of South Africa from facing the reality of the condition as it exists today. He says, "People who live within the emotional super-structure of what is idealogically a slave society seem capable of looking at everything except reality." In addition to South Africa proper, Mr. Davidson visited also Basutoland, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and made some contacts with still other parts of Africa. He feels that the problems in all these areas are related. In each case there has developed a new form of white imperialism. In South Africa it is *Apartheid* or racial segregation.

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Each racial group, theoretically, will be allowed to advance according to its own abilities, but, in actuality, the colored and the native populations shall distinctly serve the white. In other parts of Africa, the African and European relationship is called " partnership ". In actuality, it means that the native population shall be second class in the partnership. In general, throughout Africa the Africans shall not occupy positions which will give them social advantage or economic advantage, but shall be the " hewers of wood and drawers of water." Mr. Davidson does not believe the prospect is hopeless. He finds some new forces at work for good, particularly in Northern Rhodesia. He believes that growing industrialism will make racial segregation impossible, and that eventually a multiracial society will develop. He undertakes to point the way for those who are willing and courageous enough to follow. He says: " The British people in all this have a responsibility they cannot escape. If they are to conclude their imperialist epoch with honor to themselves, and without disaster to Africa, they will take thought to see that these changes are made, freely and fully, in territories where they still retain control " (p. 274).—D. W. BITTINGER, McPherson College.

Midcentury Journey: The Western World Through Its Years of Conflict (New York, Farrar, Straus and Young, 1952; 313 pp. $3.50) by the well-known foreign correspondent, William L. Shirer, is a report on a " journey in Space " (the capital cities of Western Europe) " and Time " (a brief excursion into some recent events). Mr. Shirer took the trip soon after the Korean outbreak to learn whether it would be followed by World War III. " It would not be necessary to go to the heads of state and government to ascertain that. One had only to pause for a bit in Berlin or Vienna to see whether the Russian Red Army marched westward " (p. 3). This mission was speedily accomplished: " It took only a few days in Vienna to learn from Allied intelligence that the Russian Army was not going to march despite the golden opportunity offered by America's being tied down in Korea and by the fact that Western Europe lay utterly defenseless " (p. 28). Having disposed of the immediate question of peace or war and with no likelihood of a *Vienna Diary* in the making, Mr. Shirer continued his travels, and gives us the benefit of his reading and thinking (including a chapter, " Thoughts in a Plane over the Ocean "). The result is a personal recapitulation and balance sheet of some of the tendencies and forces of our time, ending with a heartfelt peroration on the " advantages in being alive " (p. 305). The author has cast his account in the form of a nostalgic monologue in

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which thoughts that keep welling up are hastily set down, unfortunately not always with the "perspective" that Mr. Shirer tells us he hoped would develop from his journey. For the professional reader the material presented offers nothing new in the way of information or insights; at the same time, the historical flash backs are likely, in their allusiveness and discursiveness, to confuse rather than to enlighten the "general reader" or "average citizen" anxiously seeking understanding "of how and why we had arrived at our present situation" (p. 304). It is difficult to see how this work will help to impart that "sense of history" which the author stresses as being so necessary. Lacking the freshness of the first-hand, on-the-spot reporting of his *Berlin Diary,* the present work suffers from the author's admitted inability "to fathom the reason or logic" of events (p. 304). Yet, if Mr. Shirer cannot convey the meaning and significance of our past, he reflects, in his vision of progress, the influence of the American dream. This may account for his transcendent faith and his concluding affirmation, which are not entirely borne out by his own audit.—Samuel J. Hurwitz, Brooklyn College.

In *The Law and Working of the Constitution: Documents, 1660-1914*—Volume I, *1660–1783;* Volume II, *1784–1914*—(London, Adam and Charles Black, 1952; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1952; xviii, 465; xix, 531 pp. $9.50 the set) W. C. Costin and J. Steven Watson, two history tutors of Oxford University, have assembled essential documents for illuminating the development and operation of the constitution of the United Kingdom in the years from 1660 through 1914. Since their compilation covers a somewhat limited period of time, it has the twofold merit of being more comprehensive than any predecessor in this area and of concentrating numerous sources often inaccessible to the student of constitutional history. Examples of judicious selection appear in the materials revealing the complex relations among king, ministers, and parliament under the eighteenth-century constitution and in the cases dealing with the growth of administrative legislation and law. For the informed, the compilers have carved in bold relief from a varied literature a panorama of the constitution at work. Their task was complicated by the decision to broaden the basis of selection from the more orthodox use of statutes, parliamentary proceedings, and judicial cases to include under the heading of miscellanea such memorabilia as correspondence, extracts from novels by Disraeli and Trollope, and commission reports. Despite a general excellence, these volumes seem less useful for the beginning student when the editorial plan is examined. Mr. Costin and Mr. Wat-

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son have used all available space for the inclusion of original materials, relying upon their presentation " to make it possible for them to speak for themselves " (Introduction, p. vii). Accordingly, they have eliminated the commentary deemed useful by such earlier compilers as Grant Robertson and D. O. Dykes. And they have limited bibliographical suggestions to recommending that the student who needs guidance beyond what extensive cross-references, supplementary notes, a glossary, and a detailed index supply should turn to such a full-scale modern work as Sir David Keir's *Constitutional History of Modern Britain,* or, for specialized topics, to Sir William Holdsworth's authoritative *History of English Law.* Perhaps the difficulty inherent in the assumption that documents speak for themselves can be conveyed by reference to the realm of constitutional theory. Surely it is insufficient to rely mainly on the comments of Halifax in his *Character of a Trimmer* (vol. I, pp. 340-42) and of the younger Pitt, speaking in Parliament in 1784 (vol. II, p. 154), to establish that the theory of mixed government was so predominant in the years from 1660 through 1832—a major part of the period here under study—that its tenets provided the intellectual framework within which Englishmen with signal unanimity sought and found the solutions for their constitutional problems.—CORINNE COMSTOCK WESTON, University of Houston.

As political scientists are well aware, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and Harold Laski differed sharply in their social views and their approach to politics. Even the disparity in their ages—Laski was twenty-three, Holmes was seventy-five when they met—might have seemed an insurmountable barrier between them. Yet, as their correspondence testifies, they had something in common: a vigorous love for the play of the intellect whether displayed in books or in affairs of state. Their close friendship, inaugurated shortly after their first encounter in 1916 and ended only by Holmes's death, was based on their desire to share their experiences with someone who would fully appreciate them, and reinforced by their mutual respect. The *Holmes-Laski Letters,* brilliantly and unobtrusively edited by Mark DeWolfe Howe (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953; 2 vols., xvi, 1650 pp. $12.50), abundantly illustrates the depth of their friendship and the range of their interests. They discuss books, from Plato to Dewey. They recommend authors to each other: ". . . a novel by E. M. Forster, *A Passage to India,*" writes Laski, " which is the biggest novel this country has produced in fifteen years. Pray read it. . . ." And Holmes replies: " I shall try to get *A Passage to*

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India. Fred Pollock mentioned it also, the other day" (pp. 627, 631). Holmes reports on his Supreme Court work. "The Federal judges seem to me (again between ourselves) to have got hysterical about the war." (Thus Holmes on the *Schenck* and *Debs* cases.) "I should think the President when he gets through with his present amusements might do some pardoning" (p. 190). Both men are omnivorous readers and sparkling letter writers. Laski is the more highly charged of the two men. He is nervous, garrulous, scintillating, and unfailingly generous to the older man. Holmes, on the other hand, is sober, penetrating and reliable. Historians must beware of taking Laski's anecdotes literally. As Justice Frankfurter admits in a brief foreword to the volume, "Laski's stories often gained in the telling." There was a streak of irresponsible radicalism in Laski that became more evident in the late twenties and thirties, when he abandoned the liberalism of *Political Thought in England from Locke to Bentham* for the dogmatic collectivism of *Democracy in Crisis*, and which Holmes, with his common-sense conservatism, rather distrusted: ". . . as you know," Holmes wrote, "some of your yearnings I don't sympathize with and almost believe noxious—but the crowd is with you rather than with me and I dare say that you will smash a good deal that I should like to keep" (p. 1144). Nevertheless, the two men complemented each other admirably and there was never any diminution in their regard for each other. One rather pleasant problem that the reader of these letters must face is that there are too many of them. The correspondence lasted for nearly twenty years, and the two men wrote to each other almost weekly, often at great length. Not all the letters are particularly important, but the best of them are consistently exciting. The most rewarding method of tackling these volumes would seem to be to dip into them freely, possibly with the aid of the excellent index. Then the intellectual fascination which these men felt for the life of the mind and for each other will be fully conveyed.—PETER GAY, Columbia University.

Fulgencio Batista, who reëstablished his power in Cuba last year by a coup, first achieved that power under conditions which are documented in the Department of State publication: *The American Republics, 1933* and *1934*, Vols. V of *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1933* and *1934* (Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952; lxxxiv, 887 pp., $3.25, and lxii, 674 pp., $2.75). The turbulence which followed the despotic Machado régime sorely tested the newborn good-neighbor policy. Ambassador Sumner Welles, who arrived in Havana in May 1933, three months

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before Machado's exile and a year before the abrogation of the Platt Amendment, was forced to walk a precarious tightrope. He had strict orders to avoid intervention except under the most urgent compulsion. And yet the United States could scarcely escape an involvement tantamount, in the eyes of many interested parties, to intervention. Simple diplomatic recognition of a new régime would be thus interpreted. So too would American mediation which, in the atmosphere of anarchic factionalism after Machado's fall, became indispensable to any new administration. During Céspedes' brief term Welles apprehensively wrote that he was "now daily being requested for decisions on all matters affecting the Government of Cuba" (*1933*, p. 368). In so volatile a situation it was inevitable that Welles should be accused, as he was by Cuba's Ambassador in Washington, of "using the economic distress in Cuba, which can only be cured by a new commercial treaty, to bring pressure to bear" (*1933*, p. 331); and that he be assailed for "attempting to coerce rather than persuade" by means of a paternalistic "Welles' plan" (*1933*, p. 354). In general, however, Welles's shrewd, perceptive reports indicate earnest commitment to a mediative rôle—and also provide an object lesson in the patterns and exercise of political power in Latin America. When at length Batista came to Welles for advice, the latter recorded: "I told him that in my judgment he himself was the only individual in Cuba today who represented authority" (*1933*, p. 470). The same might be said in 1953, two decades later. Welles naturally recognized foreign commercial and financial interests as an element of Batista's support. Their influence is in fact implicit throughout the documents, though one would have to look elsewhere in order fully to elaborate it. This dilemma, posed for the would-be good neighbor by economic interests, previous policy and current aspirations, recurred throughout Latin America. Though the Cuban papers are the most extensive ones in these volumes, documents pertaining to fifteen other nations are also given. Through them may be traced negotiations over such matters as trade agreements, external debts and internal finances, exchange restrictions, Panama Canal annuities, diplomatic recognition, American missionaries (Ecuador), and withdrawal of American marines (Haiti). Finally, rivaling the drama of the Cuban scene are dispatches relative to the assassination of Nicaragua's world-famous anti-"imperialist" *guerrillero*, Sandino—an act instigated by Anastasio Somoza, another of the Caribbean strong men who, like Batista, nestle under the good neighbor's wing.—RICHARD M. MORSE, Columbia University.

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The twenty-sixth annual number of the *Political Handbook of the World: Parliaments, Parties and Press as of January 1, 1953* (New York, Harper and Brothers, for the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1953; 233 pp. $3.75), unlike its predecessors, has had two editors, namely, Walter H. Mallory and Joseph Barber. In usefulness, conciseness, accuracy, and attractiveness of format, it is a worthy addition to the series. The major part of the volume gives, for each of 65 nations, the country's official name, capital, area, population, detailed composition of the government, programs of the political parties, names of party leaders, editors and political affiliations of the leading newspapers and journals, and an outline of chief political happenings in the last five or ten years. There are special features in indvidual cases: thus, the sections on Germany and China give the facts for both sets of governments and the section on Japan has an excellent précis of the new constitution. (One might wish that the governmental setup of Pakistan were described somewhat more clearly.) For twenty additional small countries, the *Handbook* gives name, capital, area, population, form of government, and ruler. Here, since even Monaco with its area of little more than one-half square mile is listed, there might also be included such regions as Andorra and San Marino. Finally, there are nine crowded pages of useful information on the United Nations and the International Court of Justice. Once again, let it be emphasized that a copy of the *Handbook* should be within easy reach of every intelligent citizen in any walk of life.—WALTER CONSUELO LANGSAM, Gettysburg College.

As a companion volume to Mr. Schwartz's *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao,* published last year, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* by Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952; 552 pp. $7.50) is a compilation of the most important basic pronouncements and decisions in the course of the Chinese Communist movement. The documents have been judiciously chosen and are accompanied by concise critical commentaries. There are also a thoughtful, balanced general introduction and a useful chronology of the Communist movement. This is an excellent source book for students of contemporary China.—NATHANIEL PEFFER, Columbia University.

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